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EDITOR: LESLIE F. CHURCH, B.A., Ph.D.

JANUARY, 1943

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CONTENTS

ARTICLES

The Bible and Its Challengers
Freedom and Fear
Wise as Serpents, Harmless as
Doves
What Think Ye of the Christ?
Whose Son is He?
Aeschylus and the Messianic Idea
Cardinal Virtues
Prayer and World Revolution
Joseph Rayner Stephens — A
Reassessment
All the World's a Stage

C. Ryder Smith, B.A., D.D.
William F. Lofthouse, M.A., D.D.

Wilfrid L. Hannam, B.D.

A. E. Garvie, M.A., D.D., D.Th.
J. Minto Robertson, M.A.
R. M. Goodfield
J. Henry Bodgener, M.A.

F. H. Amphlett Micklewright, M.A.
W. H. Stubbs

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS

A Revolution of Reconstruction
Revenge and Retribution
Bishop Barrington's Educational
Experiment
That Strange Thing which we
Call Beauty

F. Harold Buzz
J. Duncan Percy, B.A.

Francis R. Brunskill

Charles C. Gimblett, M.A.

EDITORIAL COMMENTS

Continentalism — Liberty in
Britain and America —
Bernard Lord Manning

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The London Quarterly and Holborn Review

JANUARY, 1943

THE BIBLE AND ITS CHALLENGERS

ON January 10, 1884, when the writer was eleven years old, his father gave him a Bible, which he still has. On the fly-leaf his father wrote a text from the Book of Proverbs: 'In all thy ways acknowledge Him, and He shall direct thy paths'. This meant, of course, that the Bible is a sure guide to the Christian way of life. In the intervening years much has happened to the Bible. Can we still make the same claim? There have been four major controversies about it in the last half-century or so, and the question may be answered by a brief survey of these controversies and their results.

The first controversy arose from the challenge of *science*. This focused on the story of the Creation with which the Bible opens. It was already raging in 1884, but it is now dead or at least moribund. Yet it is worth while to note how it ended. The writer was talking about it long ago to a Young Men's Class, and was saying that the Bible is authoritative in religion but not in science, when a young fellow asked: 'But I thought that the Bible is authoritative in *everything*; isn't it?' It was easy to reply, 'In electricity, for instance?' — but the young fellow expressed the belief of very many Christians of those days. They held that, where the Bible says anything on any subject, there it is authoritative, and indeed inerrant. There were a number of attempts to harmonize 'Moses' and geology, but these are now usually abandoned. It is admitted that, so far as there is anything that may be called 'science' in the Bible, it is the 'science' of the period when this book or that was written, and is now out of date. Few Christians now believe that the universe was made in a week. But this does not mean that the story of the creation is of no use. It teaches at least three religious truths that are fundamental in Christianity. The first is that, in whatever way the universe came to be, *God made it*. This assertion, whatever science may say about the *way* of creation, is beyond its sphere, as many men of science themselves admit to-day. The second truth is that the universe that God made is '*good*'. Though the fact is often unnoticed, this is the postulate of science itself. Hinduism has troubled little with the 'things that are seen', for it teaches that the universe is illusion and ultimately unprofitable. In the 'Western science', that is for ever prying further into the secrets of nature, the presupposition is that they are worth discovery, in other words that they are 'good'. Here of old time the Hebrew and the Greek agreed, though they put the truth in different ways. The third fundamental truth taught in the first chapter of Genesis is that there are ways in which *man is like God* — 'in the image of God made He them'. Without this truth there would be no Christian religion, for it teaches that the basis of the true way of life is fellowship with God, and there can be no fellowship

between beings that are altogether unlike each other. To leave the Creation story and take a New Testament instance, when Paul wrote that God had 'made [Christ] to sit at His right hand in the heavenlies', he was referring, under the last word, to the science current in his day. This taught that between earth and the 'highest heaven' there were a number of intermediate spheres wherein certain 'powers' (largely malevolent) held some degree of sway over men, and he was claiming that Christ is all the while their master. We don't accept this cosmogony, but we are quite well acquainted with evil powers of very many sorts, and we say that even now Christ is master of them all. In other words, under the challenge of science, the Christian claim about the Bible has been restated. It is no longer claimed either that it is authoritative in *every* realm, but it is still claimed that it is authoritative in *religion*. Science, on the other hand, admits that this is not its realm. Of course, it is true that the two realms are not ultimately separable, for both must be included in the final account of the universe which we call philosophy. But, as matter of fact, the particular controversy with science that raged half a century ago rages no more. In its issue both Christianity and science have gained more than they have lost. Each has learnt its own limits, but each has won its proper liberties. In particular, while the Bible has been set free from the embarrassment of a false claim, we are still able to say, 'Here is *the* guide to the Christian way of life'. The outcome of this controversy may encourage us as we look at the others. Perhaps it is best to say that it is over 'for all intents and purposes', for in America there seems still to be a sect that believes that the earth is flat, for the newspapers announce that its leader, Wilbur Voliva, died on October 12, 1942, at Chicago. *Requiescat!*

The second challenge came from *history*. The last word is here used in the widest sense, to include what is sometimes called 'pre-history', and archaeology, and anthropology, and mythology, and biography. Perhaps there have been two chief battle-grounds here. The first was in the field of chronology. Archbishop Ussher, in the seventeenth century, was not far out when he reckoned that if all the figures in the Bible are carefully added together (including the years assigned to such people as Methuselah), they require that the first man was created about 4004 B.C. It was, however, another matter when a second 'authority' of this sort went on to claim that he could fix the year and the month and the day and the hour when God began to create! The fact that the Septuagint translation of the Old Testament and the Samaritan version of the Pentateuch have different figures gave pause to some students, but few would now claim that it matters at all, for instance, whether Adam was a hundred and thirty years old when Seth was born, as the Hebrew Bible says, or two hundred and thirty, as the Septuagint claims. Such differences, however, are slight beside the anthropologists' assertion that beings that may be called 'men' have frequented the earth for a million years or so. It is impossible to harmonize the chronology of the Bible with such a claim. Most Christians are prepared to admit that the Bible chronology has no better foundation than the chronologies of other ancient peoples, and that it is mistaken in its earliest parts. But this does not mean that it is unreliable everywhere. Again, like the chronologies of other ancient peoples; it becomes more reliable as it proceeds. From the time of Saul and David onwards, at latest — that is to say, for about

a millennium before Christ — it tallies, except in inconsiderable details, with the findings of archaeologists and secular historians. No one doubts, for instance, the substantial correctness of Roman chronology for some centuries before even though it is impossible to fix the date of the Founding of the City with any certainty, let alone the date of the arrival of Aeneas (if he ever did arrive). Christianity does not depend upon the chronology of Methuselah and his brethren.

The other chief battle-ground under the challenge of history falls under the question, 'Is there any mythology in the Bible?' The answer reached is 'Yes, and it is very valuable'. During the last half century there has been a revolution in the estimate of mythology. Once upon a time men took it for granted that if anything were found to be a myth (or a legend) it could thereupon be dismissed as useless, but to-day the mythology of all nations is being studied as never before, because it is now taken for granted that if any one wishes to understand the early *thought* of a people (as distinct from *facts* about it) he must study its myths. Indeed, it is paradoxically true that the less of fact there is in a myth or legend, the more valuable is its witness to an early people's *ideas*. The stories of William Tell, for instance, which belong to as late a period as the thirteenth Christian century, are the best witness to the ideas and spirit of the Swiss peasants of that time, whether Tell were a real person or not. His story embodies the love of freedom that has kept Switzerland alive and independent to this day. Similarly, the myths of Adam and Noah, to take the leading Biblical examples, tell us the *mind* of early Israel. It is true that there are similar myths in the records of some other early peoples, notably the Babylonians, and the early Hebrews, no doubt, borrowed the stories from the Babylonians, or from the same source as the Babylonians. But the important question here is not, 'What was the origin of the stories?' but 'Did the Hebrews do anything distinctive with them?' The answer to the latter question is becoming plain. In the story of Adam and Eve the Hebrew emphasis is on the truths that the first duty of man is to obey God, and that if he disobeys, disaster will come upon him. Similarly, in the story of the Flood in Genesis the Hebrew declared that God would deliver the righteous, whatever befell the wicked. However naively these truths are stated, and however difficult it may be to state them in final form, they are eternal truth. Again, while it is to be allowed that Israel had no monopoly of these truths, it was the Hebrews who emphasized their importance and who maintained them through 'thick and thin' through the centuries. Again, it was in Hebrew soil that the doctrines grew to their full stature. The ultimate question about a great nation is not 'Where did it begin?' but 'Where did it end?' Greece, for instance, had no monopoly of early art, and it would be difficult to show that in its beginnings Greek art was plainly superior to the art of Babylon or Egypt, but neither of these ended with a Parthenon or an Aeschylus. Similarly, Babylon had a kind of Noah in its story of the Flood, but, apart from the fact that he is not set down as specifically a 'righteous' man, there is no Babylonian parallel to Jeremiah, for instance — let alone Jesus. To admit that there are myths in the Old Testament does not mean that they are to be flung on a rubbish heap. It is true that the New Testament has a few references to Adam and Noah, but it will be found that the relevance of these does not depend on their historicity. Peter's use of the story of Noah as an

illustration of 'the longsuffering of God', or Paul's use of 'Adam' to express the corporate nature of man (or James' appeal to 'the patience of Job'), are all pertinent, not because these three were 'historical personages', but because their stories illustrate fundamental truths. Preachers of to-day, or at any rate of yesterday, used the stories of the *Pilgrim's Progress* without supposing that they were historical. It is the same with our Lord's use of the story of Jonah. Did not Jesus Himself use parables?

'But some one will say', to quote a Pauline phrase, 'How far are we to extend this principle? Are Moses and Isaiah and Jesus Himself merely useful mythical figures? If they are, does this make no difference to Christianity?' The answer is that the same kind of historical investigation that destroys the historicity of Adam and Noah establishes the historicity of these others. Such historical investigation says: 'Adam and Noah are mythical figures; Abraham and Isaac and Jacob *may* be mythical figures (or their stories may combine the legendary with the historical); the historicity of some such man as Moses is required by the story of the Exodus, and this cannot be mere legend for no nation ever "made up" a story that derived it from a slave race. There is no doubt that all the great leaders of Israel after Moses were real men; so were the men of the New Testament; the historicity of Jesus Himself is at least as firmly established as that of any other man.' There used, indeed, to be writers who claimed to reduce Jesus to myth, but they did not stay to ask what would become, say, of the Buddha, or Mohammed, or Julius Caesar, if the historical records about them were subjected to the criteria that they applied to Jesus. Whately's satirical pamphlet, *Historic Doubts relating to Napoleon Bonaparte*, written while that gentleman was still living in St. Helena, is still in point. It is true that Christianity is an 'historical religion', and that this means that some historical facts are essential to its truth, but the question is, 'Which historical facts?' and the same kind of study that assigns Adam to myth, assigns every great Biblical figure from Joshua onwards to history. It is true that archaeology shows that, for instance, there is no place in history for Daniel's 'Darius the Mede,' but it vindicates the historicity of the Bible records, taken by and large. Christianity has no need to fear the appeal to history. At that bar it wins its case.

There is, however, a realm where the issue is, at least in part, undecided — the realm of 'miracle'. Here the challenges of science and of history go together. In recent years science has abated its claims. It no longer declares that nature is a closed system of immutable laws, but admits that the 'uniformity of nature' is no more than a generalization from human observation, which cannot exclude novelties—as, for instance, when the ancestor of all copper beeches appeared suddenly in Germany in the eighteenth century. Christianity, on the other hand, no longer takes miracle to be more than an auxiliary proof of its truth. It asserts that the Exodus, for example, is an instance of God's control of history, whether the 'plagues of Egypt' are historical or not, and that Jesus was 'the Word made flesh' whatever be said about the miracles of our Lord. But there is more to say than this. The Bible, in both its Testaments, calls miracles 'signs', and it means by this that God's people could and did see what He was doing in certain events. Almost all the miracles of Scripture fall into three groups. The first belongs to the period of Moses and Joshua.

Here it seems clear that the stories tell of what we now call 'natural' events, though they have been heightened in the telling of centuries. For instance, the story of the Death of the Firstborn seems to be founded on the outbreak of a great plague, and the story of the Crossing of the Jordan on the occurrence of an earthquake, followed by a land-slide that temporarily blocked the Jordan, as the Bible itself hints (Ps. cxiv). Unbelievers may say that the way in which such events helped Israel was an accidental coincidence, but the Christian can admit no doctrine of 'accident', if that word denotes something with which the omnipotent and omniscient God has nothing to do. For Christians God is always at work in nature, and by 'accident' they can only mean either (a) some event where God's design cannot be traced, or (b) some event where man does what he did not intend, or (c) a combination of the two. They would agree with Israel that the miracles of the Exodus and Conquest were 'signs' of what Jehovah (to use the incorrect English form of this name) was doing for His people, though they would add that no doubt He had other purposes in them too. The next cluster of miracles belongs to the days of Elijah and Elisha, and tells for the most part of Jehovah's care for these prophets and their helpers and followers. Here there seems to be undoubtedly a larger degree of legend, though it is quite wrong to conclude that there is no historical basis for any of these 'signs'. But these Prophets were great, not chiefly because they worked miracles, but because, in the fight against the coming of polytheism in Israel, they 'turned back the battle at the gate' and left the way open for the evolution of that ethical monotheism that is the unique achievement of this little people. The third group of miracles centres in Christ (and His Apostles). Here there has been a great change of attitude through the modern study of psychotherapy. Little difficulty is now felt about many of the 'miracles of healing'. The healing of the 'Man borne of Four', for instance, is a classical instance for the psychopaths. The main difficulty lies in the 'nature miracles'. Here there is a division of opinion among Christian scholars. Some virtually 'explain them away', while others, having reached the conviction that Jesus was the Son of God on other grounds, go on to ask, 'Would not such a One do wonders beyond the reach of others?' They appeal, too, to the unique way in which our Lord *selected* the miracles that He worked. A comparison with the miracles of the spurious gospels is very significant here. The stories of the Virgin Birth and of the Physical Resurrection of Jesus stand rather apart. Some reject these outright, while others, like the present writer, think that the evidence for them is good, but that belief in them is not fundamental to Christianity. The beliefs that 'the Word was made flesh' and that Christ is 'alive for evermore' are indeed fundamental, but these may be held without belief in the Virgin Birth and the Physical Resurrection. Yet is not the first 'congruous' with the Incarnation, and is not the second an 'earnest' of the deliverance of 'the creation' from 'the bondage of corruption'? It may be added that if miracles be defined as 'outstandingly clear instances of God's saving power', they have never ceased to occur. Not a few believe that they have occurred in the present war. The controversy about the historicity of certain of Christ's miracles, however, is still undecided.

While both Judaism and Christianity are historical religions, their interest in history is altogether ancillary to their interest in religion. In the whole Bible

there is no interest whatever in history *per se*. The Old Testament, from the Call of Abraham onwards, concentrates on the history of Israel and confines itself to parts of this. It says little of the centuries of servitude in Egypt or of the period after the Kings. The reason is that these were of small use for its religious purpose. Throughout it teaches that Jehovah is Lord of History. The period of the Exile offered a problem to this doctrine—except in the episodes of Zerubbabel and Nehemiah (with Ezra). It therefore leaves it alone, but without abandoning the doctrine. In effect, the 'problem literature' itself proclaims 'Even though we cannot now understand the ways of God, yet we believe that He is Master of history'. The religious motive also rules in the treatment of the historical narratives of the Old Testament themselves. They are sermons, not history 'for its own sake'. The Hebrew name for the Old Testament, 'The Law and the Prophets and the (holy) Writings,' itself shows this. From the point of view of 'history proper', the reigns of Omri and the second Jeroboam, for instance, were very important, but the writers of the Books of Kings pass over them very summarily. It is the same, *mutatis mutandis*, with the New Testament. Apart from the story of the last week of our Lord's life, it might be said that we have only 'scraps' of His biography, were it not for the unity of the picture and its effectiveness for its religious purpose. Similarly, we have nothing but pieces of the story of the Apostolic age. But throughout it is either assumed or asserted that the Incarnation, Crucifixion and Resurrection, taken together, are the focus of all history, and that Christ is its Lord. 'He must reign till He hath put all enemies under His feet.' The Bible throughout teaches that history is the tool of God. Many historians, of course, deny this, and it is true that the doctrine cannot be fully proved until 'the end' comes. While it can be shown that the historical *facts* that are fundamental to the Bible *are* historical, the Christian has still a fight to wage about the *nature* of history itself. Here it is challenged still.

The third challenge is the challenge of *palaeography*, or, to use a commoner but less satisfactory phrase, of the Higher Criticism. It is perhaps still necessary to show what the latter phrase means. In the third line of the famous paraphrase of the Hundredth Psalm beginning 'All creatures that on earth do dwell', some hymn-books read 'Serve Him with fear' and some 'Serve Him with mirth'. If any one were to seek to learn which is the original and why the variant occurs, he would be engaged in the Lower Criticism. If, however, he were to go on to ask who wrote the paraphrase, what was his *provenance* (his date, environment, etc.), and what the history of the whole hymn has been, he would use the methods of the Higher Criticism. Of course, the two kinds of criticism intertwine and overlap. As in other specialized studies, no one is fitted to follow this one unless he has mastered its *technique*. If, however, any one wishes to see experts at work in this field, he will find examples in the discussions of 'authorities' for the life of St. Francis, often prefixed to editions of the *Fioretti*, or in Von Hugel's elaborate examination of the sources for the life and teaching of St. Catherine of Genoa. It is interesting to note that, like Jesus, these saints have left us no documents that they themselves wrote. It is true that these instances do not fall strictly within palaeography, for this is the study of *ancient* documents, but the methods used are broadly the same. Is it wise to allow experts to use the methods of this study upon all ancient records

except those of the Bible and to bar them there? But when the experts have done so, what are the results?

The earliest dated manuscript of the Old Testament comes from A.D. 916, and it is unlikely that any of the undated ones are older. There are people who say, forthwith, that the manuscripts are of little or no value. One wonders whether they are aware what would happen with other ancient writings if they were judged by the same criterion. For instance, what would happen to the poems of Homer, or the Pitakas of Buddhism, or the Annals of Tacitus? The fact is that most people quote any ancient book except the Bible unhesitatingly without so much as asking a question about the age and number and accuracy and authenticity of its manuscripts. This is to trust the Higher Critics with a vengeance! Palaeography shows that in the centuries of the Christian era that end with the ninth, the Old Testament text was more carefully preserved than any other ancient text. Earlier manuscripts than the one named were destroyed *because* they were becoming imperfect through constant use. Yet first they were copied with consummate care. For instance, the number of verses in each Book was counted, and (except in the 'minor' Prophets) their middle point fixed. The number of verses in the Book of Genesis was found to be fifteen hundred and thirty-four and in the Psalms two thousand, five hundred and twenty-seven — the middle point in Genesis being Gen. xxvii. 40, and the middle point in Psalms falling at Ps. lxxviii. 36. A scribe was required to count the verses in his new copy and make sure that the results tallied with those in the old one. Already, indeed, in Christ's day the Jews were careful of 'jots' and 'tittles'. The great challenge of the palaeologists falls in the centuries *before* Christ. At that time, they claim, a succession of unknown Jewish scholars were busy selecting, arranging and editing ancient documents, and assigning them to different authors. There is no reason for reckoning these Rabbis infallible. In the result the palaeographers claim, for instance, that Moses did not create a kind of reservoir of Hebrew Law, but that this was gradually made, in the Pentateuch as we have it, by a succession of schools of legalists. Moses, they claim, was not the maker of a reservoir but a fountain-head. The stream that began with him (probably with the Decalogue) grew and grew through the centuries. He was the maker of a nation, under God — indeed, of the most important nation in the history of man — and its first law-giver. This does not diminish his greatness. On the whole Old Testament, palaeographical study passes the verdict 'First the stalk, then the ear, then the full corn in the ear'. For it Hebraism was not created 'at a stroke', but evolved by degrees. But is not God the master of evolution? In the new way of treating the Old Testament there are great gains. For instance, the imperfections, especially in the earlier stages of evolution, may be freely admitted. But the results of palaeography exhibit the process by which this one little nation, and it only, attained at last to the doctrine of God that underlies the New Testament — the doctrine that there is one, personal, active, righteous and merciful God. There is nothing to lament here.

The results of palaeographic research on the New Testament may be more briefly stated. On every hand the materials are unique. There are far more manuscripts than for any other such study. They come from a wider field. The oldest of the complete manuscripts date from a period (the fourth Christian

century) that is nearer the times of which they treat. It is only in relatively small ways that they differ. The number of auxiliary authorities, chiefly translations and quotations, is far greater than for any other book. The number of investigators has been far larger than with any other. They have given far more meticulous care to their work. And the result? With the exception of Second Peter — an exception that 'proves the rule' — all the documents are assigned to the first Christian century. Again, no fundamental doctrine is affected. The only remaining field of battle lies in the problem of the historicity of the Fourth Gospel. Here there is, indeed, still discussion about the authenticity both of the acts and words of our Lord. Yet even here it is admitted that the teaching is the organic culmination of early Christian thought. Christians add that, at the lowest, it draws out accurately the truths already implicit in the Synoptic records. At the bar of palaeography the New Testament triumphs as no other book does.

The fourth challenge has come from *comparative religion* — or, more accurately, the study and comparison of religions. In the last half-century or so men have shown an interest, as never before, in religions at large. A strange comment on the materialism of the period! Along with this Christians have forsaken the ancient belief that all religions except Judaism and Christianity are of the devil. Instead they have returned to the belief of St. Paul that God has nowhere 'left Himself without witness', and have drawn the inference that in all religions, even in what is called 'primitive religion', there is something good, and that, if any man anywhere 'follow the gleam' of truth as he knows it, God will have mercy on him. Yet the comparison of religions has also displayed their differences. It has been made plain, for instance, that Hinduism, being fundamentally pantheistic, teaches that everything in the universe is in some sense 'incarnational' — even the thing called sin. Or again, Buddhism is shown to admit no such being as an ultimate personal God — and therefore teaches men to 'save themselves'. Or again, it is found that Confucianism is a code of ethics rather than a religious faith, and that Zoroastrianism does not clearly distinguish between spiritual and material 'good' and 'evil'. As for Islam, it turns out to be little more than a warped and second-rate Judaism. To take even these few differences, how fundamental they are! It is the claim of Christians that in all religions except Christianity, however much of value they teach, there are fundamental errors. Many non-Christians, indeed, agree that, if ever there is to be a universal religion, it can only be Christianity. On the other hand, Christians claim too that their faith includes — and includes in the right perspective — all that is true in other religions. But all students of religion, whether Christian or not, agree that it is only in the little Hebrew people that the belief in ethical monotheism emerged and developed — and that it is only in Christianity that the creed is found that God, being the only God, 'so loved the world that He gave His only-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in Him should not perish, but have eternal life'. The study of religions has shown past doubting that, whether Christianity is true or not, it is unique. Beyond this it is not its province to go.

But, 'some one will say', is it not admitted that both Hebraism and Christianity borrowed from other religions, and if this is so how can either, or both taken together, be called 'original'? To answer this question another must be

asked, 'What is originality?' It will be found, on examination, that every nation and man that is called 'original' was a great borrower. For instance, Greek art is called 'original', yet it is certain that Greek architecture borrowed much, in its early stages, from Egypt. Its originality consisted in what it did with its loans and what it added to them. Similarly, Shakespeare may be called 'original', yet there does not seem to be a single play of his where he has not borrowed his materials from English or Roman history, or from Scottish, Danish, Greek or Italian stories. It is true that Hebraism borrowed, for instance, the stories of the Garden of Eden and the Flood from Babylon (or that Babylon and Israel borrowed them from a common source), but to judge Hebraism by these stories is like judging Greek art by its first early borrowings from Egypt or Shakespeare by the *Comedy of Errors*. Yet even in these stories, as told by the Hebrews, there is a hint of 'things to come', as in the earliest Greek art or in Shakespeare's first plays, but it is by the 'things to come' that 'originality' is judged, and not by its first hints. In the story of the Garden of Eden, for example, as already noted, the Hebrews told of the primary sin of disobedience and of its fearful consequences, as the Babylonians did not; but this is no more than a first, and relatively faint, hint of Israel's originality. Or again, Paul could tell the Athenians that 'certain of their own poets' had said that men are 'the offspring' of God, but what of the Resurrection with which he ended his speech at Athens? Such a concept as that of the Logos, again, grew in soil that was a mixture of Greek and Jewish thought, but this does not mean that Christianity was not original when it said, 'The Word was made flesh'. The Bible here is like the body of a man, which draws its food from outside sources, but is itself unique — except that the Bible's borrowings were far less frequent and significant. Here too that book emerges from the ordeal of scrutiny triumphant.

What may be said of the Bible after the challenges of the last half-century? It is best to admit frankly that the belief in its infallibility is gone. It is natural that man should seek some infallible guide to life, and particularly in the all-important realm of religion — but it has nowhere been given him. God, of course, is *Himself* infallible, but He has given men no infallible guide to His will. Neither the Pope, even when he speaks *ex cathedra*, nor the individual conscience, even when its mandates are clearest, nor the Bible, is infallible. Indeed, if the last were so, we should still need either that the meaning of every passage should be beyond discussion, or that we should have some infallible guide to its meaning. There is no need to say that both these things are to seek. The two Wesleys were 'men of one book', yet Charles could so interpret a passage in Genesis as to call the African races 'the servile progeny of Ham', and John found it necessary, without himself claiming infallibility, to give his preachers a guide to the true meaning of the New Testament in his Forty-four Sermons and 'the Notes'. The truth is that, if there were an infallible guide to the will of God, men would be spared the discipline of 'thinking for themselves', and mental discipline — sometimes very hard mental discipline — is one of God's instruments in the making of a man. In religion, as everywhere else, we have to live without infallible guides. We are so used, for instance, to trust our bodies to engine-drivers and doctors that we rarely stay to remember that they are fallible. When we say that we are 'sure' about anything, we usually mean

'sure enough for the practice of life'. We are not even infallibly sure that the sun will rise to-morrow, but we are sure enough of it to go quietly to sleep to-night. It is true that in the Fourth Gospel there is the text, 'If any man willeth to know His will, he shall know of the teaching, whether it be of God, or whether I speak of Myself'. This is a difficult passage, and it cannot be discussed here. But it may be pointed out that the context shows that our Lord was speaking to Jews who dishonestly shut their eyes to the light, and that, in any case, He is not here speaking of the Bible, but of His own impact on men.

But if the Bible is not infallible, is it authoritative? It has already been implied that we habitually submit to fallible 'authorities'—for instance, to doctors and policemen and parents. But there is something more to say. The word 'authority', when rightly used, always describes a relation in which one *person* stands to another. It would not be accurate to speak of the 'authority' of gravitation, for instance. Neither is it accurate to speak of the 'authority' of a book *per se*. When the Buddhist appeals to the 'authority' of the Pitakas, and the Muslim to that of the Koran, and the Christian to that of the Bible, they are really appealing to the authority of the men behind the books—to that of the Buddha or Mohammed or Amos or Paul. The books named are 'canonical' because they contain the records of authoritative *men*. For the Christian there is only one Man who is ultimately authoritative, all other 'authority' being secondary and derivative. However little or much Christians may have been aware of this truth, they have always practised it. For instance, whenever Charles Wesley based a hymn on an Old Testament passage—to use Spurgeon's phrase about his sermons on texts from that book—he 'made straight across country to Christ'. 'Wrestling Jacob' is a classic example. Similarly, when a devout Christian 'of old time' 'thumbed his Bible', he rarely thumbed it all. His thumb-marks were found at those parts of the Old Testament, in particular, that taught truths whose perfect fulfilment is in Christ. He thumbed the Fifty-third of Isaiah and not the genealogies of Chronicles. In other words, the ultimate authority for Christians is Jesus Christ. There has never been, and there is not now, any hesitation here. When the Bible has been treated like other books, as its challengers rightly claim it should be, it emerges unique. This book, and no other, shows how the 'fullness of the times' came and how 'God sent forth His Son'.

On examination it will be found that when a father gives his child a copy of the Bible, he is doing a unique thing. In effect, he is saying to the child, 'Here is a translation of a large number of ancient books which are the "sources" of our knowledge of the growth and culmination of a religion that I hope you will make your own'. It is almost as if a boy, when he is set to learn the history of England, were to be given a translation of Caesar's *Gallie War*, a 'modernization' of the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle*, a translation of the text (if one exists) of *Magna Charta*, and so on! What would the boy make of these? It is true that when he is taught literature, as distinct from history, he is given the original text, but if the text were that of *Hamlet*, for instance, he is not given copies also of the *Historia Danica* of Saxo Grammaticus, Belleforest's *Historie of Hamblet*, etc. With the Bible, however, the method has abundantly justified itself. (Of course, the reason for the difference is that, while *Hamlet* can be understood without Saxo, etc., the New Testament cannot be adequately understood without the

Old.) Yet surely it is right that the boy should be given help in this study, as in every other, or rather, more than in any other, for religion is more important than arithmetic, or the history of England, or the use of a knife and fork. Neither parents nor teachers have any right to refuse to take trouble with this one subject. It is better for a boy to read the Bible unaided than not to read it at all, but best of all to read it with guidance. This means, of course, that parents and teachers ought themselves to make use of the many good modern aids to Bible study. Yet, whether they do this or not, a Christian father, after half a century of challenge, may still confidently give his boy a Bible and write on its fly-leaf, 'In all thy ways acknowledge Him, and He shall direct thy paths'.

C. RYDER SMITH

FREEDOM AND FEAR

I

AFTER three years of war, some of us are still asking what we are fighting for, or wondering whether our political leaders know the answer, or suspecting that they know but do not choose to say. Hitler and Mussolini were in no doubt as to what they started fighting for. It is always an easier thing for the devil, if he chooses to speak out, to state his aims than for an archangel. Most of us, however, even if, as we hope, we are on the side of the angels, are not likely to hesitate. Three years ago, the answer might have been 'to put a spoke in Hitler's wheel'. Now, we are aware that we are fighting for freedom, and fighting to rid the world of fear.

Freedom, however, dresses herself up in all sorts of guises. No man who uses the word can be sure that others know what he means; or that he knows himself. A volume appeared lately, *Freedom, Its Meaning*, edited by Ruth Nanda Anshen (Allen & Unwin, 1942; 16s.), containing contributions from nineteen well-known writers, British, American, and continental, such as Boas, Croce, Einstein, Thomas Mann and A. N. Whitehead. To look for any one meaning or opinion from such a diverse crowd would be vain. The philosopher, the politician, the anthropologist, the man of science, each has his own angle of approach. Nor are they always lucid. Listen, for instance, to Bergson: 'The social instinct of the ant cannot differ radically from the cause, whatever it be, by virtue of which every tissue, every cell of a living body, toils for the great good of the whole'. Or to John Dewey: 'The problem must be placed in the context of the elements which constitute culture, as they interact with elements of native human nature'. Here is Bertrand Russell: 'Every man desires freedom for his own impulses. Man's impulses conflict, and therefore not all can be satisfied. We must make common men aware of the identity of their interests wherever it exists; conflicts of interest which are apparent and not real must be shown to be illusory.' And here is John McMurray: 'Freedom is the product of right personal relations'; or, to quote from his Broadcast talks, 'freedom depends upon reality'; 'freedom is the criterion of good conduct'. To H. J. Laski freedom means the right to create and to dream.

Yet the diversity is not as wide as might appear. All the writers approach — some seem even forced to approach — the contention of T. H. Green, that a

man is a microcosm and is placed in a macrocosm, the society of other men, his only way to avoid frustration and attain freedom is by attaining harmony within himself and with others, by pursuing the satisfaction of his permanent or real self and of the community of which he is a member.

But this, like most of the contributions in Miss Anshen's book, simply removes the difficulty further back. *Ignotum per ignotius*. And Bertrand Russell's common man, who has never thought about his real self, and is often uncertain about his true interests, knows that the environment in which he is set, the vast machinery of the modern state, is so powerful and so ruthless that he has no more initiative than a belt or a cog. Freedom to act as he desires is beyond his horizon. Enough for him if he can reach freedom from what he dreads, freedom from fear. Spectres rise before him; want, unemployment, disease and sheer boredom, as in the international world of three years ago the terrifying might of Germany rose before the smaller peoples of Europe, paralysing them as the snake paralyses the rabbit.

Hence the peculiar importance and appropriateness of both the Atlantic Charter and the Beveridge Report. For while the first has to do with the ordering of the world, so that for the first time in the history of mankind (such is the audacity of the authors) nations may not be driven to seize by the sword what they think they cannot do without, and the second, confining itself to this country, aims at the achievement of economic security, they both proceed on the assumption that if we can be reasonably assured of certain desirable experiences in life we shall have moved a long way to happiness. Security: we have left behind the word as Macbeth's witches used it: 'You all know security is mortals' chiefest enemy'. Security is not the mere absence of anxiety, but the possession of powers and opportunities which compel anxiety to keep its distance.

The authors of the Atlantic Charter look forward to this consummation, if the nations, by some covenant or pact or control, can shake themselves free from the constant threat of war. For Sir William Beveridge and his supporters, the country must so apportion its actual and potential resources that every one will be ensured against unemployment and its allies, want and disease, ignorance and squalor. War and unemployment have certainly become twin terrors, bestriding a large part of the civilized world. Yet they are not equally terrifying to all the inhabitants of that world. Some objects of experience or imagination can cast a deeper shadow than either across the path. The truth is that each man has a set or group or little universe of fears of his own. With many of us, some of these take the fantastic forms of being alone in the dark or passing under a ladder, to which our newer psychologists have paid such reverent attention. To one man, the fears of another may seem irrational and ridiculous.

Ultimately, fear is, for us all, fear of being robbed of some necessity of life. All human beings acknowledge the primary needs of food, clothing, shelter and companionship. The exceptions, tribes which wear no clothing and individuals who feel no need of the companionship of members of their own or the opposite sex, need not here detain us. To the foregoing we must, however, add two more needs, which appear in the most diverse shapes, but which may conveniently be named play and prayer, supreme in the sphere of

art, worship, literature, sport and morals. So long as all these are not seriously threatened, the current of life flows on smoothly. In fact, to defend them with a fair share of success, is pleasurable and exciting. But if the chances are that they will be lost, anxiety awakes; and when they are lost, anxiety passes into misery. Thus a man's fears will be as numerous as the things he values and trembles lest he lose them.¹

II

It is an interesting question whether the real objects of fear are not persons. We fear to lose something which is essential to our well-being; but this may be only because we conceive that there are individuals or groups, known or unknown to us, actual or imagined, who are determined to rob us of it, and whom it is useless to resist. This would account for the close connection between fear and hate; and it would explain why our reactions to the dangers of the physical world have, psychologically, so little in common with our reactions to the men and women and even the animals in it. But a totally different view has recently been urged in a volume entitled, *The Fear of Freedom*, by Dr. Erich Fromm (Kegan Paul, 1942; 12s.). 'We are witnessing to-day a widespread desire to surrender freedom'; for many, freedom is a cherished goal; for others a threat'; reminding us of the character of whom Dostoevsky, quoted by the author, wrote, 'He has no more pressing need than to find some one to whom he can surrender, as quickly as possible, that gift of freedom with which he was unfortunate enough to be born'.²

To account for this disturbing feature of the present day, the author goes partly to the economic history of the last six hundred years, which he interprets in general conformity with the school of which in this country Tawney and Max Weber are the best known representatives, and partly to Freud. Man is always found as a member of society, a system of groups. From society he draws his beliefs, his activities, the whole pattern of his life and thought; in society he finds his protection and his peace of mind. This was true of the narrow yet resplendent world of Greece and Rome; still more true of the Middle Ages, because Christianity supplied a binding and regulating force of which the Pagan world knew nothing. But the Renaissance and the Reformation changed all that. The individual suddenly found himself alone, in the face of a world of new discoveries, new forces, new beliefs, new kinds of work, where all the old kindly bonds lay shattered; and in the face of God, before whom, no longer able to rest in the bosom of the Church, he was helpless. Previous to this crisis, the desire for money was subordinate. Now, while the new doctors were thundering their 'work, work!' capitalism was born, and economics completed what the new spiritual interpretation of life had begun.

The crisis has usually been hailed as the vindication of freedom; but 'freedom from' is forced on the individual, continues Dr. Fromm, while 'freedom to' is still unknown. Protestantism was 'the answer to the human needs of the

¹ The Epistle to the Hebrews speaks of those 'who through fear of death were all their lifetime subject to bondage', thus linking fear and freedom as opposites. But a lifelong fear of death is known, happily, to but few.

² 'Gentlemen,' declared Sieyes (in 1800), 'you have a master over you. Bonaparte wants everything, knows everything, and can do everything.' The country rejoiced in the new-found despotism (A. Bryant, *The Years of Endurance*).

frightened, uprooted and isolated individual who had to orient and relate himself to the new world'; but neither Protestantism nor any other influence could confer that positive freedom which 'consists in the spontaneous activity of the total integrated personality'.¹ It is this 'time-lag' between the two freedoms, negative and positive, which is responsible for the misfortunes of later centuries, for capitalism (a term which Dr. Fromm is no more careful than many other writers to define) and for the flight to the mass (like Galton's famous buffalo, parted temporarily from the herd) and to the dictator.

It is strange that Dr. Fromm has nothing to say about Russia, and very little about Marx, whom he links with Feuerbach and Nietzsche as 'expressing the idea that the individual should not be subject to any purpose external to his own growth or happiness'. That the economic motive is fundamental in human nature he emphatically denies. But Fascism, in its Italian and still more in its German dress, provides the poor naked victims of the age with what they need. To some it gives the sense of power which history had taken from them; to others it gives the relief of being in a world (a world not confined to Central Europe) where they are no longer responsible for thinking, judging, acting for themselves; and to all, that union of dominance and obedience (by no means opposites psychologically) which is the most obvious escape from the shock administered by the sixteenth century.

This interpretation is fortified by a study of Freud. Dr. Fromm does not agree that our normal conscious life, or even our abnormal phobes and complexes, are derived from the sexual difficulties of our childhood, or from the sexual jealousies of our remote and savage ancestors. But he thinks that much can be learnt about human behaviour in society from Freud's observation, even if he misinterpreted their significance or exaggerated their importance. 'Cultural phenomena are rooted in psychological factors that result from instinctual (*sic*) drives which in themselves are influenced by society only through some measure of suppression.' Freud's psychology, he complains, is one of want. It takes no account of 'the satisfactions of abundance'. It knows only of relief from tension. But since tension is everywhere, in childhood and in society, and especially the tension of loneliness, it has a very wide application. This is best seen in Dr. Fromm's long discussion of sadism and masochism.

Sadism is used for the desire to inflict pain, masochism for the desire to suffer it; both are commonly connected with sexual experiences. The sadist loves to feel that he has power over the object of his desires; the masochist, that the object has power over him; as the helpless slave of his beloved, he finds or becomes what he would really be. Freud enlarges all this. Distinguishing between potency, the power to influence others like a teacher, a dominance, the power to subdue others to one's will like a slave-owner, the sadist, he holds, fulfils his instinctive desire to exchange the weakness of solitude for strength over others, by tyrannizing over his society, on a small or a large scale, like Heydrich or the humblest SS man. The masochist fulfils the same desire and effects the same escape by attaching himself to some stronger person and rationalizing his desire or his fear by reflecting on the glory of submission or the heroism of endurance.

¹ We may ask in passing whether there is any difference between freedom and spontaneity, and whether Dr. Fromm is not really telling us that man is free when he is acting freely and harmoniously. Freedom thus becomes equivalent to harmony or integration.

Sadism and masochism may thus often go together; they are indeed varieties of the same attitude. Each may masquerade as love; but only as love, which is properly based on equality and freedom, is debased into the 'symbiotic' need for dominance or dependence. Whether sadism and masochism, so understood, are as abnormal in societies as they have usually been held to be in individuals, we can understand Fromm's discovery of the origin of our present distress, in the absence of a freedom that as yet is not ours combined with the flight from a freedom we unhappily possess. 'Democracy must take the offensive and realize what has been its aim in the minds of those who fought for freedom throughout the last centuries.'

III

With this formula for the new order we may take our leave of Dr. Fromm and turn to Dr. Ranyard West's *Conscience and Society* (Methuen, 1942; 16s.); 'a study of the psychological pre-requisites of Law and Order'. Dr. West, a physician with wide philosophical interests, presents what is at once a parallel and a contrast to Dr. Fromm. Starting from political theory instead of from political history, he sums up Hobbes' doctrine of society in the *Leviathan*,¹ and proceeds to the replies to Hobbes given by Locke and Rousseau. He devotes considerable attention to Grotius, the extent of whose importance as the pioneer of international law he is inclined to narrow; and he makes many useful references to later writers on the subject, like C. K. Allen and Lasswell and Laski, though the echoes of a more resounding voice, Gierke's, are unheard. Next he turns, like Dr. Fromm, to psychology; and here he has a dozen of his own cases to bring before his readers—he is closely connected with the Tavistock Square Clinic. But no conclusions can be based, as Dr. West is aware, save with the most cautious reserve, on neurotics. The Oedipus complex is pushed, happily, into the background.

Dr. West balances the view of Freud (the fundamental hostility of the individual to his fellows) against that of Ian Suttie (*The Origins of Love and Hate*), who would interpret all emotions in terms of love or the need for love, as Hobbes interpreted them in the terms of desire for power; 'anxiety is love threatened, despair is love rejected,' and so on. This would be intelligible enough if only a few lovers were born into a world of hatred. But the individual who longs for love is himself an aggressor, and therefore at least a possible subject or object of hate, or both. This Dr. West shows in his study of Mrs. Isaacs' report on her little school of normal children (*Social Development in Young Children*; Routledge, 1933). The dividing line must not therefore be drawn between individuals but between the two 'primary instincts', social and aggressive.

We are thus led up to a discussion of the basis of law, national and international. Law, whose object is ostensibly to restrain the aggressiveness of the other man, is really meant to restrain the aggressiveness which I feel and fear within myself. Once enacted, it can shelter and protect the slower growth of custom. With custom, develops conscience or the 'superego'; and conscience, based on custom, gradually supersedes law. I keep my promise (has Dr. West been reading Ross' *The Right and the Good*?) first because I must, and then because I would. Side by side with conscience, so understood ('modern

¹ Hobbes, Dr. West hints, was perhaps influenced more than he was aware by childish memories of that 'violent' clergyman', his father.

psychology affirms at once its universality and its universal social inadequacy'), appears loyalty. Each man is loyal to his own group; each group believes in its own righteousness and in the untrustworthiness of other groups; the negotiations for international disarmament between 1920 and 1935 leave no doubt about that. *Societas societati lupus*; one group is no better than a wild beast to another. Hence, the sovereign state, the group *par excellence*, so to speak, the root of aggression, hate, fear and slavery, must go; the hope of a better life and a saner world lies in enlarged loyalty to a world state, whether produced by voluntary abnegation of sovereignty, military victory, or revolution. 'The strong nation that can bind itself will free the world.'

There is little about freedom here; and not much more about conscience. Dr. West is more interested in law and its defence. He is convinced that behind law must be force, even if, in time, no one will need to appeal to it. But his description of the best life would fit several definitions of freedom; 'where each of the natural instincts of man is allowed to make the combination required of it for his life to be one of happy association with his fellows'. But what is the best life save the happiest? What we are told therefore is that happiness means association with others. Inevitably, Dr. West has the present crisis in mind. But he seems entirely unaware (and this is true of Dr. Fromm also) that to-day we have not to deal with a general aggressiveness, of which each nation is equally guilty, but with an outburst, in one nation, of cruelty and greed and pride, whether we call it sadism or masochism, which has horrified and outraged mankind. Freedom is to-day threatened by a brutal rage never hitherto even conceived of. Fear trembles beneath a lash far more ruthless than was ever wielded by isolation. Conscience and law are not only disobeyed; they are despised and trodden under foot. The question of the restitution of order is not only urgent (as Dr. West and Dr. Fromm seem hardly aware); it is terrifying.

IV

A new form of disease, however, may send us to the past for a cure. We must have some theory of freedom, of humanity. For this we must look to history. We cannot build on the products of our modern artificial society, whether in the nursery or the mental home. What does man want, and what is he meant to attain? What are the laws which he must obey, the pattern to which he must conform, if he is not to be a 'foiled circuitous wanderer'? Lord Acton, in the addresses¹ which might have formed the groundwork for his projected History of Freedom, goes back to the men of Palestine, Greece and Rome, and their struggles against despotism. Sir Henry Maine, in his *Ancient Law*, passes behind them to questions of kinship, tribal solidarity, legal fictions and the like, which are vital even to-day. Since then, anthropology, which has happily refused to fall beneath the spell of Freud and his fellow-excavators, has enabled us to watch still earlier stages of social development. There, social life is a pattern to which all gladly conform. The only object of hate is the outsider, the *xenos*. The only authority is half personal, half tribal, the elders or the chiefs. The wrongdoer, disobeying a taboo, like Achan, condemned by others, condemns himself.

In such societies the sphere of selfishness is strictly limited. The 'body-

¹ *History of Freedom and Other Essays* (Macmillan. 1907).

'politic' is something more than a metaphor. But the group is surrounded by other groups. Groups tend to combine if their interests are felt to be identical. Otherwise, they will clash; and the leader, invoked to defend his country from the enemy, or bend the enemy to its will, turns his force inward, and seats himself on a throne. Or the growth of wealth within the state makes itself at home, not in the whole society, but in one class, and the weaker and exploited party looks for a champion from within or without the borders of the state. It is the story of the Hebrew kings, the Greek despots, patricians and plebeians in ancient Rome or the mediaeval Italian cities, and of Bonapartes and Hitlers everywhere. When once the struggle for existence grows acute, either among states or individuals, and either from economic or political or religious reasons freedom gives way to fear, and the distinction between aggression and defence disappears.

Among individuals and within the bounds of a state that can lay some claim to homogeneity, the struggle is settled, in the main, first by custom and second by law. Law, in spite of Dr. West, does not precede custom; the hardening of custom into law can be watched in the 'Book of the Covenant', Exodus xxi to xxiii. And the principle is the same, whether in a primitive agricultural community or in the League of Nations; the quarrels of each must be the concern of all; in the maintenance of order there can be, as Mr. Wickham Steed is fond of urging, no neutrality. Force there must be; but as force grows effective, it is seen to be less and less worth while challenging or defying, whether it resides in the London policeman, or the tiny but highly efficient British forces at present in Transjordan. And when once this principle is grasped, advance can be made from the condition of safety to the condition of the good life, as recognized in both the Atlantic Charter and the Beveridge Report; the *needs* of each must be concern of all; in other words, the members of the good society are concerned not only with their own interests, but with those of others less favoured than they; they will love their neighbours as they love themselves.

Can this be applied to nations? Can we hope for a Parliament, a High Court of Justice, for mankind? Some would read the epitaph of such hopes in the history of the League of Nations. But that is premature. To attempt to do away with national loyalties and traditions, as Dr. West bids us, is neither wise nor practicable. But common action and the common maintenance of peace, whatever the size of the units affected, follows the recognition of common interests. That is the moral of the coherence of the United States of America; of the long peace and the unfortified frontier between the States and Canada; and of the agreements, so startling to the historian, between various combatants in the present war. No one can estimate, when the 'cease fire' is sounded, what fires of revenge will burst forth; but apart from all questions of policing conquered or conquering countries, the imperative services of re-victualling and re-organizing them can surely be accompanied by conditions which shall produce an effective disarmament. Even Germany may learn that to obey the commandments of hell means to tread the path to destruction, and may turn her eyes to the light that has shone upon so many of her nobler children in the past.

There is no question here of hate or forgiveness or love. These sentiments have their place in the minds of individuals. They are inapplicable and un-

meaning in relation to societies and nations. The one relevant question is, what treatment is best fitted to make Germany or Japan or any other nation ready for membership in a community of free peoples, that is, a community where all institutions encourage co-operation, discourage separation and rivalry (such as results from tariff walls and national armaments), and make aggression (when I try to take what is yours and make it mine) seem merely stupid.

Here is to be found the role of the Christian Church. If we use the term in the sense of the accredited leaders of religious bodies, they will surely see in such a programme the implication of His purpose who would have all men act to one another as brothers because He would have them all look upon Him as their Father; if in the sense of the great body of believers, scattered through all nations and groups, in all professions and occupations, they have access to every side of life, and, like even the slave-members of the Pauline churches, can use their opportunities for a preaching of the Gospel of the royal law of freedom which is as practical as it is essential. They will be no more content to proclaim generalities than their religious leaders will attempt to elaborate details. But they can seize the key positions in which details are worked out. Every great reform of the past two thousand years has been carried out by the marriage of practical wisdom and unfaltering faith. And here, we may claim, is the road to a larger freedom than the world has yet known. Compatible with every genuine loyalty, and with every constitution, democratic or aristocratic or socialist, it will embody the combination of diversity with unity which is the secret of true harmony. When I can claim my foe as an ally, fear ceases and freedom begins.

We live in an age of destiny. For the first time in history we are learning that if we are to survive, we must pass from 'I will try to make you agree to what I want' (which is as far as Versailles could see), to 'we must work together; your interest is mine, and mine is yours'. If we can achieve this, we reach the fulfilment of the ancient dream that 'mercy and truth are met together; righteousness and peace have kissed each other'. Never was there such a desolated world to be rebuilt; never so deep a desire, so clear a knowledge, to build it on a new and firm basis, 'that truth and justice, religion and piety, may flourish among us for all generations'.

W. F. LOFTHOUSE.

WISE AS SERPENTS, HARMLESS AS DOVES

THAT wise and handsome creature, the serpent,' says the writer of a recent and much discussed biography, as he tells the story of that provocative, pathetic and entirely devoted servant of his generation, the late Dick Sheppard. He has Scripture warranty, of course, for the first of his adjectives, but who would be willing to concede him his second without protest? For most people the serpent is loathsome and repellent, and such fascination as he exercises is baleful, boding nought but ill to its palsied prey. Yet when our shuddering is over and we turn to the text which Mr. Ellis Roberts is quoting and extending, we find quite enough to think about without worrying as to the place of the serpent in a beauty competition.

What Jesus said was, 'Behold, I send you forth as sheep in the midst of

wolves: be ye therefore wise as serpents, and harmless as doves' (Matt. x. 16). The first reaction of the mind to this concerns sheep rather than serpents — the reader is bewildered as he gazes at the animal portrayed, for never before did he see or dream of such unsheeplike sheep. Here is the one case in the whole of Scripture where the sheep are bidden by the shepherd to prepare themselves for war, and for successful war! The members of the flock are not being offered as a cheap and easy meal to the ravening wolves, but are intended to overthrow them. Elsewhere in the Bible we are reminded of the helplessness of the sheep, and its complete dependence upon the shepherd's care. We have not to go far from the immediate context of this verse to find an illustration of what Scripture thinks of sheep for, in Matt. ix. 36, we read that Jesus, 'when He saw the multitudes was moved with compassion for them, because they were distressed and scattered, as sheep not having a shepherd', and this is typical of 'all four Gospels, because no difference arises between the Synoptic and the Johannine tradition on the characteristics of sheep. We think of the parable of the lost sheep, of the sheep that falls into a pit on the sabbath day, of the lost sheep of the house of Israel, and of course of John x. 1-16. With a still wider range that includes the Old Testament, who can forget the 23rd Psalm, or the 44th, or the 95th, or the 100th, Isaiah liii, and passages in Jeremiah, Ezekiel and the Minor Prophets? Everywhere but here we see an animal, useful doubtless, and indispensable for its meat and wool, but a feckless, stupid creature that can lose itself all too easily, needing always the unremitting care of the ever-watchful shepherd. Just this once we encounter this other kind of sheep which to the eyes of its over-confident foes looks like any other woolly victim, succulent and unsuspecting, but proves to be more than a match for them, leaving them outwitted and confounded. If we modern folk of the West, town-bred for the most part, and little versed in the lore of the countryside, are astonished at the picture conjured up by this singular behaviour of the most unenterprising and helpless of God's creatures, what must have been the surprise of those Eastern hearers who found themselves so addressed, and so sent forth about their Master's business?

To evoke that preliminary surprise may well have been part of His purpose, for Jesus did not mean these first Apostles to set forth under any illusion as to what was in store for them. His 'Behold, I send you forth' stresses His acceptance of personal responsibility for their commission, but its issue clearly depended on their own behaviour. If they were ordinary sheep, the tragedy would run its normal course — the wolves would see to that! But they were not to be ordinary sheep — they were to be a breed that wolves had never met before; sheep that could on occasion make wolves ashamed of their wolfhood, or where that was impossible, make them lick their chaps in baffled impotence. To bring this to pass they must be 'wise as serpents, and harmless as doves'. It is now our business to see what this means.

It is futile at this time of day to suppose that a saying which has become proverbial can be corrected in common speech. Even Dr. Moffatt leaves 'wise' as the translation of *φρόνιμοι*, and where his stout heart quails, we cannot be surprised that the Revisers of Queen Victoria's days left the Authorized Version undisturbed. Dr Weymouth gives us 'sagacious' but the word which is nearest is 'subtle', and it can claim scriptural precedent, for we read in

Gen. iii. 1 that 'the serpent was more subtil than any beast of the field which the Lord God had made'. As Archbishop Trench reminds us, *φρόνησις* skilfully adapts its means to the attainment of the ends which it desires'; but whether the ends themselves which are proposed are good, of this it affirms nothing. It is true that as often as *φρόνησις* occurs in the New Testament, it is used of a laudable prudence, but for all this *φρόνησις* is not 'wisdom' nor the *φρόνιμος* 'wise'. 'Subtle' then let it be, with the word purged of all its venom by the accompanying characteristic; which also needs emendation if we are to read the verse aright. 'Ἀκέραιοι is not 'harmless' as present-day English uses the word. There are few things more damning to say of a man's character than, 'Oh, he's all right — he's harmless'; it would be kinder by far to finish him off at once as a useless cipher, than to let him drag out his ignominious days with that poor clout of contempt as his only covering! Dr. Findlay, not for the first time, comes to the rescue with his brilliant rendering, 'You are to be as clever as the devil and as innocent as God's Spirit', which he justifies by reminding us that 'the snake is the symbol of the devil' — 'generation of vipers' means 'children of the devil' — 'and the dove of God's Spirit', and so we arrive at what he calls justly 'this exhilarating paradox', and adds that 'the shrewdness and the simplicity of true love could not be more piquantly described'. Etymologically, the word means 'free from foreign admixture', 'unalloyed', something that is in its true and natural condition — thus the picture of the sheep that is sent forth on its conquering mission takes its final shape before our eyes. He is a warrior who carries no overt weapons, and yet there is that something about him, or rather in him, which makes him the most formidable adversary that evil can ever be called upon to face: 'be ye therefore subtle as serpents, and as free from artifice as doves'.

Subtlety is not a characteristic which we are wont to place amongst the Christian virtues, and the reluctance to include it is quite natural, for it shades off so quickly into craftiness, which is a vice. Yet this precept of our Lord's cannot be disregarded. The best thing to do is to watch Him at His work, and to note the type of person whom He approves. Too little attention has been paid to His evident approval of personal initiative, His commendation of the people who did not wait to be told what to do, but used their own brains and decided their own course of conduct. How He rejoices over the barrack-square economy of words, and the stress that is laid on personal obedience, by the centurion who asks His aid, and the quick repartee of the Syro-Phoenician woman! He never told Zacchaeus to say, 'The half of my goods I give to the poor; and if I have wrongfully exacted aught of any man, I restore four-fold'. It was the business-like instinct of Zacchaeus, the instinct that had made him a chief amongst the tax-collectors, now surcharged and sublimated, that said the words which embodied a prompt decision. What Jesus said was, 'To-day is salvation come to this house, forasmuch as he also is a son of Abraham'. And so in truth he was, setting forth like his great progenitor on a road that might lead anywhere, on which his sole guide would be his faith, but Jesus had no doubt at all as to his safe arrival at his appointed destination.

In this matter of Christian subtlety, as in all else, the Master Himself is the best exemplar. How often the wolves found themselves foiled when they pounced upon Him! Think of the questions which they asked Him, and of the

answers which He made! 'Perceiving their thoughts' He led them on into the centre of the maze and there left them to make the best way out they could amidst the titters of the crowd, or else He would ask them some shatteringly direct question which left them speechless, afraid, for that occasion at least, to 'ask Him any more questions'.

The Acts of the Apostles shows us plainly that the Apostles learnt their lesson, as Annas and Caiaphas, to mention no others, could bear their rueful witness — 'Now when they beheld the boldness of Peter and John, and had perceived that they were unlearned and ignorant men, they marvelled; and they took knowledge of them, that they had been with Jesus' (Acts iv. 13). That same quality, which left its opponents humiliated, even though they still retained power enough to inflict death upon a man whom they could not confute, was seen in Stephen, and time would fail to tell of the quickness with which Paul could read a confused situation and turn its opportunity to immediate advantage (*vide* Acts xvi. 35 ff.; xxi. 37; xxii. 25; xxiii. 6) not for himself alone, but for the cause for which he stood.

In a later volume of the Acts, written some hundreds of years after the Canon of Holy Scripture was closed, but also an inspired word, there runs a tale which is entirely apposite. It cannot be told too often, and it must be told in full.

There was a great expectation at Bath of what a noted man was to do to me there; and I was much entreated 'not to preach, because no one knew what might happen'. By this report I also gained a much larger audience, among whom were many of the rich and great. I told them plainly, 'The Scripture had concluded them all under sin', high and low, rich and poor, one with another. Many of them seemed to be a little surprised, and were sinking apace into seriousness, when their champion appeared, and coming close to me, asked, 'By what authority I did these things?' I replied, 'By the authority of Jesus Christ, conveyed to me by the (now) Archbishop of Canterbury, when he laid his hands upon me and said, "Take thou authority to preach the Gospel"'. He said, 'This is contrary to Act of Parliament. This is a conventicle'. I answered, 'Sir, the conventicles mentioned in that Act (as the preamble shows) are seditious meetings; but this is not such; here is no shadow of sedition; therefore it is not contrary to that Act'. He replied, 'I say it is: and beside, your preaching frightens people out of their wits'. 'Sir, did you never hear me preach?' 'No.' 'How then can you judge of what you never heard?' 'Sir, by common report.' 'Common report is not enough. Give me leave, Sir, to ask, is not your name Nash?' 'My name is Nash.' 'Sir, I dare not judge of you by common report. I think it not enough to judge by.' Here he paused awhile, and having recovered himself, said, 'I desire to know what this people comes here for?' On which one replied, 'Sir, leave him to me. Let an old woman answer him'. 'You, Mr. Nash, take care of your body. We take care of our souls; and for the food of our souls we come here.' He replied not a word, but walked away.

As I returned, the street was full of people, hurrying to and fro, and speaking great words; but when any of them asked, 'Which is he?' and I replied, 'I am he,' they were immediately silent. Several ladies following me into Mr. Merchant's house, the servant told me, 'There were some wanted to speak to me.' I went to them, and said, 'I believe, ladies, the maid mistook; you only wanted to look at me'. I added, 'I do not expect that the rich and great should want either to speak with me, or to hear me; for I speak the plain truth: a thing you hear little of, and do not desire to hear'. A few more words passed between us, and I retired.

(*Wesley's Journal*, June 5, 1739)

We may think our own thoughts as to whether Wesley was a little too brusque with the ladies, but of his handling the bumptious dandy, Beau Nash, there can surely be no two opinions. How Paul, who put the Philippian magistrates in their place, would have rejoiced to listen to that passage at arms, and would have counted the interrupted sermon well ended if it could finish with such a signal victory. With our verse in mind, may we not think that He who commended ready wit in others, and used it with overwhelming effect Himself when He was here on earth, would have bestowed His benediction also?

It only remains to add that Jesus does not dismiss His Apostles on their mission with a command that they shall use their brains as well as their feet in His service. Men from fishing boats and tax-collecting tables might well be excused for thinking that they could not prepare effective plans of campaign to meet authorities in their own council chambers. To the command to be wary and disinterested there is added a promise, and to repeat it is to say the one thing needful to those who want in any emergency to be equal to the event. There are the moments when our plans are of no avail, and indeed when we have no time granted to us to plan at all — 'But when they deliver you up, be not anxious how or what ye shall speak: for it shall be given you in that hour what ye shall speak. For it is not ye that speak, but the Spirit of your Father that speaketh in you.'

WILFRID L. HANNAM

WHAT THINK YE OF THE CHRIST? WHOSE SON IS HE?

(Matthew xxii, 41-46)

I

IN view of the development of Christological thought then reached and the scholarship regarding the Gospels at his disposal at the time, the late Dr. A. B. Bruce was one of the most discerning and stimulating expositors of the New Testament; and as a grateful tribute to my great debt to him, I am glad to begin the answer that I shall attempt to give to this question of Jesus, in view of the progress of knowledge and thought on the subject of Christology since his days, with his exposition of the incident (Matt. xxii. 41-46). 'The counter-question of Jesus' is 'not meant merely to puzzle or silence foes, or even to hint a mysterious doctrine as to the Speaker's person, but to make Pharisees and scribes and Synedrists generally revise their whole ideas of the Messiah and the Messianic Kingdom which had led them to reject Him.' His first question asked them what they thought generally of the Christ: His second referred 'more particularly as to His descent', and the third 'How doth David in the Spirit call Him Lord?' challenged their expected answer, 'the son of David' — 'the great idea of the scribes, carrying along with it hopes of royal dignity and a restored Kingdom'. 'This question is meant to bring out another side of Messiah's relation to David, based on an admittedly Messianic oracle (Ps. cx. 1), and overlooked by the scribes. The object of the question is not, as some

have supposed, to deny *in toto* the Sonship, but to hint doubt as to the importance of it.¹

Jesus Himself did not attach importance to it as in His Temptation He rejected the popular expectations of 'royal dignity and restored Kingdom', and as His ministry showed, accepted as His vocation that of the *Righteous Servant* (Isa. lii. 13-14. 12) who saves by His sacrifice. 'This, however, was not the only guidance He sought and found for His vocation in the Holy Scriptures. He did not describe Himself as the *Righteous Servant*, because that would have involved a premature disclosure of His aims and hopes,' but His favourite description of Himself was *Son of Man*, an ambiguous term allowing a variety of interpretation, and in His utterances regarding this function there was a combination of the *exaltation* and *humiliation* of the prophet's vision (Isa. lii. 13-14. 12). He had also in view in using this title, the vision of Daniel, 'I saw in the night visions, and, behold, there came with the clouds of heaven one *like unto a son of man*, and he came even to the ancient of days, and they brought him near before him' (Dan. vii. 13). For my present purpose it is not necessary to inquire how far Jesus was influenced by other Apocalyptic literature. The Messianic oracle that Jesus on this occasion cited ascribes not humiliation but exaltation in the title *Lord*. This combination of dignity and humility was the mystery of the person and work of Christ; and Jesus in His own consciousness felt the tension of being both humbled and exalted. I cannot agree, then, with Dr. Bruce's comment that Jesus did not intend 'even to hint a mysterious doctrine as to the Speaker's person'. His relation to God was to Himself a *mystery*, a reality firmly apprehended but not fully comprehended, a revelation gradually disclosed. Could He have otherwise had a normal human development?

Before exploring this mystery, there is a truth in both these prophetic passages that needs to be grasped and held fast. There has been much discussion regarding the reference of the prophet. Did he mean the whole nation, or the holy remnant, or an individual martyr in his description of the *Righteous Servant*? A very eminent Old Testament scholar in this country misunderstood the contention of a German scholar of equal eminence in translating the idiomatic phrase *Nichts weniger* by '*nothing less*', and not '*anything but*', and claiming his support for the individual reference. But is this insistence on '*either/or*' not too rigid? What justifies us in not excluding either remnant or nation, even when and if we emphasize individual, is that the conception of the Son of Man in *Daniel* is not individual, but collective, for in the interpretation the solitary '*like unto a son of man*' is merged in the society of the saints: 'The saints of the Most High shall receive the Kingdom, and possess the Kingdom for ever, even for ever and ever' (Dan. vii. 18). Jesus as *Righteous Servant* or *Son of Man* was typical and representative, not solitary, or, to use a physical and a biological metaphor, focal and seminal. As He conceived His vocation as *Righteous Servant* or *Son of Man*, He did not isolate Himself from, but identified Himself with, men that they might share it: His solitariness was His sacrifice. The survey in the next paragraph of the progressive recognition in His inner life as well as realization in His outer ministry of His vocation warrant the conjecture that His utterance here gives us a glimpse into His inner

¹ *The Expositor's Greek Testament*, p. 277.

life: He was becoming more aware of, and yet (dare we say?) surprised or bewildered by the Lordship which His outward circumstances were contradicting.

I do not pretend to be a New Testament expert, although I have tried to qualify myself by adequate knowledge for competent judgement in theological issues, in which the interpretation of the New Testament is involved, and venture to believe that the theological thinker may sometimes have some guidance to give to the critical, linguistic or exegetical scholar: but I cannot escape the conviction that some of the confident assertions of the '*Formgeschichte*' (Form history) School illustrate the danger of the expert, who knows more and more about less and less. So intent are they in the shapes of the stones, that they miss the plan of the temple. While making no claim for an exact chronology in the Gospels, we may trace the course of the ministry, not only in the events, but still more in the experience of Jesus; and what I here offer has many years of study and reflection behind it, and does not disregard any just claims that literary and historical criticism may advance.

Conscious of His vocation as Son of Man, that is, as Righteous Servant, Jesus sought to associate with Himself in the fulfilment of that vocation the people and more intimately His disciples, and called them to be the light of the world and the salt of the earth (Matt. v. 13-16), not at this stage laying stress on the martyrdom the mission might involve, although later teaching does indicate that the principle of salvation by sacrifice was fundamental to His mind (John xii. 24, 25). The parable of the Sower is a confession of the failure of that wider appeal, and from the nation He turned to the disciples (Matt. xiii. 1-3). The Kingdom is a certainty, but the way by which it will come is a mystery, and the description of impersonal processes or human activities takes the place of personal appeal as regards the multitude (Matt. xiii. 24-50). At Caesarea Philippi (Matt. xvi. 21-26) even His disciples disappointed Him, when explicitly He summoned them to fulfil their mission in martyrdom, if need be, with Him, and He individually knew Himself to be the Solitary Son of Man or Righteous Servant, even when confessed to be the Messiah by disciples who resisted His method of fulfilling His vocation (Matt. xvi. 13-20).

Not parallel to those *events*, for parallels do not meet, but interwoven with them was His *experience*. As He is opposed by men, He becomes more confident in God. He began by proclaiming the Kingdom of God in heaven as at hand (Matt. iv. 17): but when asked by the Pharisees 'when the Kingdom of God cometh' He declared: 'The Kingdom of God is in the midst of you' (Luke xvii. 20-21, R.V. marg.), for assuredly the Kingdom of God was not *in* His opponents then. As He grew confident of the presence of the Kingdom in His ministry of healing, teaching and saving, so He became more certain of His exaltation amid and even through His humiliation. After asserting the necessity of losing life to find it, as He was, but the disciples were refusing to be, He declared that 'the Son of Man shall come in the glory of the Father with His angels, and then shall He render unto every man according to his deeds. Verily I say unto you, There be some of them that stand here, which shall in no wise taste of death, till they see the Son of Man coming in His Kingdom' (Matt. xvi. 27-28). Although it was a stupid blunder in the division of chapters in Mark, which detached this saying from its proper content, and prefixed it to the account of

the Transfiguration: yet it is not inappropriate. However we explain the event, it was symbolic as well as prophetic, conveying what it signified, His exaltation through His humiliation (Mark iv. 1-8). The vision prepared Him as it should have prepared the three disciples who shared it, for the tragedy of the Cross and the triumph of the Resurrection. When proclaiming His approaching death, He always prophesied His resurrection (Mark viii. 31; ix. 9-10, 30; x. 34).

To me there seems to be no need of, or reason for, separating the two events, the Resurrection when 'He was determined the Son of God with power' (Rom. i. 4, R.V. marg.) and 'God highly exalted Him, and gave unto Him the name which is above every name . . . that every tongue should confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father' (Phil. ii. 9-11) and the Second Advent, as in His own prediction He describes it. The parables of the Kingdom give us indications of the modes of its coming: and we need not retain the language of Jewish Apocalypse interpreted with prosaic literalness. In His supreme authority and continued activity in His Church (Matt. xxviii. 18-20) the mystery of the Kingdom was being disclosed.

As the assurance of His exaltation came to Him in the experience of His ministry, so did the assurance of His eternal relation to God in His contention with the opponents who denied His claim as Son. We may accept John viii. 58 as an authentic saying of Jesus: 'Before Abraham was, I am'; but not the comments made upon it, when dogmatic assumptions of a later age have been read back into it. The personal development of Jesus from infancy to manhood excludes the description of this saying as a reminiscence from His pre-existence, or the assertion of a continuity of consciousness with the Logos, made by Tholuck and accepted with approval by Dr. Dods,¹—and supported by Dr. Denney.² I can repeat what I wrote in my *Studies in the Inner Life of Jesus* (pp. 85-86) as subsequent study and reflection have only confirmed the conviction. 'We must maintain that the consciousness of eternal relation as Son to the Father, as Word to the world, emerged in the consciousness of Jesus in the course of His history, and in His temporal condition its eternal presented itself as a pre-temporal form. Independent of history it is represented as prior to history.' Dr. H. R. Mackintosh commends this solution of the problem. 'This has the advantage of enabling us to regard pre-existence as a profoundly religious thought for Jesus' own mind—an aspect or expression of His awareness that He was connected with the Father by bonds to which time was irrelevant. The absoluteness of the relation involved its eternity.'³

The absoluteness of His relation to God as Son to Father is expressed most unmistakably in the saying reproduced probably from the *Logia* (Q), one of the two oldest sources, by both Matthew and Luke with slight variations, although because of its uniqueness in the Synoptic tradition it has been described as 'a block of Johannine marble which has strayed into the plain brick-structure of the Synoptics'. It was uttered in a mood of spiritual exaltation according to Luke: 'in that same hour He rejoiced in the Holy Spirit' (Luke x. 21-22). 'I thank Thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, that Thou didst hide these things from the wise and understanding, and didst reveal them unto

¹ *The Expositor's Greek Testament*, p. 841.

² *Studies in Theology*, p. 62.

³ *The Person of Jesus Christ*, p. 446.

babes : yea, Father, for so it was well-pleasing in Thy sight. All things have been delivered unto Me of My Father ; and no one knoweth the Son save the Father, neither doth any know the Father save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son willeth to reveal Him' (Matt. xi. 25). If there was any lingering disappointment at the results of His ministry, it was merged in submission and even gratitude. Absolute and solitary as was His relation to God and His function for God, His Sonship was one of entire dependence as of intimate communion. This religious consciousness of Sonship towards God was the very core of His personality : as the Son of God He was solitary, and shared not His function to reveal God as Father with any other, as He was willing to share His vocation as Son of Man or as Righteous Servant ; and yet in His vocation He remained solitary, only Son, only Saviour, only Lord. What I have been trying to do is to show that there was development such as belongs to human personality, in His religious consciousness as Son of God, from solidarity with man to solitude with God, through humiliation by men to exaltation by God. In accord with the conditions of developing human personality, limitation of knowledge, liability to temptation, subjection to emotion, there was *progressive Incarnation*, an ever clearer and fuller religious consciousness from birth through death to the rising from the dead, and in His advancing Saviourhood and Lordship in the world. Other features of His experience and character I have not stressed, 'Jesus advanced in wisdom and stature and in favour with God and men' (Luke ii. 52), nor considered the Johannine or the Pauline interpretations, as it is this principle of *progressive divine incarnation in developing human personality* that in the second part of this essay I desire to apply as *standard of judgement* to the *subsequent Christology*, most of the difficulties of which lay not in the facts, but in false conceptions both of God and man as so far apart that they could not come together. Is there an essential contradiction as well as an apparent contrast?

II

How could the Christ be David's Son and Lord? How could the Son of Man be humbled and exalted? How could the Son revealing the Father, win for His disciples only the babes? Here is the Christian paradox : an apprehension by faith which challenges the comprehension of reason. Is it credible, if unintelligible? Is it an essential contradiction as well as an apparent contrast? Or must reason try to climb where faith has soared, and make intelligible enough what faith finds credible without credulity? The Christ has confronted the Christian Church throughout the centuries not only with the claim, 'If ye believe in God believe also in Me' (John xiv. 1), but also the call, 'What think ye of Me?' (Matt. xxii. 42).

From the Council of Nicaea 325 to the Council of Chalcedon 451, Orthodoxy wrestled with Heresy about the answer to the question. At Nicaea Christianity was saved from a relapse from monotheism to paganism, and the Son was affirmed *consubstantial* with the Father, as eternally and essentially divine, and not a demi-god, intermediate between Creator and creatures as Arian Christology conceived Him. Athanasius, however, sacrificed 'the historical Christ' to his faith in the divine Son, for he ignored the conditions necessarily involved in Incarnation, *the Word flesh* (John i. 14). Only a Saviour altogether divine could offer mankind complete salvation from corruption, the penalty of sin, to

incorruption. 'God became man that man might become God.' In affirming the one truth, Athanasius ignored the other. We must start with and hold on to the historical Jesus whatever else or more our faith may find in Him. We can 'behold His glory as of the only-begotten from the Father, full of grace and truth,' only as we contemplate the Word as *flesh*, 'tabernacling among men' (John i. 14). It is imperative for a credible Christology that the full manhood of Jesus be preserved and the relation of the full manhood to real Godhood be made intelligible, as far as our reason can make it.

Apollinaris of Laodicea, who died about 390, tried to solve the problem of how the unity of Christ in essence (*homoousion*) with the supreme Godhead (Athanasius' doctrine) could be preserved in union with humanity in the unity of one person. He secured the unity of the person, however, by sacrificing the completeness of the humanity. He taught at first that the Divine Logos took only a human body, but when that statement was challenged as a denial of the humanity he conceded a human soul as well as body; but for the mutable human spirit he substituted the immutable Logos, in accordance with the tripartite psychology of the New Testament that man is body, soul and spirit (1 Thess. v. 3). Athanasius' *homoousion* is saved, but the man Jesus goes as all liability to temptation is removed. A more subtle form of the solution of the problem was offered by 'Leontius of Byzantium (485—543), forerunner of John of Damascus', who 'retaining the distinction between "nature" and "person"' taught that 'the human nature of Christ is not strictly impersonal', nor 'an independent personality or centre of the conscious moral life', but 'it is *enypostatatos*, that is, it has personality only in and through the Logos'.¹ An impersonal human nature is for our thought an empty abstraction, as man for us is nothing if not personal. Jesus as man was an individual person. While we assign personality to God, and speak of Father, Son and Holy Spirit as *persons*, we cannot so individualize the divine as we can human persons; we could not in our thought combine an individual Logos and an individual man in one, that would be a partnership, and not a person. We must now start from different assumptions, from different categories. We conceive God as not only *static substance* but also *dynamic subject*, 'the living God'; so man is not *passive nature*, but *active person*, and it is as personal that he is distinctively man. Ancient philosophy had an inadequate conception of personality; for modern philosophy, owing to the actual enhancement of personality in the Christian faith, the conception has gained a much fuller content.

So approaching the problem, false as is the solution of Apollinaris or of Leontius in the forms given to it, it directs our minds to a true solution. Neither the Old nor the New Testament has a psychology, authoritative for Christian faith: but the moral and religious discernment of a Paul has much to teach us, and following his guidance I shall endeavour to show the true solution. 'The first man Adam became a living soul' (*psyche*)—'And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life: and man became a *living soul*' (Gen. ii. 7)—The last Adam became a *life-giving spirit* (*pneuma*)—'And straightway coming up out of the water, He saw the heavens rent asunder, and the Spirit as a dove descending upon Him' (Mark i. 10)—'He breathed upon them and saith unto them, Receive ye the Holy Ghost'

¹ *The Person of Jesus Christ*, p. 218.

(John xx. 22, a symbolic prophecy, fulfilled at Pentecost) — 'Being therefore by the right hand of God exalted and having received of the Father the promise of the Holy Ghost, He hath poured forth this, which ye see and hear' (Acts ii. 33) — 'Howbeit that is not first which is spiritual [*pneumatic*]: but that which is natural [*psychic*]' (1 Cor. xv. 45-46). *Soul* and *spirit* are not parts of human nature, but stages of human development. Man apart from life in God is *soul* (natural): as he lives in God he becomes *spirit*. As the body with its appetites and passions gets the mastery over his soul, he sinks back as flesh (*sarx*), and becomes fleshly (*sarctic*). He may fall to the beast, or rise to the angel. Jesus was complete *natural* man, but in His unique relation to God as Son to Father as Incarnate Word of God He was from the beginning and did not become *spiritual* man as other men do: and as a number of passages show, that relation was for Him also mediated by the Spirit; for His baptism was His Pentecost, and it is through His mediation as Saviour and Lord, faith receiving and responding to His grace, that men become spiritual. What was His by original nature, men become by accepted grace. The Spirit from the love of the Father through the grace of the Son becomes the common possession (*koinonia*) of believers in the Church (2 Cor. xiii. 14), now the Body of Christ. Men are becoming persons in their development, and their defective personality grows towards perfection as they receive the Spirit of the perfectly personal God. The same truth can be stated in a simpler way, God is the eternal Father of all men, men as growing in time must *become* the children of God. 'Except ye turn, and become as little children, ye shall in no wise enter into the Kingdom of heaven' (Matt. xvii. 3). 'Except a man be born anew [from above, R.V. marg.] he cannot see the Kingdom of God.' 'Except a man be born of water and the Spirit, he cannot enter into the Kingdom of God' (John iii. 3-5). Jesus was born anew, from above in the union of God and man in Him. If these interpretations of human personal development, according to the divine intention, be true as we believe they are, the presence and activity of the Son in the man Jesus did not need any mutilation of human nature, but gave it its completeness. His was an original Sonship from the beginning by nature; ours is mediated to us by His grace through faith.

It was to preserve the man Jesus without denying that He was also Son of Word of God that Nestorius, Patriarch of Constantinople in 428, advanced a solution of the problem that was condemned as heretical. It was the use of the term *theotokos*, 'Mother of God', for the Virgin Mary that provoked his protest. He so sharply distinguished the man Jesus and the Word, that he was charged with the heresy of attributing to Christ two persons, the human and the divine — an accusation due mainly to the jealousy and malice of his ecclesiastical rival, Cyril of Alexandria. Dr. Bethune-Baker maintains that 'he did not think of two distinct persons joined together, but of a single person, who combined in Himself the two distinct things (substances), Godhead and manhood with their characteristics (natures) complete and intact though united in Him'.¹ Dr. Loofs has pointed out, however, that Nestorius did not use the word *persona* (*prosopon*) in the full sense we now give to the term, but rather as equivalent to function, that of the Messiah. There remains an unremoved dualism; Christ remains God and man, not God-man, or God as man. We must recognize

¹ *Nestorius and his Teaching*, quoted by Mackintosh, p. 204.

divine self-limitation (*kenosis*) within human limitations if the unity of the person is to be retained. I shall later return to this necessary truth of divine self-limitation (*kenosis*), if an intelligible interpretation of the relation of God to nature and man, and not alone to the person of Christ, is to be secured; but meanwhile I must deal with this dualism, which the Creed of Chalcedon condemns, but does not resolve. 'One and the same Son,' taught the Council, is 'co-essential with the Father according to the Godhead, and co-essential with us according to the manhood,' and 'to be acknowledged in two natures, without confusion, without mutation, without division, without separation'.¹ The word *co-essential* (*homoousion*) is ambiguous, unless God be a plurality, or all men a unity: since as applied to Godhead it means *one substance*, as applied to man *one nature*. Thus abstractly stated, the absurdity of the dogma may not appear; but apply it concretely. Divided personality is a psychic disorder; but that is what is ascribed to Christ: He is 'the strange case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde'. He was simultaneously or alternately *omnipresent* and *localized*, *omniscient* and *ignorant*, *omnipotent* and *dependent* on His Father in word and work, *immutable*, yet *subject to temptation* (trial and triumph), and *to varying emotions* (depression and exaltation). The explanation is that what was real to the Fathers were abstract ideas of their philosophy; they did not realize the concrete facts recorded in the Gospels.

While we must reject this dualism, yet as the first section pointed out, there was a tension in the consciousness of Jesus between His circumstances and His experience and as Son of God His Father, His outward humiliation and His inward exaltation, and even within His experience as, for example, between the cry of dereliction (Mark xv. 34) and His self-committal to God (Luke xxiii. 26) on His Cross. He measured the distance between the abyss of His self-identification with sinful, dying and condemned mankind and the empyrean of His self-identification with the holy, judging and forgiving God. It was one and the same Son who was transfigured on the Mount and agonized in the Garden, who was buried on earth and raised to heaven. As we shall more clearly see in the later section, the self-humiliation (*kenosis*) was not only followed in time, but throughout involved the self-fulfilment (*plerosis*). He died to live more fully: He lost His life to find it more abundantly; the events of the Crucifixion and Resurrection were typical of His whole inner life.

Entyches, 'archimandrite of Constantinople,' says Mackintosh, a 'keen but limited and ill-balanced nature, whose piety gave him influence, and who had been one of Cyril's most ardent followers,' was charged with 'blurting out what Cyril had held secretly':² in defending himself he affirmed that out of the two natures (divine and human) before the union there came one nature after the union, the two natures not being preserved in the Incarnation (Monophysitism). As the Creed of Chalcedon (451) shows this was pronounced heresy and the dualism of nature was proclaimed orthodoxy, as it is in the Athanasian Creed (whether earlier or later is uncertain), '*unus Christus, non confusione substantiarum, sed unitate personae*'. We may at once pass from Monophysitism to the Christology of the Reformers, in which I am convinced, that despite their intention and confession of orthodoxy, the two heresies reappear. Monophysitism in the Lutheran and Nestorianism in the Reformed.

¹ Translated by Mackintosh, *op. cit.*, p. 212.

² *op. cit.*, pp. 209-210.

Although Dr. Lindsay testifies that 'the Reformers knew no other God than the God who had manifested Himself in the historical Christ',¹ yet we cannot maintain that their Christologies do full justice to the historical Christ. It was Luther's doctrine regarding the corporeal presence of Christ in the sacramental elements, the only one out of fifteen points on which he could not come to an agreement with Zwingli, and yet the rock on which the Reformation was split in two, that was at least the occasion of the explicit formulation of his Christology, even if that Christology was already implicit in tendencies of his thought, consequent on the content of his personal faith. It has been maintained that controversy serves to evoke the truth; it is more probable, however, that it has provoked error in an overstatement of such truth as was being contended for. At the first stage of the controversy the communication of one attribute of the divine nature to the human nature — God's omnipresence to the body of Jesus as ubiquity—was claimed in reliance on the words 'This is My Body': at the next stage the communication of other attributes was inevitably asserted, and at the last the attempt was made to reconcile the earthly humiliation with the deified man. As there is at present in Germany a pugnacious and intolerant Neo-Lutheranism, which is refusing intercommunion with the Reformed Churches, it is worth quoting Dr. Bruce's verdict. This text of Scripture, 'This is My Body' (Mark xiv. 22) is not only capable of but demands other than literalist interpretation. The failure of the adjustment of dogmatic theory to historical facts in this Christology is as patent as in the Monophysite, with which it has close affinity, and needs no further comment.

A Lutheran theologian seems never sure of himself unless he can quote Luther in support of his doctrine, often one that Luther would probably have repudiated. Dorner, to whom I owe a deep debt of gratitude for help when I was thinking out my own Christology, although here I call no man master, 'claims Luther's authority,' says Bruce, 'in support of his own theory of a gradual incarnation, which leaves room for a real human development, and does not prematurely overlay the humanity with divine attributes (*Person of Christ*, div. II, vol. ii, pp. 53 ff.).'² It is this representation that I have already indicated, and shall seek to justify although I should use the word *progressive* rather than *gradual*, as a judgement of value, and not only a statement of fact. There was a communication of divine attributes (not absolute, but relative) in the human development, and as the Father's grace to the Son's faith. The Baptism with the Spirit, the Transfiguration and the Resurrection, not as reanimation of the *natural* body but as glorification in the *spiritual*, were only what we call supernatural stages in an experience which in its most natural phases was receiving and responding constantly to the supernatural presence, interest and activity of God. The humanity was never mutilated, nor suppressed, as it was raised into the ever closer personal union of the Son with God as Father by the mediation of the Spirit; so that in the Incarnation the triune God was revealed as active.

Calvin, like Nestorius, was concerned to preserve the historical Jesus, and gave more regard to the facts recorded in the Gospels; and yet He held a view of God, His difference and distance from man, His transcendence that made difficult belief in the unity of Christ's Person as human and divine. The

¹ Hastings, *D.C.G.*, ii. 862.

² *The Humiliation of Christ*, p. 374.

Reformed Christology held by the formulae of Chalcedon. The Lutheran maxim by which was justified the communication of divine attributes to the human nature, *finitum est capax infiniti*, the Reformed opposed by the negative *non est*. 'In consequence they held the divine and human natures rigidly, not to say coldly in separation.' The personal union of the infinite and finite nature in Christ is 'mediated by the Holy Spirit',¹ a true thought, as has already been shown. As sharply did they distinguish the state of humiliation and the state of exaltation: but in both the difference of natures persist. Luther taught the bodily presence *in, with* and *under* the sacramental elements (*ubiquity*); Calvin affirmed the spiritual presence of Christ, while His glorified body is *localized* in heaven: and any power the body communicates 'as the mysterious source of a spiritual body to appear at the resurrection'² is always mediated by the Spirit. We might ask both Luther and Calvin: 'Is Christ divided?' (1 Cor. i. 13, 'parcelled out' Moffatt). What did either know of the conditions under which the Living Christ and Risen Lord imparts His grace to faith in the sacraments? How did Luther know that the glorified body could be *ubiquitous*, or Calvin that it must be *localized*? Is it not enough to believe that the *whole* Christ in His undivided fullness imparts Himself to men? These, the logical fortresses for mutual offence and defence, were built on shifting sands of exegesis and speculation.

When in Germany by State action some Lutheran and Reformed Churches were brought into one ecclesiastical organization at the beginning of last century mediating theologians on both sides tried to harmonize the conflicting Christologies by varying *Kenotic* theories of which Dr. Bruce gives an account. It was a praiseworthy effort at conciliation, but a lamentable failure. 'The *Kenotic* doctrine,' I wrote in my book, *The Ritschlian Theology*, 'which to preserve the historical person must divest the divine nature of its distinctive attributes, is the necessary consequence of this traditional Christology, but it is also its sufficient refutation.' I agree with Ritschl that it is nothing else than mythology.³

III

The Scriptural foundation for these *Kenotic* structures is Phil. ii. 5-8: 'Have this mind in you which was also in Christ Jesus; who being in the form of God, counted it not a prize [*a thing to be grasped*, R.V. marg.] to be on equality with God, but emptied Himself, taking the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of men: and being found in fashion as a man, He humbled Himself, becoming obedient even unto death, yea, the death of the Cross'. It is to be observed that Paul soars into the lofty heavens of theological speculation from the lowly earth of moral obligation. We may, with all reverence and gratitude, describe this passage as a *myth*, it is 'truth embodied in a tale, history as a parable.' While the Son possessed the divine nature (*morphe*) He did not possess equality with God, a thing He might have grasped (*har pagmon*), but which He chose by self-emptying (*ekenosen*), and obedience as man, servant and martyr to receive as a reward 'in the name which is above every other name', and in which 'every knee should bow, and which every tongue should confess as Lord, to the glory of God the Father' (Phil. ii. 9-11). It is a divine drama, the first scene

¹ Mackintosh, *The Person of Christ*, p. 243. ² Fisher, *History of Christian Doctrine*, pp. 291 and 306.

³ *op. cit.*, p. 270.

in heaven, the second on earth, and the third again in heaven. In the first scene the eternal Son of God makes His choice of self-emptying (*kenosis*): in the second the Man of Sorrows serves, suffers and dies: in the third the Risen Christ is the Lord of Glory (*plerosis*). Christology has been content with two scenes, the Humiliation and the Exaltation. The *Kenotic* theories, following the Apostle, prefix a third, the Pre-existence. In preceding pages I have already indicated my belief in that first scene, to continue the metaphor, and tried to explain when and how the conviction of His eternal Sonship emerged in the consciousness of Jesus. What leads Paul to give that state the definite content he does? It was the Lord of Glory, who met him on the way to Damascus, and changed him from persecutor to apostle of Christ (as an *abortion*, a violent birth, 1 Cor. xv. 8), and yet he gloried only in the Cross of Christ 'through which the world *had* been crucified to *him*, and *he* unto the world' (Gal. vi. 14). The Lord of Glory and the Man of Sorrows, the Risen Christ and the Crucified Jesus—these were the two portraits of the same person enshrined in his imagination. How could the contrast be explained? Not by man's will, nor even by God the Father's will, but by the will of Jesus Christ Himself as the eternal Son. He projects the Crucified and Risen, the Incarnate Word of God, who was born, lived, died and rose again, the historical person, who had passed through these stages, upwards into the eternal reality of God, and assigns to the *person* of the Son thus individualized a definite temporal choice. If the *persons* in the Godhead are conceived as individuals, as men are, then monotheism lapses into tritheism: if within the relation of Father and Son, the Son might have made a choice other than the Father rewarded, it is not only a metaphysical, but a personal division which is injected into the divine unity. The decision for Incarnation is God's in undivided unity, and the *kenosis* no less is God's, as is the *plerosis*. Not in solitary acts does God so limit Himself, but in continuous activity; Creation and Providence (nature and history) one divine *kenosis* and *plerosis*, as well as the *Incarnation*, the consummation of Creation and Providence, for the Son was sent 'in the fullness of the time' (Gal. iv. 4), and within that Incarnation there is also consummation in the Resurrection. This is 'the truth embodied in the tale', the theology in the myth.

God and man are not so far apart, or alien to one another as the orthodox Christology, and even the *kenotic* theories represent. God is *transcendent* in His infinitude, eternity, immensity and perfection: it may be that our conception of ideal personality beyond and above human limitations and imperfections is not adequate to describe God as this vast and mysterious Universe discloses Him, and it is not unbelief, but faith to confess Him as *supra-personal*, although in His relations to us as persons, He reveals Himself as *personal*. Though transcendent He is not separated from the Universe. He is immanent, though not identical with nature and man. If He were not in all and through all, as well as over all, nothing could exist or endure. In His immanence God is ever limiting Himself (*kenosis*), and yet fulfilling Himself (*plerosis*), for we must not hypostasize Creation and Providence as independent of, or indifferent to, Him. Matter, life, sensitivity in plant, consciousness in animal, self-consciousness, 'self-reverence, self-knowledge, self-control,' in man are self-limitations of God as Creator and Preserver for self-fulfilment; we shall not say that He progressively only *shows* more of Himself, but He *gives* more of Himself. Incalculably heinous and

terrible as is the sin of mankind, and the consequences entailed, the world has not ceased to be God's, and become the devil's. The immanence of God is not merely opposition to sin in man's reason, conscience and affections; it is participation in the consequences of sin, and emancipation of man from these consequences, when human faith responds to divine grace. In Jesus Christ our Lord there is in the unity of the developing personality the consummation of the progressive *kenosis* and *plerosis* of the immanence of the transcendent God (Father, Son and Holy Spirit), a consummation so inexplicable by the preceding process, that we must describe it as a new beginning in Creation and Providence, nature and history: 'God so loved the world that He gave His only-begotten Son' (John iii. 16). 'God sent forth His Son' (Gal. iv. 4). The Word of God, Himself God, who had been the light shining in the darkness, and not apprehended nor yet overcome by the darkness (John i. 5, A.V. marg.) 'became flesh, and dwelt among men, and they beheld His glory, glory as of the only-begotten from the Father, full of grace and truth'. At the consummation, His glory falls as illumination of all the antecedent darkness.

If we use the term *infinitum* as expressing only God's transcendence, then the Lutheran maxim *finitum est capax infiniti* is false, and the Reformed *non est* is true: but if we give due weight to the conception of God's immanence, then the Lutheran is true and the Reformed false. For the Incarnate Word or Son omnipresence, omniscience and omnipotence cannot be claimed, and human conditions of finitude must be admitted, but if, rising above these metaphysical attributes, which our thought must ascribe to God, we dwell on the personal perfection of God as truth, wisdom, holiness, righteousness, goodness, love, then surely in the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ the *finitum est capax infiniti*; and in the progressive Incarnation the capacity was developed, and the limitations of finitude became less and less; the resources of infinitude became more and more, the *kenosis* decreased and the *plerosis* increased. It is the revelation of God in Christ, not any conceptions of God and man held apart from Him that offers the clue to the mystery, transformed into glory, of His Person; and Christologies of the past have failed, as they did not see Him clearly in His own light, and can succeed only as they behold His glory. So beholding 'we all, reflecting as a mirror the glory of the Lord, are transformed into the same image from glory to glory, even as from the Lord the Spirit' (2 Cor. iii. 18). Does not this transformation of believers, beholding His glory in His grace by the mediation of the Spirit, offer an analogy, though imperfect, of the 'progressive Incarnation' of the Son, whom seeing, we see the Father, the perfect theophany? (John xiv. 9).

A. E. GARVIE

AESCHYLUS AND THE MESSIANIC IDEA

A Re-reading of 'Prometheus Bound'

THE Caucasus has been much in our thoughts these months, and therefore, inevitably, the lonely, tormented figure of Prometheus, chained to the cruel rock, and preyed on by a vulture. Russia has been a modern

Prometheus, a Titan enduring martyrdom for humanity's sake, manacled and fettered, with limbs drenched with blood, and entrails devoured day and night by the German harpy.

Nor would it be difficult for one to dally with surmise — if only as a slight easement of our ever-present grief and suspense — and, limiting the viewpoint to that of the one complete play of the Greek trilogy, extend the similitude, seeing, as it were in anamnesis, at one moment, this re-enactment of the War of the Titans, the impious 'Aryans' bent on overthrowing the established order of the universe, Mount Olympus again a battleground of warring hosts; at another moment, Hitler as an upstart Zeus, the tyrannos of a New Order, imposing his will by age-old, unchanging servants, Strength and Force, tanks and dive-bombers his new thunderbolts, willing even to destroy the human race, yet ever fearful of a coming avenger, who will unseat him — Heracles or another. Whence he will come, this Heracles, as yet we cannot tell — whether from some western isle of the blest, Britannia, or the New Atlantis of America, Africa, or even the Terra Australis of the Antipodes. But come he will: that we cannot, dare not doubt.

The story of Prometheus has always captured the imagination of the poets. Shakespeare, whose 'less Greek' is hardly likely to have included Aeschylus, seized on that part of the myth which tells of the mysterious fire stolen from heaven, and gave us accordingly two fine metaphors — one in *Love's Labour's Lost*, telling how women's eyes 'sparkle still the right Promethean fire', and, greater still, in *Othello*, when the distraught hero, bending over the sleeping form of his beloved wife, whom he is about to murder, utters those words of unearthly beauty:

but once put out thy light,
Thou cunning'st pattern of excelling nature,
I know not where is that Promethean heat
That can thy light relume.

Shelley and Byron directly, Marlowe, Milton and Goethe indirectly, are debtors to the Promethean myth. Their various heroes, whether in his name or another's — Manfred, Cain, Tambourlaine, Faust, Satan, Samson — all display the pride, the stubborn resistance, the Aeschylean authadia, of their great prototype. Sometimes they even find a human, historical analogy, as Byron again, repeatedly, in Napoleon on his lonely prison-rock of St. Helena, and novelist Thackeray in his likening of Swift in his last terrible years of deafness and silence to a lonely Prometheus with the vulture devouring his heart.

One might even go so far as to trace the lineage of the superman of popular fiction — the Zanonis and Arbaces of Bulwer Lytton, the Prince Rimanez of Marie Corelli, back to Prometheus. The solitary, mysterious, God-defying personage has always been a hero of popular imagination. He has waxed fat and wicked on the lush soil of Germany's soul; and his most recent manifestation in that nation's philosophy has been the Superman of Nietzsche, while in real life it has found fantastic expression, if only as an anticlimax, in the supermaniac Hitler.

All this, then, has flowed from Aeschylus first, who, as Shakespeare with the fairy story of King Lear, did the miraculous thing, and took and transfigured the simple, primitive myth into one of the world's supreme dramas.

Meanwhile, if only as a brief escape from present-day tragic happenings, let us ponder again the ancient Greek poet's interpretation of this grand pagan myth, which in so many respects runs parallel to the Hebrew Messianic ideas and fulfilment.

It need not weaken the parallel that we know the one story to be the figment of poetic imagination, the other as happening in historic place and time. The mere fact that a human brain and imagination conceived and created this sublime figure in Greek literature makes the comparison with an actual historical personage all the more fascinating.

Take, for instance, the very opening of the Greek play. The dramatist starts from the climax of his hero's life — his crucifixion. The simple grandeur of the setting never fails to impress:

To earth's remotest plain we now are come,
To Scythia's confine, an untrodden waste.¹

More than two thousand years before Byron rhapsodized over the Alps, Aeschylus took for imaginative background to his drama the rugged, inhospitable Caucasus. And the purpose of this journey, as already stated, is to crucify one who has been the Saviour of Mankind.

Now take the first chapters of any of the Synoptic Gospels. There is the claim certainly that the story is about the Son of God, and a beginning is made in two of the narratives with the birth of the Saviour. Even so the story is chronicled with great sobriety and matter-of-factness. It has its own peculiar beauty — the guiding star, the three kings, the shepherds in the fields, the inn-stable, the homage of the Magi — but it is a beauty devoid of all artistic striving after effect. Even when the narrative mounts to the climax of the Crucifixion, that event is told in the same sober language, bare and austere. The scene is changed indeed. The Greek crucifixion was on the lonely mountain-top, at earth's utmost bound; the Hebrew Saviour is crucified on 'a green hill without a city wall', near the busy thoroughfare, with jostling throngs that pass by, mocking, deriding, wagging their heads and reviling.

Nor, properly to appreciate the independence and originality of the Greek poet, must we forget the difference in time between the manifestation of the word that was merely literary, and the manifestation of the Word that was made flesh. Aeschylus, ruminating on the mythology of his native land, pondering the ways of gods and men, conceived this drama some five hundred years before Christ was born. He knew nothing, we may take it for granted, of Hebrew Messianic prophecy.

Briefly, the hero of the Greek drama is a wonderful anticipation of the Hebrew Messiah. He too is a Saviour of Mankind. He too, for all his goodness, suffers martyrdom. He is likewise of divine origin. He is mediator between Zeus and Man. He loves mankind, is filled with compassion for him, wishes to help him, raise him, ennoble him.

So far, so good. But now the stories diverge. The Hebrew Messiah, according to our Christian theology, comes as the Saviour of the world by the grace of God. Prometheus does what he does for men against the express will of Zeus. To Aeschylus this Zeus is a parvenu deity, a usurper, jealous of his rights and prerogatives. He is the apotheosed tyrannos of the average Greek city-state,

¹ I quote throughout from Miss Swanwick's verse translation.

a Persian basileus on Mount Olympus. He is curiously reminiscent of the primitive tribal Jahveh of the early Hebrew narratives, a god of wrath, of vengeance, a jealous god, a consuming fire. He is indeed the same Deity who wishes to destroy mankind by a universal Flood, as is told in literature both sacred and profane, and to create a new race. So while both Saviours suffer martyrdom, the one suffers at the hands of men, the orthodox priests of an outworn theology, the other at the behest of Zeus, the new theocrat.

Even in their martyrdom, however, there is an utter divergence of attitude. The voluntary humiliation of the Suffering Servant of Hebrew prophecy is a thing quite alien, quite unknown to the defiant Titan. There is a world of difference in the significance of Prometheus' terrible words, 'Thus am I rhythmed', and Christ's cry, 'How am I straitened till it [the baptism He is to be baptized with] be accomplished' (Luke xii. 50). Nowhere indeed is the divergence between the Hebrew and the Greek theological attitude more evident. There is certainly a tremendous growth in the Hebrew idea of God as traced and traceable in the Old Testament; but on the part of the worshipper there is always a sense of restraint, reverence, awe. He even shuns calling Him by name. Only once in the Bible — and then, significantly enough, in a drama — does the Hebrew mind openly challenge the Divine governance of the world — 'O that mine adversary would write a book!' 'Wherefore indeed is light given to him that is in darkness?' — but even there, in the end, there is humble acknowledgement that God's ways are not as our ways, and indeed are past finding out. 'Shall he that contendeth with the Almighty instruct him?'

Far other is the Greek mind's attitude to the Supreme Ruler of the Universe. It is free, sceptical, inquiring, challenging. Humility is essentially a virtue of Christianity. It is unknown to the pagans. So we get Paul's magnificent paean on the Kenosis of Christ, 'Who, being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God: but made Himself of no reputation, and took upon Him the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of men: and being found in fashion as a man, He humbled Himself, and became obedient unto death, even the death of the Cross'.

It is true 'thought it not robbery to be equal with God' is strangely anticipated in the utterance of the Chorus of Greek Nymphs:

Good hope have I that, loosened from these bonds,
In might thou'lt prove an equal match for Zeus.¹

But the sequel in this case is not kenosis but authadia, stubborn resistance to, and defiance of, God. Aeschylus is obviously groping towards a religious faith. He cannot reconcile the actions of a righteous Zeus with his treatment of men and of one who had been the saviour of men.

There is again a wide difference in the form of service either Saviour rendered to mankind; though we should not forget that Prometheus' service had extended even to the new Pantheon:

What other but myself marked out
To these new gods their full prerogatives?²

But, confining our attention to the benefits received by the human race, we find that in the case of Prometheus the emphasis is almost wholly on material things.

¹ *P.V.*, xi. 509, 510.

² *P.V.*, xi. 447, 448.

They are very laudable benefits, but they are physical or material. The proper use of eye-gate and ear-gate, to build houses of brick, sunward-turned instead of dwelling in caves, the joiner's craft, the seasons, astronomy, arithmetic,

and marshalling of written signs,
Handmaid to memory, mother of the Muse,

the harnessing of oxen and horses, agriculture, chariot-driving, the invention of ships,

I the ocean-roaming wain
For mariners invented, canvas-winged,

medicine, prophecy, the interpretation of dreams, augury, divination, sooth-saying, religious observance and sacrifice, metallurgy, all this was the gift of Prometheus to man:

The sum of all learn thou in one brief word;
All arts to mortals from Prometheus came.

Fundamental, of course, to all was the gift of fire.

The gifts are to man when he is still far down the evolutionary ladder, and have as their primary aim and significance the material well-being and progress of the human race. Even the gift of fire, wonderful and all-potent as it was, had a purely material significance. There is no slightest hint of that spiritual significance which even the primitive Hebrew mind found in the phenomenon of the Burning Bush.

But there was one spiritual gift which Prometheus gave to men — hope. Of the great trinity of Christian gifts — faith, hope and love — Aeschylus has, strangely enough, anticipated one. But how poor is its pagan content as compared with the spiritual riches of Pauline hope!

Mortals I hindered from foreseeing death,

exclaims the Titan; and the Chorus of Ocean Nymphs ask:

Finding what medicine for this disease?

The answer is:

Blind hopes I caused within their hearts to dwell.

There could be no 'earnest looking forward' for those sons of men. They were to be utterly present-minded. Prometheus bestows his gifts on man, obviously, at the first step of his upward climb.

The emphasis with Christ is on spiritual things. He takes civilization for granted, all the gifts that Prometheus has lavished on man, and sets little store by them, even Herod's temple — *sub specie aeternitatis*. Not that He ignores the physical wants or ills of man. He feeds the hungry in their thousands, He heals the sick, the deaf, the dumb, the halt, the paralytic, the epileptic, the leper, He even restores the dead to life. He is Asklepios as well as Prometheus. But, supremely, His greatest gifts are purely spiritual — faith and love. It is appropriate, therefore, that Christ comes later in time than Aeschylus' imaginative projection: for He serves man at a much later, a much higher stage in his evolution. Human imagination having done its utmost in *Prometheus Vincitus*, came in the fullness of time the revelation of God in Christ.

As with ordinary men we see best the difference between the great pagan

hero and the Christ in their final attitude to the absolute. To the last, and even on the cross, Christ is submissive, trustful and — save for that one cry of dereliction — resigned. It is the attitude of a dutiful and loving son to his father. Prometheus simply cannot so envisage Zeus. Aeschylus does indeed make him yield in the end. There is a sequel — *Prometheus Unbound*, though, unfortunately, we have only a fragment of the play. But in the play which we have in full there is no yielding, and we shall never know what was Aeschylus' full intention. He may just have discreetly conformed to orthodox religion.

In his stubborn resistance indeed to the will of Zeus, Prometheus offers a closer resemblance to the very antithesis of Messiah — namely Satan or Lucifer, especially as that character has been depicted by another great poet, Milton. But only in that respect. Satan is no friend of man. He plots the downfall of God's new creature. Also, although we are compelled to admire the fallen archangel in the opening books of *Paradise Lost*, yet the poet inexorably depicts his decline and deterioration, so that we clearly realize he is not meant to be regarded as the hero of the poem. It is otherwise with Prometheus as depicted by Aeschylus. From first to last he is the hero of the drama. If he is not, the dramatist has committed a grievous artistic error in so enlisting our sympathies with the sufferer.

There is something, too, of *Samson Agonistes* in Aeschylus' poem. There is the stubborn pride, the consciousness of immense strength and fortitude; also the consciousness of having erred. Samson admits his fault, and Prometheus exclaims, 'Of will, free will, I erred, nor will gainsay it'.¹

But Prometheus' martyrdom and even final catastrophe, for all its magnificent fortitude, is barren of spiritual significance. He has done his work for mankind. In that respect he, too, may say, 'It is finished'. But he looks no further. There is no thought or purpose in his martyrdom beyond defiance. There is a secret concerning Zeus which he will not yield. He recks no more of man. His death is purely penal.

The martyrdom of the Hebrew Messiah is fraught with the richest spiritual consequences — the redemption of man from sin and death, the atonement, reconciliation with God, the mediation, the making intercession for the transgressors. The Hebrew mind and Christian theologians have gone much deeper than the Greek mind in this sphere of redemptive purpose.

Even so, it may quite well be argued that, though not explicitly stated, the significance, the gospel, if you will, of Prometheus' life and mission as a Saviour, is the same as that of Christ — love of man, faith in his destiny, hope. Only the plane of action is different. The extraordinary thing about the Greek poet's Messianic vision is that it is, if I might so say, retrospective. There is indeed no hint as to time-happening, as to how long the accomplishment took of his hero's mission to mankind. A thousand years in his Greek sight was but as yesterday, or as a watch in the night. But one thing is certain, it happened in the irrevocable past. It is a *fait accompli*. It happened, also, at the transition from an old to a new theocracy, or, if you will, from an Old to a New Testament.

It is with this humble, earthly race of men that the hope of the future lies, in the view of this Saviour of the human race. Salvation will come from them.

¹ P.V., i. 266.

Prometheus is done with theocracies. Of making these there is no end. Even this new theocracy of Zeus, he knows, is only for an age. He despises it, aristocrat that he is, as a New Order.

Nor has the poet any forebodings of human degeneracy. His philosophy in a sense is that of Comte — Humanity. He knows nothing of a Fall or need for Atonement or Redemption. He indeed has been the Redeemer of Man. But his martyrdom is not eternal, but merely age-long: for, like Tithonus, he is cursed with immortality. Yet some day he will achieve deliverance, and — strange happening — his deliverance will come from one who is the son of man and yet the son of Zeus.

This Messiah idea, then, in Aeschylus differs in many respects from the Hebrew idea, but in nothing so much as this — in Aeschylus the Saviour is seen in retrospect, in the Hebrew writings the vision is prospective. The Greek, therefore, we may say is realist — the Saviour did appear in time and space. The Hebrew idea is prophetic, visionary, vague — the Saviour will come. Thence ensues the strange paradox — we do not know, we never shall know, if a Prometheus Saviour did appear in human history. It is merely a grand, poetic, imaginative projection. The Hebrew idea — faint, elusive, visionary — did achieve realization. In the fullness of time the Word was made flesh, the Light shined in darkness. This was the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world. At a definite point of time, in a definite corner of the world, the Hebrew Saviour of mankind was made manifest.

The difference, again, between Art and Life is well seen in this respect that we have only the dramatic moments of the one Saviour's life represented, while of the other's we have, certainly not a biography, but at least an epitome of the life, including birth as well as ministry and death. Greek mythology, indeed, is not usually preoccupied with that stage of life known as infancy. Taking their immortality for granted the gods bother little about their beginnings. We have indeed the story of the birth and infancy of Zeus on Mount Ida in Crete, the lovely stories of the birth of Pallas Athene and Aphrodite, the boyhood of Hermes, and the infancy of Heracles. But Prometheus, Saviour of Mankind, is projected on our vision in full-grown, mature deity. On the other hand, the story of Jesus' birth in lowliest circumstances is utterly inconceivable in Greek mythology. The mere fact is an argument for the veracity of the Gospel writers.

Nor was the humility of the manger-birth any less repugnant to the Roman imperialist mind. The nearest parallel indeed to the story of Christmas with all its implications is to be found, not in Greek mythology or literature, but in Roman. Virgil's *Fourth Eclogue*, written, be it remembered, before the birth of Christ, foretells the birth of a child who shall inaugurate a new era in human history, a millennium of peace. The child is the offspring of a royal house. But Christ too was of royal lineage, of the house of David. But neither Greek nor Roman would have either dared or deigned to project, even imaginatively, the setting of the child's birth in an inn stable.

Nevertheless the language of the so-called Messianic Ode bears many resemblances to the language and ideas of Hebrew Messianic prophecy; and scholars have compiled an impressive list of parallels. But the idea of the child and the New Age is not unique even in pagan literature, and

once again we are left wondering at the strange similarities of thought in these imaginations of Virgil and Aeschylus, with their visions both prospective and retrospective, and what must seem to the Christian believer their groping, their stumbling towards the same Messianic idea.

Did the writers of the New Testament know aught of these similarities in thought between Hellenic and Hebraic religious beliefs? If so, what did they think about it all? There is, for instance, that notable crux in the First Epistle of Peter which tells how Christ 'went and preached unto the spirits in prison' (1 Peter iii. 19), with its vivid mediaeval interpretation of 'The Harrowing of Hell'. The idea is traceable to such purely Jewish writings as the Book of Enoch; but, of course, in the mythology of Greece also there were heroes who 'descended into Hades', — Orpheus, Pirithous and Theseus, Heracles and Odysseus, while the legendary fame that gathered round the name of Virgil in the Dark and Middle Ages, investing him with supernatural status — he is Dante's guide in the *Inferno* — sprang more from the Sixth Book of the *Aeneid*, with its description of Aeneas' visit to the Underworld, than from the so-called Messianic Ode.

There was one writer at least, university-bred, with access to the Greek and Roman culture of his age, who must have known that pagan mythology in all its richness and variety — Paul of Tarsus. More than once in his Epistles he seems to have in mind the so-called mystery religions which enjoyed such a vogue at that time in the Hellenized world. Yet explicit reference to Greek literature or mythology there is none, with the notable exception in his speech on Mars' Hill in Athens. There, in an atmosphere that breathed poetry, Paul made his one overt allusion to Greek literature. In God, said he, 'we live, and move, and have our being, as certain also of your own poets have said, for we are also His offspring'. But using that merely as a jumping-ground, he proceeded to soar: 'Forasmuch then as we are the offspring of God, we ought not to think that the Godhead is like unto gold, or silver, or stone, graven by art and man's device,' and, with a wave of the hand, Prospero-wise, he sees the Partheon, the solemn temples, the gorgeous palaces, dissolve and fade and, like the baseless fabric of a vision, leave not a rack behind.

Nevertheless, why did Paul declare with such emphasis to his Corinthian converts: 'I determined not to know any thing among you, save Jesus Christ, and Him crucified' (1 Cor. ii. 2)? In the previous verse he says: 'When I came to you, I came not with excellency of speech or of wisdom'. Have we yet plumbed the full depths of that self-effacing statement? Do we get a partial explanation in his Epistle to the Colossians? He will have no competing claims over against Christ, no 'worshipping of angels'. 'For in Him [Christ] dwelleth all the fullness of the Godhead bodily' (Col. ii. 9). So, too, in Galatians we have, it may be, a reminiscence of his Hellenic culture and reading: 'Even so we, when we were children, were in bondage under the elements of the world' (Gal. iv. 3). In both passages Paul is probably attacking a belief in elemental spirits of the Cosmos. Heathen mythology regarded the stars as animated by astral spirits, and late Jewish belief knew of 'Holy Ones above' and angelic 'Powers' ruling 'on the earth' and 'over the water'. The completeness of the Divine Being resides for Paul in Christ bodily, that is, in concrete actuality, and the cultus of angelic powers is thereby excluded: He is, in fact, the 'Head'

of all such. The Divine fullness, says Peake, is not split up and distributed among a number of angels, but exists indivisibly in Christ as an organic whole.

What, then, if the Prometheus myth was actually one of those mysteries which then enjoyed such a vogue? The words translated in Colossians ii. 18, 'intruding into those things which he hath not seen,' it has been suggested, 'may be a reference to the secret spectacle of some sacred drama revealed to initiates in a quasi-pagan mystery'. The word *εμβατευον*, translated 'taking his stand upon', has been shown to be a technical word for 'entering upon' the higher initiation in the Mysteries at Klaros in Phrygia (see Sir W. M. Ramsay, *The Teaching of St. Paul*, pp. 288 ff.).

It surely is not assuming too much to suppose Paul of Tarsus university, familiar, not merely with the Greek myth of Prometheus, but even with Aeschylus' dramatic interpretation of it, and resolved, in his conversion, not to be 'vainly puffed up by his fleshly mind' (Col. ii. 18), and to give no admittance to the pagan Greek ideas of another Saviour of the World. Not even in Athens, where all about him were sermons in stone to remind him of those myths, did he vouchsafe a single mention of the noble story of Prometheus, if only to show how far the Hebrew Messianic idea transcended the pagan myth. It is the most impressive proof, if such proof were necessary, of the Apostle's steadfast resolve henceforth to know nothing, preach nothing, save Christ crucified. Shall we compare his total abstention to Plato's banning of the poets from his ideal Commonwealth? The snare of the myths, like the charm of all the Muses, was a leading away from Him who was the Way, the Truth, and the Life. The austere faith that was to rise to rhapsodic heights in his Letter to the Corinthians was already implicit in the speech on Mars' Hill. All his learning, all his knowledge of Greek literature, was just so much 'partialness', just 'sounding brass, or a tinkling cymbal'. 'Whether there be knowledge, it shall vanish away. For we know in part. For now we see through a glass — in riddles.' The sublimities even of Greek drama were as dross to this Apostle, to whom it was given, 'according to the dispensation of God, to fulfil the word of God: even the mystery which hath been hid from ages and from generations, but now is made manifest to His saints: to whom God would make known what is the riches of the glory of this mystery among the Gentiles, which is Christ in you, the hope of glory'.

J. MINTO ROBERTSON

CARDINAL VIRTUES

THE cardinal virtues according to Greek and Roman philosophers were temperance, prudence, fortitude and justice. The essential virtues according to the prophet Micah were justice, mercy and humility.

Justice did not mean the same thing to the Greeks and Romans as to the Jews. Justice was defined in Roman law as the constant and abiding wish to give every man his due. What was due to him was determined ultimately by the law of nature, that is to say, reason. To the ordinary Jew justice no doubt meant an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth. But to the Jewish prophets it

meant the Mosaic precept 'to love one's neighbour as oneself'. So justice for Micah meant determining one's actions in accordance with sympathy, not reason. The cardinal virtues of the Greeks and Romans, and therefore all virtues of the intellect and will, are moral virtues, if morality be defined as obedience to self-imposed law. Such virtues are primarily self-regarding. Micah's three essential virtues are all virtues of feeling, and virtues of obedience to the law of God. 'What doth the Lord require of thee, but to do justice, to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God?' (or to humble thyself to walk with God). They are all other-regarding virtues — principles of self-expression rather than self-protection. They are spiritual, not moral virtues, and are based ultimately on faith in the Unseen, not on human reason.

Goethe said that the history of man is the story of a ceaseless conflict between faith and unbelief, that is, between faith and human reason, and the ages when faith persisted are the only ages when history is of any interest. The ages of faith are the ages when the spiritual virtues, the virtues of self-sacrifice, are cultivated. The ages of scepticism are the ages when the moral virtues were shown at their best. History shows a rhythmic alternation of period in which the spiritual and moral qualities, respectively, were at their best. It is obvious that an age whose ideal is self-centred cannot at the same time be an age in which humble self-sacrifice is the fundamental virtue, though self-sacrifice for the sake of glory may be its distinguishing feature.

All through the classic period of Greece and Rome, a period of 800 years from the Persian Wars to the days of Constantine, human reason, not faith, was the source of moral conduct and the virtues cultivated were the virtues of self-respect and self-improvement. Self-sacrifice was only admired when it was patriotic, useful to the community and glorious to the individual. In the following 800 years, when the centre of temporal life was not the cities of Athens, Alexandria or Rome, but the spiritual City of God, faith, and not reason, was the guiding principle of conduct, and the virtues cultivated were the spiritual virtues of humility or self-sacrifice for its own sake. In the former period the cardinal virtues were temperance, prudence, fortitude and justice. In the latter period the cardinal virtues of the ordinary man at his best were Micah's virtues of justice, mercy and humility before God. This was the age of saints, and the saints carried the principle of self-sacrifice further than ordinary men. The cardinal virtues for them were the distinctively Oriental virtues of patience, humility and self-renunciation. Confucius had said that humility was the fundamental virtue; Buddha had said that it was self-renunciation; and the Persian Hafis had said that it was patience. Christianity embraced all three in its ideal, and the saints tried to realize that ideal in their lives, while the ordinary man of affairs had contented himself with Micah's ideal.

In the 800 years following the Age of Faith, the papal city of Rome was the centre of human thought, and Christianity was the religion of civilization. But the prevailing ideal was the moral ideal, based on self-respect, not the spiritual ideal of self-sacrifice. The monks' vows of poverty, chastity and obedience, though professedly of Christian origin, are really the classic virtues of fortitude, temperance and prudence in a Christian guise. The knights' vows of utter gentleness, utter hardihood and utter obedience are similarly the classic virtues of self-control, fortitude and prudence under the guise of humility. Love of

glory, not humility, was the motive of the vows, and the end in view was self-realization, not self-sacrifice.

It was the philosopher Hobbes who first pointed out that Micah's ideal for the ordinary man was higher than that of the heroes of Plutarch. He said: 'Justice, mercy and gratitude are instinctive and eternal virtues.' Goethe expressed the same view that justice and mercy were cardinal virtues, though he substituted renunciation for humility. Humility for Goethe meant recognition of one's own limitations, and a voluntary surrender of all that was out of one's power to achieve.

Carlyle, a disciple of Goethe, taught the English people that justice and mercy were more fundamental than prudence, fortitude and temperance. But he called them sincerity and sympathy, for he wrote when the intellectual virtue of truth, not the emotional virtue of faith, was the guiding principle of thought. He therefore laid stress on the intellectual aspect of justice, that is, its truth to fact, and to the intellectual aspect of mercy, that is, its understanding of temptation to the sinner. So justice and mercy were recommended to the nineteenth-century Englishman as sincerity and sympathy. Carlyle, being a worshipper of heroes, had little admiration for humility. But he accepted Goethe's ideal of reverence for what is above, around and beneath us, leading to reverence of self. Thus the ideal set before the early nineteenth century was the ideal of sincerity, sympathy and reverence, as the modern form of Micah's justice, mercy and humility.

Ruskin, a follower of Carlyle, set the same ideal before England. He called the essential virtues justice and gentleness, instead of sincerity and sympathy, for he was more a prophet of action than of understanding.

The Victorian prophets recognized the difficulty of reconciling the Christian virtue of humility with the English ideal of self-respect. Though they all taught the need of reverence, the word humility dropped out of use after Dickens had ridiculed the virtue, or vice, in the person of Uriah Heep. They concentrated on Micah's first two virtues, justice and mercy. But in leaving out humility, they gradually deprived these two virtues of all their sublimity. For humility towards God means magnanimity towards man. George Eliot said: 'Pity and fairness are almost the whole of morality — pity for man's sufferings and fairness to his faults.' Pity and fairness are other names for mercy and justice, but the divine element in the virtues has left them, and they have become purely human with their change of names.

Matthew Arnold carried the change a step further, and taught that sweetness and light were the fundamental virtues — sweetness being the urbane equivalent of pity or mercy, and light being the intellectual equivalent of fairness. The sublime ideal of justice and mercy that the Jewish prophet taught was thus watered down to the Oxford man's ideal of urbanity.

R. L. Stevenson took the change still further by saying that 'gentleness and cheerfulness are the essential virtues'. Such qualities were to him a sufficient ideal for ordinary domestic life, but they are commonplace and uninspiring ideals compared with the divine mercy and justice which the twentieth century has transformed further into good nature and fair play.

The twentieth-century moralists, though they carry on the ideal of gentleness and cheerfulness under the names of good nature and fair play, make a third

virtue also fundamental. But that virtue is not humility. It is courage. This is an age of 'catch-phrases', and the moral ideal now recommended is 'Courage, love and laughter', or 'Courage, consideration and common sense'. The twentieth century has definitely rejected humility from its ideal of manliness, as being inconsistent with the ideal of an English gentleman. Courage, fair play and humour are supposed to be the distinctive characteristics of an English gentleman.

These qualities are not the descendants of Micah's justice, mercy and humility, but of the classical virtues of fortitude, justice and prudence.

It is possible that Tennyson initiated the change from the Jewish Prophet's to the classical ideal when he wrote: 'Self-reverence, self-knowledge, self-control; these three alone lead life to sovereign power.'

This is not the Christian or the Jewish ideal. It is the classical virtues in a modern form. Self-control is temperance, self-knowledge is prudence, and self-reverence is fortitude based on self-respect. Tennyson has disguised the classical virtues in some semblance of a Christian form by his use of the word 'reverence'. But his use of the word is different from that of Goethe, whose 'reverence' was for what is above us, reverence for what is beneath us and reverence for our equals. Tennyson's self-reverence is no part of the Christian character. It is the foundation of the pagan character, which Goethe tried to reconcile with Christianity by asserting that humility gave birth to self-respect.

The poet Blake saw that the pagan ideal was not fit for Christian men, and he denounced prudence, temperance, fortitude and justice as the four pillars of tyranny. He saw that such virtues led men to sovereign power, but he also saw that power as an ideal led to tyranny. A man who makes power over himself his aim soon loves power for its own sake, and then strives to master his fellow-men. This is exemplified by the fact that when some sculptor of the seventeenth century made a statue of Louis XIV, surrounded by four cardinal virtues, the statue of strength was called force, not fortitude.

Shelley attempted to combine the Christian and pagan characters in his conception of Prometheus, whose dominant characteristic was strength and defiance, though he was animated by love for the race of men. At the end of the poem Shelley makes the cardinal virtues to be 'gentleness, wisdom, prudence and endurance'. These are the classical virtues of prudence, justice and fortitude with gentleness substituted for temperance. The addition of love does give a spiritual element to the classical ideal. But it is not love of God. It is love of men. And the strong man cannot force himself to love his fellow-men when he finds that his strength makes them envious of him. No man who relies on strength for self-realization can love his fellow-men unless he is surrounded by humble people who accept his leadership. The only possible basis for the love of enemies and criminals and unpleasant people is the belief that Christ identifies Himself with every human being, and that to do service to a man, however bad he may be, is to do service to Christ. Shelley's ideal has no motive force in it because we do not in fact feel love for all our fellow-men.

Kipling also has tried to combine the Christian and pagan ideals in his square of virtue — faith, wisdom, strength and love. Faith and love are two of the three cardinal virtues of theology, and wisdom and strength, or fortitude, are two of the cardinal virtues of the Greek philosophers. If Kipling's 'faith' is a

faith in God who is a God of love, and who requires us to love all our fellow-men, then faith and love are in themselves a sufficient ideal of conduct without wisdom and strength. For divine wisdom and divine strength will be added without our making human wisdom and human strength our aim in life. Kipling's ideal is an attempt to serve two masters.

Lord Baldwin thinks that for a European there is nothing lacking in the Christian ideal of faith, hope and love, though he adds 'work' to the ideal. But since Christian love is not a mere sentiment, it is a motive force and includes work.

Faith, hope and love are the Christian forms of Micah's essential virtues; for hope means the belief that God is justice, and that justice will some day prevail. Faith, hope and love are the cardinal virtues of theology, though strictly speaking they are not virtues. They are emotions which impel us to be virtuous. If they are not virtues then it might be useful to make up one's mind what the foundation virtues are.

We have seen above that courage, consideration and common sense are simply the pagan virtues of fortitude, justice and prudence in a diluted form. Courage, love and laughter is a mixture of pagan fortitude with Christian kindness and English humour — a very good mixture for ordinary use, but not sublime enough for the ideal of a great nation. Humour is a most valuable quality, which is peculiarly, though not exclusively, an English virtue. We must not lose it. But it is a quality for everyday life rather than a high ideal.

Spinoza said: 'The first principle of divine law is to love God unconditionally as the Supreme Good; unconditionally, I say, and not from any love or fear of aught besides.' He also said: 'The essence of religion is a belief in a Supreme Being who delights in mercy and justice, and whose worship consists in the practice of justice and mercy towards our neighbour.'

Pagans and Christians alike agree that justice is one of the foundation virtues. But justice alone does not satisfy the whole of man. It is said that the mind of man has three functions, namely thought, feeling and will. The Platonic division of the forms of thought into the True, the Beautiful and the Good has now been superseded, but it seems that there must be three fundamental virtues — a virtue of the intellect, a virtue of the emotions and a virtue of the will — which bear some resemblance to the pursuit of the true, the beautiful and the good.

To do justice is a virtue of the will, though to know what is just is an intellectual quality. To love mercy is an emotional virtue, and all acts of mercy, of strength giving way to weakness, appeal to us as beautiful. Humility towards God is a virtue of thought, though humility towards man is not recognized as a virtue except in those whose strength is so overpowering that humility cannot be mistaken for cowardice. Micah's three virtues satisfy the requirements and are a sufficiently high ideal to satisfy an Englishman, provided that humility is towards God and not towards men who are his equal or his superior.

The Christian form of Plato's three ideals, Truth, Beauty and Goodness, is Faith, Hope and Love, and is closely related to Micah's virtues. To do justice in scorn of consequences and to believe that justice will eventually prevail is to act in the hope of the divine control of life. It is an act of will and a form of goodness. It is found in our reverence for our fellow-men, and our respect for their individual rights. Mercy is found in the sentiment of love or reverence for

what is beneath us, though it is usually understood as leniency to the guilty. I prefer the word compassion in the sense that Bacon used it. 'The nobler a soul is, the more objects of compassion it hath.' The remaining virtue must correspond to faith and truth, or reverence for what is above us. Micah's humility will serve the purpose. Thus justice, mercy and humility are adequate, though we call them justice, compassion and reverence. At any rate these virtues are more suitable for a national ideal than courage, love and laughter.

It is interesting to notice that the Church of the Middle Ages found that a perception of the humorous side of sacred things did not diminish reverence. In fact the greater the reverence the keener was the sense of humour. Goethe said: 'All humour should be the lighter side of reverence. They went about their greatest work — As noble boys at play.'

There is another virtue which ought to be remembered, namely, patience. It is a virtue for all men at all times, and is the foundation on which the happiness of the lives of our dependants and subordinates rests. A place must be found for it among the fundamental virtues. It is a Christian virtue, whereas justice is a pagan virtue. The Christian precept is 'judge not at all', and the lesson learnt from English history is that tolerance or patience makes for happiness more than justice does. Therefore patience should be substituted for justice. It includes fairness and cheerfulness, good humour and respect. I should say then that the fundamental virtues of a Christian are patience, compassion and reverence rather than justice, mercy and humility.

But the twentieth-century Englishman, not being overwhelmingly religious, has, as his fundamental virtues, courage, kindness and humour. This is a fine foundation for a nation's character, but there is no religious element in it — no faith. Our nation cannot be a great nation unless its character is founded on faith. If the average Englishman will reply that he can have neither courage, kindness nor humour without faith we must take his word for it, and trust that in the end his virtues are patience, compassion and reverence.

R. M. GOODFIELD

PRAYER AND WORLD REVOLUTION

PRAYER is an art to which even the noblest spirits can only haltingly and clumsily aspire. To a generation not given to seeking God, perhaps wholly unaware of the most elementary disciplines of the devotional life, the call to unite in Intercession to Almighty God must sound almost as strange as an invitation to an Englishman to worship in a mosque. Special days for National Prayer must have caused heart burnings to all responsible for them. And though the difficulties arising in connection with Prayer on Special Occasions is not my theme, it may not be out of place to touch upon one or two of them *en passant*.

There is a certain incongruity in any religious meeting, attendance at which is importuned by the State and by much newspaper advertisement, when the only way men can be united in prayer is in the bonds of peace and the fellowship of the spirit. Also, there is such a diversity of views represented on such occasions, ranging from naïve superstition which thinks that God can be

persuaded if only enough people pray together at the same time, using the same words, to those who regard the Deity as ready to smile graciously upon the war effort and further its success. There are of course nobler intentions among the non-churchgoing public, but these mentioned exist. Such discordant elements cannot be melted in the most cordial atmosphere or dissolved by any voice, however suave. Nor can the personalities from which they emanate be resolved into concord by any wit or wisdom of man. If prayer at any time were an exercise depending upon 'the way we do it', upon our form of words, or, to use the word now more blessed than Mesopotamia—'technique'—we might well despair. Prayer is of Grace, like all other spiritual gifts; and we can believe that God honours almost any form, however primitive, so long as it is not from the Pharisee's rubric. Nevertheless, it is not to be expected that prayer, so intimate and essentially of the family as the Lord's Prayer can provide a model for public occasions. On the whole, the orders of services issued for such times sufficiently provide for what, in the circumstances, must be a rather diffused and diluted kind of spirituality. Such orders cannot in the strict sense be the prayers of the Church but can be prayers used by men wishing to be better and desirous of God's blessing upon themselves and their country.

The major problem about which I am concerned arises whenever we try to think about this far-ranging war and all that is involved in it. If we go to prayer as muddle-headed as we mostly feel when we try to size up the present situation we should sadly malign a magnificent creature if we likened our woolly-mindedness to the unthinking horse rushing into the battle. If we are to pray in the spirit and with the understanding also, we must at least have an object and aim. Nothing is more certain, than that many Christians come together without knowing what they want to pray about though doubtless they feel better for having prayed. But 'a good feeling in the meeting' is not enough. We must try to help one another in a very real spiritual dilemma. Even to say that we don't know where we are is better than pretending. The object of this article is to try to clear the fog by considering certain primary factors, the acceptance and understanding of which seem to me essential if we are to bring reality into modern prayer. The war, says Professor Carr, is an episode in a world revolution. A revolution is, of course, an attempt to change things in favour of those who have set it in motion, and war, like strikes and rebellions, is an attempt to secure the change desired by violent methods. The determination to make far-reaching alterations in the distribution of necessities and privileges may arise from a rankling sense of injustice and suffering, and, equally, from ambition and greed. Both impulses are usually at work when society, seething with unrest, resorts to arms. The point at issue is economic change. The rise of Soviet Russia and the European Dictatorships is due to frustration within the economic structure both in the countries concerned and within the industrial and financial network of international order—or disorder. In all States and countries there is enough of suffering and deprivation to provide just cause for changing the old way of life, and everywhere the spirit of pride and aggression, whether in individual leaders, groups or parties, is sadly in evidence. Hitler's so-called New Order is a good example of a people suffering inhibitions for want of elbow-room and the uprising of a wilful and ugly temper. Hitler and his satellites are making an attempt to replace a bad order with one that is

worse and more oppressive, designed only to benefit one nation. If the issue in the present world war was simply the removal of one tyrant, prayer might mean simply asking God to strengthen the arm of the Allies and give them victory.

Such prayer, however, would not be directly concerned with the cause of the war, world-wide frustration. Besides, in attempting to climb the hill of the Lord we know that, as a nation, our own hands are not clean. For though not responsible for the blood guiltiness of actually starting the war or, thank God, the ruthlessness, cruelty, and the denial of truth and freedom as spiritual values, we are responsible, very largely, for the economic order against which mankind everywhere is in rebellion. It was in this country that the Industrial Revolution began which became a form of Totalitarianism. It is inevitable, therefore, that the note of penitence should be foremost in our prayers and we can be glad that our spiritual directors have fully realized this. Writers like Niebuhr have made it very clear that we are moral men in an immoral world and because of our complicity with the world implicated in its guilt. The first condition of prayer at such a time is contrition and a spirit of humility, a full, frank confession of sins done in the past and a repentance not to be repented of. That there is such a spirit abroad to-day is a promise of good to come.

Perhaps a greater problem in reaching definiteness in prayer is that we have no constructive plans for the future of mankind in the world. In a recent issue of *The Fortnightly* there appeared, from the pen of Peter F. Drucker, familiar to readers as the author of *The End of Economic Man*, an article entitled 'Hitler's Pax Germanica'. One read with amazement and horror of the thoroughness with which Europe was to be parcelled out, the heavy industries all to be brought to Germany, and other countries reduced to purely agricultural pursuits. But, reading it, one could readily understand how every German who had become a thoroughgoing Nazi could both pray and work for an order so definitely and scientifically planned beforehand. Because there has been given no kind of outline, not even the barest sketch of the New World Order, our footsteps may falter on the steps of the oratory. Constrained to pray, we have nothing concrete about which to pray.

It was Ajax's prayer, in the gathering twilight, that the gods should give him sufficient light in which to see his enemies' faces, and we need grace given us at this hour to be able to view our problem in such clearness so as to judge whether it is as formidable as we imagined, or only a shadow cast by our perversity and fear. Let us, then, try to see things steadily and whole. Changes are taking place: they will be followed by greater changes. More control is necessary over individuals and privileged groups. Careful planning is essential if we are to live together in a friendly universe and not a madhouse. Allowing this, is it essential that we see the end from the beginning or must have prophesied for us the shape of things to come? Can we not travel hopefully and securely, with only the road before us, like Abraham seeking the city, not knowing where and how the foundations were to be laid?

Have we not become tarred with the enemy's brush in becoming obsessed with the idea of plans—five years, ten years—forgetting, as he has done to his cost, other agencies at work than those he has called into being; forgetting, as he most obviously has done, to ask the question: 'Who plans the planners?' Are we

not, like him, in danger of being blinded with the gods of this world — efficiency, organization, scientific techniques, economic orders; so absorbed with cupboards, cash-boxes, machines, that we cry up the new Humanism whilst we denounce the old, meantime forgetting the artists, poets, philosophers, mystics and saints: that culture comes before civilization and makes it, that its values — beauty, truth, goodness — are spiritual before they become material, and follow the order of Nature, where function precedes structure, and 'the soul it doth the body make'? And finally, that much greater truth, that all that we mean by such words as cultures and civilizations have their origin in one source, the creative fountain of all true life so that there is no order but only disorder apart from God.

To be limited within the process, to be occupied with the shaping and not the design, is no real obstacle to prayer any more than praying for the kingdom of God, which can never be clearly envisaged, belonging as it does to Eternity. The Christian must always first set his affection upon things above, if ever he is to see things properly beneath. And if there are any lingering doubts that we cannot pray with earnestness about an order which we only barely imagine, the words of a great historian should dispel the last remnants of unbelief. 'A soul which . . . makes the best of its spiritual opportunities will in qualifying for salvation, be advancing . . . towards communion with God and towards likeness to God under the conditions of life on Earth, before death . . . The Christian soul can attain, while still on Earth, a greater measure of Man's greatest good than can be attained by any pagan soul in this earthly stage of its existence.'

Whilst we must ever seek first the Kingdom of God, we must also realize that more and more we are going to be beset by problems, arising out of the complexities of economic order, which call for action. Spirituality will not relieve us from temptations in that order and the necessity for political decisions. We shall be confronted, to be precise, with the task of clarifying the meaning of the ambiguous word Democracy and the shifting of the centre of power and control from the hands of the unrepresentative few to the more representative many.

First, to quote Professor Carr, we have: 'To achieve a re-interpretation in predominantly economic terms of the Democratic ideals of equality and liberty.' What is the bearing of prayer upon such an endeavour? If worship and prayer are relevant in this sphere, their influence and power must be exercised where changes take place — in governments. Lambeth must have something to say to Westminster: the windows of the oratory must look out upon Parliament. Religion and Politics must be shown as somehow related to one another. Surely whenever prayer rises to communion the worshipping Church is joined as one body to the Lord and shares in His never-ceasing creative and redemptive energies. The Church, it has been said, is 'the extension of the Incarnation', and if this means anything, it means that like the Living Word it is active through such agents that bring alterations in the social fabric — Finance, Industry, the Polling Booth, Parliament. It is true, of course, that the Church is concerned with principles and only indirectly with politics. But it needs little arguing to prove that great moral principles are brought into vital activity when confronted by such actual evils as poverty, slums, unemployment, social injustices. The eighth-century prophets of the Old Testament were such magnificently high-towering men because they brought to bear upon the evils of their time the light of clear vision, caring for nothing but God in applying the laws of moral righteousness.

They brought to light evils which for others did not exist because they did not see them.

Now it cannot be charged against us that we have disregarded the need of social righteousness, proclaimed so passionately by Amos and Isaiah. But because we have for ever gone back to the prophets, instead of bringing them up to date and setting them within our own time and environment; because we have rather lazily taken over their discoveries of moral principles instead of discovering them for ourselves by bringing Christian conscience into direct contact with the social evils arising from the nature of our peculiar economic structure, we have repeated their teaching parrot wise, adopted their righteousness, instead of finding it begotten in ourselves.

This evasion of the historical circumstances has reacted upon prayer so that it is often Deistic, a flight from reality preventing its energies from coming down to the miner, the dock labourer, the widow, and the afflicted, save as a pious sentiment; and so it will continue until we realize that the knowledge of our own times, our own economic history, is as important for us as was the knowledge of life in ancient Israel and Judea for the prophets, and must form the background of our praying.

Then in the second place we must recognize, to quote the same writer again, that 'the primary struggle will be to make political rights effective over economic power'. Herr Hitler, it will be remembered, could only get into power when he was subsidized by Heavy Industry. It is widely accepted that the common people have little power to-day to assert themselves against the domination of organized economic power. 'The attitudes and policies of political parties in most democratic countries are determined only in a minor degree by the opinions of the electorate and in a major by the vested interests which supply party funds.' The trend has been for more and more wealth to pass into the hands of fewer and fewer individuals. With wealth goes power and prestige. The question was asked the other day at a religious Brains Trust whether the possession of great wealth could be reconciled with the Christian principles of brotherhood. The reply was given in the affirmative. It may be possible for great wealth to coexist with a Christian profession and character, but it must surely be difficult to possess it without a very uneasy conscience about a system which can make a few millionaires and throw thousands and thousands upon the dole.

The attempt to bring in a totally different order will doubtless meet with the strongest opposition from certain quarters and there may be, after the war, a rising of class against class. This can be prevented by Christians who take their social obligations seriously. The significance of prayer here is that it is a means of rising above the levels of family, social, business, political and traditional levels, from which we may so easily take our values, into an altitude in the clear light of which rival systems can be weighed and judged with the same impartial spirit of judgement as a scientist passes upon his data in a laboratory. Further, prayer provides a spirit which can bring a tranquillizing element into class and party rivalries, thus making for orderly changes, instead of vindictive violence in the social situation.

Christian prayer is concerned both in learning God's will in the world and seeking the courage and resolution to make it effective when it conflicts with private interest. Submission to God's will is not submission to changes that

have become inevitable but submitting to the obligation of bringing to pass such changes as are in accordance with God's purpose for mankind.

A poor man, so it is said, made way at the Communion Table for the Duke of Wellington, who bluffly said 'We are all equal here'. History needs to repeat itself in a modern duke using the same words with the added meaning of equal political and economic opportunities. Nothing to-day is so likely to convince men that there is a power in Christianity, like no other power on earth, than to see men readily forgoing material possessions and privileges so that a juster world may come into being. The Atonement will remain a doctrine in the cold storage of theological treatises until it becomes a dynamic in the lives of professing Christians. But a sense of superiority, a clinging to the amenities that money brings, and, it may be added, patronage in bestowing charity, are deeply entrenched in human nature. These can only go forth through much prayer and fasting.

J. H. BODGENER

JOSEPH RAYNER STEPHENS—A Reassessment

AMONG the various figures which emerge from the troubled seas of Chartism and English Radicalism, possibly none has suffered so much in assessment from subsequent writers as Joseph Rayner Stephens. His biography was written by George Jacob Holyoake in 1886; it is generally admitted to be a poor book, rambling, inaccurate and containing serious mis-statements. A useful note occurs in the *Dictionary of National Biography*, the work of Alexander Gordon, but it is no more than a note. Perhaps the best study is the essay contained in G. D. H. Cole's recent volume, *Chartist Portraits*. Mr. Cole sets out to be studiously fair to Stephens and to illustrate the part which he played in the political life of his times. Yet it is still possible for many authors to portray him as no more than an inconstant politician. For example, in a recent popular study of Chartism, Neil Stewart sums up Stephens' place in events after 1841:

Curiously enough, the principal Tory speaker was J. R. Stephens, who had spoken so often from Chartist platforms on behalf of the policy of physical force. After his period of imprisonment, he had crossed over to the side of respectability, and was now using his demagogic powers for the benefit of the Tories.¹

Stewart later on makes exactly the same charge in another form:

A number of the old Chartists, following in the footsteps of Stephens and Oastler, had taken to a pious respectability.²

The summary of Stephens' career given by Cole shows the extreme unfairness of this point of view, but it also calls for the treatment of Stephens from another angle than the conventional political approach. Stephens was first and foremost a Wesleyan minister: he never ceased to be a minister of religion. The true importance of his career lies in the impact of religious ethics upon social considerations which his preaching illustrates. He did not set out to be a political theorist; he was impelled by a conviction derived from Methodism that the policy of *laissez faire* was sinful and that its upholders must be moved to repentance. He is an important illustration of a certain spirit which was rising up in Methodism; he must be read over against the background of

¹ Neil Stewart, *op. cit.*, p. 205.

² Neil Stewart, *The Fight for the Charter*, p. 165.

contemporary religion rather than as a political leader with a programme sadly wanting in consistency.

Joseph Rayner Stephens was born in 1805, the son of the Rev. John Stephens, a distinguished Methodist minister who was President of the Methodist Conference. The father was a champion of the unbending ecclesiastical authority of Conference, but both J. R. Stephens and his brother, also a minister and editor of a critical magazine, *The Christian Advocate*, were rebellious to a degree, challenging all such authority as undemocratic. Joseph Stephens had been Chaplain of the British Legation in Stockholm; he was the solitary Methodist missionary to Sweden and preached as far afield as Lapland. When he returned to England, he was stationed at Ashton-under-Lyne, where the prevailing social conditions arising from the Industrial Revolution forced political and economic matters upon his attention. In 1834, he was expelled by the Methodist Conference for acting as secretary of an Anti-State Church Association. Henceforth, his ministry was of an independent nature, attracting followers from those who had grown weary of the autocratic rule of Jabez Bunting and other prominent members of the Methodist Conference. During the years from 1837 to 1839, Stephens was a tireless advocate of the physical force policy, an agitator for the Ten Hours' day in the factories with Oastler, and an opponent of the new Poor Law. In 1839, his inflammatory utterances, of which Cole gives numerous specimens, earned for him eighteen months' imprisonment. The government policy seems to have been one of gagging rather than revenge; he was well treated in prison and suffered none of the brutalities which Ernest Jones had to face.

When Stephens came out of prison, the position had changed rapidly. In his defence, he had denied being a Radical or Chartist; he was in fact a Tory demagogue. The new situation called for fresh measures; Stephens now advocated a policy of reform within the existing social system. Taking to journalism, he edited papers in Ashton-under-Lyne and Stalybridge. He was a prominent figure throughout the rise of the Trades Unions and during the period of the Cotton Famine. During these years of stress in Lancashire, he spoke out boldly, denouncing from his chapel pulpit the policy of handing out ragged clothing as a relief for the starving operatives;

It is said that a dissenting minister, having got hold of a ragged pair of trousers which had been given out by the committee, held them up in the pulpit; and generalizing his remarks from the individual instance before him, ridiculed the gifts which had poured in from all parts of the country, with the benevolent intention of protecting from the wintry winds the bodies of men and women who, at their ordinary occupations, experience a constant summer temperature; and to fit their children for attendance on the gratuitous instruction which had been provided for them.¹

This incident is to be identified with Stephens, now for many years an Independent minister at Ashton-under-Lyne. At the time, Dr. J. H. Bridges, afterwards a noted Positivist, was working in Bradford and, writing to Frederick Harrison in January, 1863, he refers to his fiery labours.² Bridges will not allow that there is anything cowardly about Stephens; a sign that his constancy was

¹ John Watts, *The Facts of the Cotton Famine* (Manchester, 1866), p. 264.

² Livinge, *A XIXth Century Teacher* — J. H. Bridges, p. 101 f.

attacked in his own lifetime by Radicals. He writes to Harrison in April, 1863:

Two words as to Stephens. You accuse him of fear. A strange charge against a man whose thirty years of public life have proved that he does not know what fear is. Natural enough from the capitalists, and from the capitalist press. Not so natural from you, who should know that the strongest proof of courage is to have vast power over the people, and freely to abdicate it when you think them wrong. It is not by the Trades Union Committee that he is to be judged; but by the people in governing whom they are his rivals.

Your letter moves me not a jot. I say again that Stephens is more in the right than any of you.¹

The Cotton Famine found Stephens an ageing man; it was his last great contest. He died in 1879 and, ever since, his figure has provoked controversy. The charge of fear and inconstancy has arisen again and again.

Stephens' first public controversy took place in 1834, when he was expelled from the Methodist Conference. So muddled have memories of him become that the grounds of his expulsion are not always stated accurately. In *The Town Labourer*, J. L. and B. Hammond write:

Stephens, the Chartist orator, had originally been expelled from the Wesleyans for attacking the factory system,²

a statement which is merely untrue.³ Stephens had angered his superiors by taking a prominent part in the anti-State Church agitation and entering other circuits than his own to advocate his views. The agitation was in the form of party politics; the Radicals were determined to throw off the vested interests implied by the union of Church and State. Methodism at the time was under the sway of Dr. Bunting, president of the Conference in 1834 and on three other occasions. Bunting was determined to keep Methodism non-political; its task was evangelistic and it had no alignments with political dissent. He was fearful of the determined radicalism of the Independents and of the free theology of the Unitarianism which had captured the remnants of English Presbyterianism. Again, he was a Methodist in the strict succession of John Wesley; he desired to see his Church act in the closest unison with the Church of England. By 1834, Bunting's autocracy was already causing trouble; he was finding bitter opponents in Dr. Beaumont and Dr. Samuel Warren, the first of whom lent to a political radicalism; he had sympathized with the Tolpuddle labourers and the agitation for their return from transportation. Stephens' conduct had caused annoyance to the wealthy laity; he was cited before Conference and, after a hectoring treatment from Bunting, was given an opportunity of recantation. He refused and was expelled the Connexion. Neither the Ten Hours' day nor the new Poor Law were questions which arose in the debate.⁴

The issue was important for Methodism; it was followed by an indictment of Bunting for persistent and open support of Tory candidates for

¹ Living, *op. cit.*, p. 103.

² J. L. and B. Hammond, *The Town Labourer*, p. 279 n.

³ The true reason for his suspension, his anti-State Church activities, is given in J. L. and B. Hammond, *The Age of the Chartist*, p. 239.

⁴ cf. *The Minutes of Conference for 1834* and B. Gregory, *Sidelights on the Conflicts of Methodism*, pp. 150-65. This work is important; it is based upon the eyewitness narratives of Jos. Fowler, of which Bunting admitted the accuracy (cf. p. 4).

Parliament as being an equal infraction of the rules of Methodism. Bunting shouted down opposition and refused to have the matter debated. In practice, he was terrified of radicalism and revolution and thus excused his conduct. But the Stephens' expulsion did not end the matter. Many of the secession Methodists, such as the Methodist New Connexion, had taken to Liberalism in politics; they gave a home for a while to the semi-Chartist, Joseph Barker. In Lancashire and Yorkshire, the 'Cookites', the Unitarian Methodists, showed the same trend.¹ Conflict persisted within Wesleyan Methodism; it led to various expulsions, to the bitter revolutions of 1849, and to the liberalizing processes which took place after 1851. Bunting's policy is interesting; it has been analysed fully in E. R. Taylor, *Methodism and Politics*, 1791-1851. It implies political neutrality; the work of Methodism was strictly religious. A desire expressed by Wesley that his followers should eschew politics had been solidified into a wooden rule. But, the upheavals of the times would not allow of this static position as a real thing; Bunting, by his neutrality, lent his support to a reactionary conservatism which desired to see no form of social change; the younger ministers grew impatient, for circumstances, especially in the North of England, pointed to social conflict. The Unitarians were mainly upon the side of liberalism and *laissez faire*, save in the case of a few radical groups; the Independents included some who denounced such anomalies as a State Church, tithe, church rates, and the like. Stephens and his followers desired to see Methodism expand in the direction of this dissenting radicalism; they were prevented by a combination of conservative ministers and wealthy laity. But they laid the foundations of a radical Methodism which demanded that the theology of sin should be applied to the social order as much as to individuals. As Cole defines his work:

Stephens, trained in this school of religious enthusiasm, committed the crime of transferring his violence and adjuration from the affairs of the next world to the affairs of this, and of exemplifying sin in the persons of the tyrannical millowners and Malthusian reformers who were making the lives of his congregations a misery. . . . Stephens was one of the many Methodist ministers who were driven forth to gather their own congregations among the distressed miners and factory operatives, with a sense of sharing their exclusion from the benefits of the new industrialism and from the religions professed by the well to do.²

In his anti-State Church agitation, Stephens took a line dictated by this religious-political approach. He had little in common with the later disestablishment campaigns of Edward Miall, which appealed to the liberal industrialists rather than to their employees.

An interesting sidelight upon Stephens' religious activities after his expulsion in 1834 is found in connection with the Unitarian Chapel at Oldham. Stephens had many links with Oldham where, in 1839, he addressed a torchlight meeting a few days after Frost's abortive rising at Newport. From 1834 and his expulsion till 1839, some of his followers became the tenants of the Unitarian Chapel which was temporarily in disuse so far as the Unitarians were concerned.³ The negotiations were conducted by Mr. Wm. Knott, a local hatter, who was a

¹ This body is fully explored in H. McLachlan, *The Unitarian Methodist Movement* (Manchester Univ. Press).

² D. G. H. Cole, *Chartist Portraits*, p. 78.

³ cf. H. McLachlan, *The Unitarian Methodist Movement*, p. 48.

prominent Chartist and radical; in 1865-66 he became mayor of the town. Writing to the trustees of the chapel on August 11, 1834, Knott said:

You may perhaps wish to know to what party or sect we belong. We have left the Wesleyan Methodists on account of the Rev. J. R. Stephens (Chartist), and as the question is now settled, we shall want a place of worship, and shall rent one or build one, just as we may be best suited.¹

The followers of Stephens withdrew from the chapel after a tenancy of five years and three months, efforts to buy it from the Unitarians having proved fruitless.

The letter of Mr. Knott underlines the fact that, even though Stephens was popularly connected in the mind of his followers with Chartism and his applied religious views were of a political nature, his movement had its roots in religion and religious association. It was this background which tended to give to it an emotional character and made it unstable politically; Stephens was a collaborator of Chartism rather than at one with such definite and whole-hearted secular politicians as Harney, Attwood, Ernest Jones, Bronte O'Brien, or Feargus O'Connor, none of whom would have been especially interested in his theologico-political polemics as affording the ultimate explanation of social injustice. Stephens was first and foremost a Methodist minister in revolt whose final importance belongs to the history of Methodism rather than to that of Chartism. A few prominent Methodists had been radicals but the general attitude was revealed by John Stephens, father of J. R. Stephens, who—

preached a sermon in 1810 at Rotherham, in which he said that a few Methodist preachers had yielded to Jacobinism, when the fever was at its height, but he said their sins found them out, and they had been driven from a Connexion to which they were a disgrace.²

John Stephens was typical in many ways of the narrowly reactionary views which pervaded the leadership. In the year of Peterloo, he could only see the contest as being—

between vile demagogues and a venerable king; between anarchy and social order.³

His son was stung by this reactionary attitude into discontent which revealed itself in his anti-State Church agitation and his political choice of the methods of the physical force Chartists. As the manuscripts of Francis Place show, he moved about advocating acts which could only lead to direct violence and revolutionary overthrow.⁴ But his activities were intended to be those of a minister of religion rather than of a practical politician. Stephens took a certain course because he felt that morality demanded it. A very similar attitude was shown by the Rev. Henry Solly, a well-known Unitarian minister who possessed Chartist sympathies. In *These Eighty Years*, Solly gave an autobiographical account of his contacts with the non-violent Chartists. His later work for mechanics' institutes shows him to have been, in reality, a social reformer; the peculiar circumstances of a particular time drew him into co-operation with a political Chartist group. His case affords a close parallel in this respect to

¹ A. Marcroft, *Historical Account of the Unitarian Chapel, Oldham*, p. 59 (Oldham, 1913).

² Maldwyn Edwards, *After Wesley*, p. 57.

³ Maldwyn Edwards, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

⁴ R. F. Wearmouth, *Methodism and the Working Class Movements*, p. 130 f., for citations of the Place MSS.

Stephens, whose political activities were also the direct outcome of a moral and religious attitude.

Stephens has often been accused of recanting at his trial. Actually, as early as 1838, he was becoming sceptical of Chartism as a secular political party. As Hovell points out regarding the rapid aggressive movements of that year:

Oastler and Stephens were steadfast in their refusal to call themselves Chartists, and they were swept aside.¹

The defence which Stephens made at Chester Assizes in 1839 was extremely bad but it did not show recantation. He was accused on account of his violent language. He retorted with a long attack upon Carlyle, Paine, Bentham, and the liberal radical position.² He denounced the Attorney-General and declared that he had been persecuted. This outburst forms Stephens' last appearance in the Chartist world save for a brief opposition to his former colleagues at Nottingham in 1842. But, in view of Dr. Bridges's memory of him in 1863, it does not show that he ever recanted his very real sympathy with the working-classes. Like Oastler, he had never in fact reached a political programme which went beyond an unreasoning sentimentalism. His position was that of a demagogic Tory without parallel in Lancashire but with numerous examples of the Oastler school in Yorkshire. He believed firmly in altar, hearth and throne; he looked back to good old days which history has shown to be no more than a fictitious golden age. He felt that certain developments of industrialism, such as the new Poor Law and the exploitation of labour implied by the pure individualism of *laissez faire*, were the cause of this golden age disappearing on earth and the parent of the age of ill which had taken its place. Stephens was convinced on theological grounds that sin was the root-cause of the sufferings of the labouring classes; he therefore employed a form of denunciation for which he could at least cite the authority of the Old Testament prophets! The woes which he pronounced upon industrial civilization led him to advocate violent and immediate action in the interests of a moral social order; it threw him for a while into contact with the physical force Chartists.

When Stephens came out of prison in 1841, the Chartist world had changed from that of 1839. It was already sub-divided hopelessly into varied parties. He was not at home in the new situation; he had never been a Chartist in the sense of Lovett or Feargus O'Connor, seeing the Charter as the absolute remedy for the ills of mankind. His defence at his trial shows him to have felt that he was threatened with punishment for something which was not politics but the Lord's work. He repudiated his fellow-agitators who had stirred up the people for a purely mundane end. When he came out of prison, he devoted himself very largely to his duties as a minister of religion and to journalism. But he never did change his essential convictions and was still insistent that his religious message possessed very definite social implications.³

Stephens was a man of powerful character, possessing great gifts of oratory. His published sermons and speeches show him to have been absolutely fearless; he dreaded neither the Methodist Conference nor imprisonment. George Jacob Holyoake compares him to Kossuth for mastery of tongues.⁴ Holyoake was

¹ M. Hovell, *The Chartist Movement*, p. 74.

² M. Hovell, *op. cit.*, p. 171.

³ G. D. H. Cole, *Chartist Portraits*, p. 75 et seq.

⁴ G. J. Holyoake, *Sixty Years of An Agitator's Life*, ii. 258.

under no illusions that Stephens recanted; his description affords a sufficient answer to uninformed criticism of the Neil Stewart order:

Stephens was a Tory, not of the baser sort who seek personal power for purposes of political supremacy, but of the nobler kind who desire to see power in the hands of the wise (which they take themselves to be) for the improvement of the condition and the better contentment of the people. Stephens was for the Crown, but he was for the people, come what might of the Crown. On the platform he was a master of assemblies. In conversation he excelled all men I have known. He saw all that was in the words he used and all around the subject upon which he spoke. His easy precision resembled that of Lord Westbury. Stephens did vehemently teach armed resistance, not against public order, but against public wrong. The Government did not see the distinction — no wonder the people did not.¹

It is certain that Stephens cannot be accused with justice of settling down into respectability; he supported Tory candidates in later years solely because he had never ceased to be a Tory at any time. His deadly foes were the *laissez faire* Liberals whom he deemed to be sinners who should be brought to repentance. It was only in the sense that for a few years he thought Chartism to be a means of recovering the good old days that he could be called a Chartist. The letter of Mr. Knott does not imply anything more; in 1835, the general designation, Chartist, did not imply all the secular and mundane politics that it conveyed in 1848. Stephens' single parliamentary candidature, his attempt to secure Ashton-under-Lyne in 1837, was in this tradition even though it meant opposition both to a Tory and to the sitting Liberal member. His memory has suffered when authors such as Mr. Neil Stewart read back the circumstances of later political groupings into this date. During Stephens' active life, there were only two political parties. Those who stood in rooted opposition to *laissez faire* Liberalism had no alternative open than to support the Tories. A number of Radicals took this course. It does not prove that their political convictions were any less radical in substance.

Stephens had no place in the Christian Socialist movement conducted by F. D. Maurice and Charles Kingsley from 1848 till 1854. His main work lay a decade earlier. The sole strand which binds his varied utterances into one harmonious whole is that of a preacher denouncing sin and urging repentance; his politics are founded upon this elementary theological assumption. He restored to Evangelical and Methodist religion a sociological note which it had tended to lose. He removed pietism from a preoccupation with the next world and applied its primary assumptions to immediate social conditions. This fact gives to him a permanent importance. It is a pity that he has been usually treated in terms of Chartism for he was only a politician in spite of himself, that he might further prosper the Lord's work. His true place is as an offshoot of the second generation of Methodism. He was the forerunner of the upheavals of 1848 which forced the Methodist Connexion to become more liberal and democratic in its ordering; he was one of the elements which led Methodism away from its older conservative attachment to the Church of England and forced it to embrace within its ranks a more political type of dissenter. He showed that Evangelical religion need not be detached from the events of the social and political fields.

¹ G. J. Holyoake, *op. cit.*, i. 104 f.

The stormy career of Stephens illustrates the extreme difficulty which faces the preacher who brings his message into relationship to the prevailing political and economic controversies; possibly it is not without relevance to the persistent criticisms which are made against the social utterances of the present Archbishop of Canterbury. Failure to do so can only mean that religion accepts a neutrality which, in practice, accepts and justifies the *status quo*; this was the position of Dr. Bunting and it is highly unsatisfactory. But the preacher accepts certain theological premisses; he cannot be bound therefore to the shifting scenery of political programmes. He gives the appearance of instability, for his main interest is the eradication of sin from society. Beyond erecting a mythical golden age in his mind, Stephens had no really practical programme such as that of, for example, O'Connor. He was concerned solely with the overcoming of the sinful elements in the new industrial order. But he has deserved better than he has received at the hands of historians. He was a man of intense sincerity and feeling who insisted that the religion in which he believed must be applied to all life. It is as a preacher and minister of religion that the worth of Stephens must be assessed and Mr. Cole, in *Chartist Portraits*, has certainly undone some of the wrongs committed by previous workers in this field. Any searching criticism of Stephens must lie in the realm of his theology which was not unlike that of Isaiah; it was this intensity of conviction which stirred him to action. It is for this reason that the purely political historians have missed his essential meaning for the most part and have left no more than the impression of ranting inconsistency. Stephens was a considerable power in the Lancashire of his day; his name occurs in connection with a good deal of economic and industrial history as well as that of Methodism. It is important, therefore, that his outline should be drawn accurately.

F. H. AMPHLETT MICKLEWRIGHT

'ALL THE WORLD'S A STAGE'—THE DRAMA OF LIFE

IT is easy these days to charge God with folly in the ordering of our human life. In the confusions which gather about us and in the frustrations which attend upon the work of our hands, there is abundant material, if you are seeking it, for a strong impeachment of the Divine Wisdom. Life is so easily broken into fragments and goodness suffers defeat at the hands of evil men. All of us, overcome with the measure of our sorrow, are moved to strange questionings. Some, like Job's wife, are moved to revolt. They would curse God and die.

It is not our sorrows which break our hearts but rather our failure to find any purpose within them. We could endure with more fortitude, so we think, if we could only understand. The pain of life does not hurt so much as the darkness which gathers about our minds. The wisest among us realize that there is nothing to be gained by revolt, save further confusion and heartache. With a mark of interrogation in their minds, the wise ones face the whole sorry scheme of things, seeking to piece together the fragments of our broken life into a

coherent whole. They try to decipher the hieroglyphic character of the strange events which crash into our ordered circumstances.

Religion has always been presented as an interpretation of life. The priests have always claimed to possess the secret of life and they have professed an ability to read the hidden meanings of the eternities. That interpretation has been given in its clearest terms by the ancient Greeks and Hebrews who more than any people in history have most influenced the life and thought of our Western Civilization and to whom we owe so much for the ordered discipline which they imposed upon human thought and the directive organization of human activity.

In the city state of ancient Athens, some five hundred years before the Christian Era, where the mind of man came to its most lighted period and faced the eternal tangle of things with fearless questionings, a nimble-witted people penetrated the dark mysteries which gathered about life, and formulated and presented a religious interpretation of life which has served to guide and illumine in no small measure the minds of men in all succeeding generations in their persistent efforts to understand the things which they suffered.

They attempted to present that interpretation in their theories and philosophies with disputable success, but when their religious poets enshrined that interpretation in the dramas which they presented on the Greek stage the darkness about life was broken, and light from the source of light and understanding lit up the mysteries with sufficient clearness to give men courage and confidence.

The Greek Drama mirrored the eternities and reflected as upon a screen the secrets which lie on the other side of life. It was not a complete and well-defined reflection since the temporal always obscures while it seeks to reflect the eternal. Words which are used to define the unseen things always darken counsel even as they are used to define and explain the unseen. Ultimate things are too great and elusive to be held in human minds in their entirety and an understanding of life belongs to the ultimate things. When the Greeks looked deeply into the mysteries which environed life they saw more than they could express, and in the tragedies which they acted upon the stage they tried to reproduce the things which they had seen. They tried to reflect in their dramatic action the relations, the interactions, and the connections of the souls of men with the Unseen and the Eternal. They dramatized their spiritual discoveries. They acted the faith by which they were sustained in life, and in that acting they reflected the convictions concerning the reconciliation of the sorrows of life with the meanings of eternity. The Drama was an attempt to display among the things of time the meanings of life which are hidden from human eyes in the mind of God.

Among the Ancient Hebrews the interpretation took a different form but none the less dramatic, and certainly more awe-inspiring in the greatness of its conception and in the fling of its staggering revelation. The Hebrews had no theatre but they had a deep dramatic sense and their religious festivals served the same purpose, and in these they dramatized their national history and their place in relation to the Unseen. They saw themselves upon the stage of time, in the setting of their own land, with other nations bearing a part, as participants and actors with God in a great Divine and Human Drama. The Feast

of the Passover was a solemn drama in which the nation reflected their calling in the caste of history and their destiny in the cosmic scheme of things.

The prophets enlarged on this idea. They saw Israel called to play a special part among the nations of the earth, a part assigned to them in the High Purposes of God upon the stage of human life. History to them was the record of the Drama of God. The Bible is the story of that Drama as it was seen by people who were supreme in their spiritual insight and unequalled in the seriousness with which they addressed themselves to the part which they were called upon to play.

It is with a background such as this that the greatest men among us have thought of life, and in the terms of the Drama they have tried to explain its meaning. It shows itself at more than one point in the New Testament, and St. Paul thought within its framework when he reviewed the history of his own people or when he envisaged in concrete terms the struggle in which he was engaged. He even hints at the angels desiring to share in the struggle and learn its secrets. The Divine redemptive purpose was to him being worked out on a cosmic stage and the whole creation was gathered up in toil to prosper its end.

We recall that Shakespeare spoke of life in these terms:

All the world's a stage,
And all the men and women merely players.
They have their exits and their entrances,
And one man in his time plays many parts.

But it is vital to note that the men and women are players and not puppets. They are not dolls mechanically controlled by strings which are manipulated by some unseen agency and to which their every movement must respond, because it is so willed, so determined, outside of their control. Even granting that the part which they play is chosen for them, we must concede that they are free to play it as they chose, or they may sit in the wings and sulk. They are undetermined in the manner of their life, if not in its part. This assertion of freedom may be contrasted with the fatalism and determinism postulated by that old Persian pessimist Omar Khayyám when he declares:

We are no other than a moving row
Of magic Shadow Shapes that come and go
Round with the sun-illumined Lantern held
In Midnight by the Master of the Show.

Such an interpretation only darkens our understanding. It intensifies our frustrations since it fails to account for the tangles in the strings which manipulate life, tangles which produce confusion in our movements and our purposes. The Master of the Show is a sorry bungler if he is responsible for it all. In our search for an understanding we want light, not darkness. We desire the solution of the problem, not a further mystery.

Even the Greek Dramatists failed to see as clearly as Shakespeare saw this freedom of the players. They laboured, in the twilight of our human understanding, with the weight of a grim fatalism superimposed upon the tragedy of life. The characters in the Greek Drama struggled with an overwhelming Fate already determined before the curtain is raised. They cannot help themselves. They can do no other than they do, for relentless Jove moves them with un-

pitying purpose to their destiny of tears without mercy and seemingly without a revealed purpose. The characters are the sport of the Gods. They are like leaves tossed in an autumn wind and at the last there is not even the hope of another springtime, only a sense of tears in mortal things. There is no meaning in the tears nor is there hope of a time without tears, or of anyone to wipe away the tears.

Shakespeare hurls his defiance against this paralysing interpretation of life, and breaks the shackles which has enslaved the minds of men for twice ten thousand years:

The fault, Dear Brutus, is not in our stars,
But in ourselves, in that we are underlings.

So, we fling that claim as a gauntlet into the face of our present circumstances and shake our minds free from all enslaving thoughts. If we confuse the issues of life and multiply confusion, then the responsibility rests with ourselves. If we fail utterly and fall at last upon disaster, then we shall do so in and of ourselves. Therefore we lift up our hearts within us, and we stride across the stage of life with firmer tread. We determine to play our part nobly; if the part be grim and the odds against us many, we will play the part with a smile, since we are assured that in and of ourselves we shall determine the shape of things to come. We grasp with firmer fingers whatever tools or weapons are placed in our hands, and the purposes in our mind take on a more resolute and disciplined shape. There may be pain, and there may be tears, but these things shall not break our hearts nor bring us to dejection so long as we know that we are masters of our fate and captains of our own destiny.

But we must grasp the sense of the wholeness of the Drama so that we may not be defeated or obsessed by a single event or clashing circumstances and purposes. It is a Drama. That is, it is an ordered and coherent whole, planned and staged with purpose. There is a sense of unity within it as it moves to some definite end and conflicts and contradictions are transmuted. They are made to further and prosper the movement of the Drama towards the desired end. This life is no bubbling of protoplasmic slime stirred into shape and activity by erratic forces from unsunned places blown, producing at one point a moonlight sonata and at another the marching of triumphant evil across the garden of life. There are tears mingled with our love and our laughter. There are the hands, bloodstained and fevered, clutching at and possessing purity and meekness for evil ends, but there are also tiny baby fingers clasping our own in trustfulness and moving us to a stern resistance to evil that meekness may inherit the earth and that decency may have freedom to prosper. All these things are part of a whole, the pattern of which is laid up in the mount of God. We misread the pattern when we isolate a part and give it a wholeness which does not belong to it. The single event or circumstance is no clue to the completeness of the Drama. It is the wholeness which gives meaning to its parts. We are not dealing with a music hall revue in which one item has no relation to the next, a mere jumble of acrobatic stunts, funny songs, clownish antics and pathetic gestures of futility.

Judgment about the Drama, therefore, must be suspended until we have seen it through. Immature opinions must be disciplined into silence. We must wait

until the curtain is rung down on the last act. Until then, the drama is merely opening out, and in its movements, uncovering and revealing the enigma which life is, through a succession of scenes and acts to its last and final stages. A drama in which there was no problem to solve, no villain to hate, no mystery to arouse our interest, no pathetic figure to move us to pity, no evil to stir us to wrath, no difficulties to surmount, and no secrets hidden until the last scene would not be worthy of so vast a stage, nor equal to the pain and toil involved. It would not intrigue our moods nor match our minds. There are parts to learn. We must become familiar with our entries and our exits. Fitting ourselves into the caste is a personal adventure into social relationships and by its very nature a painful and difficult thing. Complications abound, and confusions and tangles are eliminated only as the spirit of the drama casts its spell of completeness, unity, and wholeness upon the company.

My soul, sit thou a patient looker on.

Judge not the play before the play is done.

Her plot hath many changes, every day speaks a new scene.

The last act crowns the play.

But while we are free to play our part as we will, it is important to recognize that we have no choice of parts. It is wisdom itself to become reconciled to that fact. Our parts in the caste are chosen for us, and we are left to play the part assigned to us with seriousness and the spirit of a ready acceptance. There are some parts which we are all wishful to play. But we must learn that it is not the part that matters so much as the way in which we play. The clown always wants to play the part of a tragedian until he learns to take his clowning seriously and becomes reconciled in spirit to his part.

Epictetus, the slave philosopher, has some wise words of direction on this point: 'Actors of just such parts as are assigned to us by the Author of the play, short parts if the play be short, of long parts if the play be long. Should he wish us to act the part of a beggar, let us take care to act it nobly and naturally, and the same if it is the part of a lame man, or a ruler, or a private man; for this is in our power: to act well the part assigned to us; but to choose that part is the function of Another'

Most of us would confess to an intellectual curiosity about the end of the drama, and we want to turn over the pages of the script that we might have a peep at the last page, just to see how it all ends. But supposing that the last page is written in a language which we cannot understand, and in signs and symbols which we are not old enough nor wise enough to decipher? It is only those who experience life who can understand it. It is only those who grow old and scarred in life's conflicts who come to understanding and who enjoy the consolations and satisfactions of that understanding. Life yields its secrets to those who live greatly and dangerously, and it is curious to note that those who have lived abundantly and played their part nobly and courageously are less inclined to ask questions about the worthwhileness of life and its ultimate purpose than those who stand on the edge of things and ask questions. We shall understand the end of the drama only when we come to the end, and only then, since life does not yield a capacity to understand save those things which we have already experienced.

This means that so far as we have gone and within the limits of our present experience we learn that the Drama has a present purpose in the training, the education and the improvement of the players. We shall never understand life until we realize that its purpose lies not so much in the future nor in the consummation of a grand finale, but rather in something being accomplished in the immediate present, and in ourselves. The Drama is constructed to serve the ends of the Kingdom of God, but that kingdom is within us and it is a present and immediate fact. As the kingdom is built within us we begin to understand life in terms of that kingdom and the purpose of the Drama reveals itself in the secret places of the soul. As that kingdom enlarges its scope and sway within us, as it brings every instinct and desire of our human nature into disciplined activity to the will of God we begin to read the last page of the script.

This life, said Keats, is the 'Vale of soul making'. Robert Browning speaks of it as being so constructed to 'Try the soul, educe the man'. Every hardship which we endure, every victory which we win, every moral test to which we are subjected, and every act of loyalty which we perform towards the highest and best that we know for the enrichment of our own life and our capacity for a richer, larger life is increased. It is a process of growth and transformation until the time when we shall look into the face of God and He will find His own image reflected in ourselves.

We shall make no sense of life until we grasp this central fact. Life has no end other than the creation of character. The whole creation groans and travails to produce those who shall be sons of God. Our mental perplexity, and our moral and social confusions arise because the purpose of life is generally mistaken, and because men and women attempt to use life for purposes other than those which God intended. Neither money making nor material prosperity, nor shirking the hazards of life nor the search for a life of pleasure serve the purpose of God. If we attempt to make butter in a rabbit hutch we shall fail as surely as when we attempt to breed rabbits in a churn. Men who were born to be free are everywhere in chains, bound by the confusions and frustrations which their moral disobedience has produced. They are entangled in the twisted strands of life like a kitten who plays with a ball of wool.

Men do not readily submit themselves to the purpose of the Drama nor do they willingly become reconciled to that purpose when it is recognized. We revolt against the conditions and the restrictions which are imposed upon our inclinations. Sometimes we turn the Drama into a Revue in which we play the fool and we hear continually such a voice of regret as that of David weeping over his son Absalom. The tragic refrain of realized folly comes to us continually over the violated gardens and the disordered scenes of life—'The pity of it, Iago, O Iago, the pity of it'.

At other times men turn the Drama into a Comedy and they convert and twist the serious purposes of life into means of self indulgence, pleasing momentary fancies and sensual delight. But darkness falls about them and age old illusions are shattered again and again. The stage is set for serious drama and if it be converted to any other purpose, it becomes a place of tears.

The tragedy of life lies in the fact that we will not accept the serious purpose for which life is created. There is no tragedy apart from this. Sometimes, our rebellion is seen when we project the end of the drama to another and a future

existence with a setting of golden streets and pearly gates because we find this present setting so difficult. We think that with a better environment, with conditions more conducive to happiness and harmony our life will be attended with more success. Then at other times we rearrange the scenery and in our zeal for social change we think that we can break the harsh conditions which are imposed upon our life and create conditions which will make life more acceptable. We become humanists and think that we are sufficient in and of ourselves. We allow the light and knowledge of the Unseen World to fade. At one time men try to live a spiritual life as disembodied wraiths in a material environment. At other times they try to forget the eternities and the fact that here they have no continuing city. And both experiments fail because they ignore and misunderstand the ends which God has set before us in our present circumstances.

Men need to be reconciled to God and this means being reconciled into an acceptance of the conditions under which in our present circumstances we may be free, and by which we may realize within ourselves the end of all God's striving and the triumph of His holy purpose in us.

Then welcome each rebuff
Which turns earth's smoothness rough.
Each sting that bids not sit, nor stand, but go
Be our Joy three parts pain,
Strive and hold cheap the strain,
Learn, nor account the pang,
Dare, never grudge the throe.

What life makes of you is more important than what you make of life.

W. H. STUBBS

FROM GEORGIA, TO YOU OF THE BRITISH ISLES

ACROSS the blue Atlantic from you of the British Isles, and on the other Atlantic coast, there is, in the United States of America, a state called Georgia. It is a beautiful land, and a goodly land. It is a land to which some of your fine British sons have been coming during the last few months to receive training as air pilots.

We have met your sons, and have made friends with them. They have worshipped in our churches; they have dined at our tables; they have slept in our homes, and have been to us almost as our own sons. They have become a link to bind our country more closely to yours. Throughout the past few months, my husband, my daughter, and I have had from one to three of the British lads in our own home over week-ends, and we are indeed grateful that you have loaned them to us.

Perhaps you may feel closer to the people who have temporarily 'adopted' so many of your lads if you have a closer mental picture of Georgia itself.

Georgia, the child of your great England, has become great herself. Settled by your English general, James Edward Oglethorpe, in 1733, it was named for

George II, at that time King of England. The last of the thirteen original colonies of what became the United States, with an area of 59,265 square miles, it ranks twentieth in size in this nation, and is the largest state east of the Mississippi River. It is called 'The Empire of the South'.

The first college for women was Wesleyan Female College, established at Macon, in 1830. Juliette Lowe, of Savannah, founded the Girl Scout movement which has spread to all the world. John Wesley, the great leader in Methodism, organized the first Sunday School ever to be organized in America.

In history, inventions, and production, Georgia is great. Just as this state had the first steamboat, so it had the first passenger train, and the first long-distance telephone call. It had the first sewing machine. The first steamship to cross the Atlantic was the *Savannah*, which left Savannah, Georgia, for Liverpool, England, on May 20th, 1819.

In manufacturing, the largest plant in the world for making saddles and harness is in Buford, Georgia, and the largest industry under one roof in the world is Bibb Manufacturing Company at Columbus, Georgia.

It was Eli Whitney, a Georgia man, who invented the first cotton gin which revolutionized the textile industry in England and elsewhere. The first automobile was constructed by a Macon, Georgia, man. Georgia leads all the world in naval stores shipments.

Besides gold mines and deposits of precious and semi-precious stones, Georgia's marbles and other stone, her bauxite, talc, and other minerals yield millions of dollars each year. Georgia marble and granite is used in construction of buildings throughout the United States and in some foreign countries. Stone Mountain, a solid rock which is located near Atlanta, is the largest visible body of granite on earth. More than a mile high, this rock is seven miles around at the base.

Georgia is a state of mountains in the north, and plains in the south. Oaks, pines, and more than one hundred and sixty other species of trees cover its rich, dark surface. Peaches, apples, pecans, grapes, and other fruits are plentiful. Cotton, peanuts, peppers, corn, tomatoes, sweet potatoes, and other such crops form its bountiful stores of comfort and livelihood.

Georgia's beautiful churches are numerous. The Protestant religion predominates throughout the state, with Baptists and Methodists numerically in the lead. Most of the negroes, who comprise more than half the population of the state, are also of those two denominations.

Hundreds of these Protestant churches open on Sunday morning at nine-thirty or ten o'clock for Sunday School. Sunday School in Georgia (as well as in the other Protestant churches of the United States) means Bible study classes for all ages. Churches have cradle roll departments, attended by infants up to four years. Every age has a department — junior, intermediate, young people, and adult, primary, beginners, with officers and superintendents and teachers. In the church which we attend, as in most of the larger churches, the adults are divided into classes for men and classes for women, grouped according to ages.

Following Sunday School services, usually held in the Sunday School rooms attached to one side of the church, we go into a large church auditorium for preaching services. The young people's training meetings are held in the evening, followed by the evening preaching services. The Georgia church to which

this writer and family belongs has around twelve hundred members, with about six hundred present each Sunday at preaching services, and the same number at Sunday School. About one hundred teachers and officers are required to conduct the Sunday Schools. Periodically training classes are held for Sunday School teachers.

When the first group of the lads, clad alike in their grey-flannel suits, arrived in this town, they were met by a large group of cheering citizens. They smiled and nodded cheerful responses to the greetings extended them. I do not know what they expected, but it seemed to me that they were surprised at this cordial reception. Perhaps it was only the strangeness. Yet they need not have been surprised at all, for every man, woman, and child in the city had eagerly looked forward to their coming.

While the lads immediately buckled themselves down to study and hard work they were free to come and go at will on certain hours of the week-ends. Townspeople lost no time in asking them into their homes, and to the churches.

On that first Sunday, back in June 1941, we met a Methodist lad from Bristol, and were blessed with his visits for week-ends for several months. He told us of his parents, of the bride he had left at home, and of England. Now he is gone from our midst, but we shall carry the warmth of his friendship with us for the remainder of our lives. In every group that has come we have found friends. Numerous other families have likewise 'adopted' from one to three lads during their stay in the vicinity.

It has been our good fortune to meet your sons in various walks of life. Among those who have been in our home many times have been a London journalist, a real estate dealer, two post office clerks, a draughtsman, an Irish farmer, an English farmer, a Scotch policeman, and many others. We have written many letters to the mothers and fathers of these sons, and have received heart-warming letters in return. Now we love the British people more than we have ever loved them. Historically they are our parents, and we are as one.

And this is my last word to you, Parents of England: Even before this appears in print, it is possible that some of our American lads, including sons of Georgia fathers and mothers, may land upon your own soil. Even before they go, we believe that you will receive them with open arms and hearts. We know that we can count upon you to love them even as we, of Georgia, love your sons.

PAULINE TYSON STEPHENS

Notes and Discussions

A REVOLUTION OF RECONSTRUCTION

Dr. Hermann Rauschning needs no witnesses to the sincerity of his anti-Nazism. Resignation of his official and personal connection with the party has been followed by published writings in which he has exposed the perversions of Nazidom with a brave and mordant pen. He has paid for his loyalty to honour and principle with the bitterness of exile and the peril of his life. He is, therefore, not open to the charge of making propaganda for the pernicious regime which is wrecking Europe when he points out in his latest book, *Make and Break with the Nazis*,¹ some of the reasons which attracted many high-minded Germans to the new movement. There were undoubtedly possibilities of good for Europe in the restoration of a disciplined and self-respecting Germany. A strong nation, inspired by the spirit of good-neighbourliness, and wholly desirous of serving the general good, might have led Europe to an ordered and prosperous peace. All the world knows how soon such hopes proved false and vain. Beguiled and bullied by unscrupulous leaders, the German people bowed down and worshipped savage and pagan gods. They became a nation of destroyers. The new order revealed itself as an inferno of 'brute violence and proud tyrannic power', a reversion to the jungle.

With the grim object-lesson of dynamic nihilism before them, what have the nations at war with Nazism to offer in its place? As against Germany's 'revolution of destruction', what signs are there of a 'revolution of construction' waiting to be born when the travail of war is ended? The future of civilization and of Christendom depends on the answer to these questions. A return to the *status quo ante bellum* is impossible. The ravages of total war cannot be healed by a general 'as you were'. That would leave the septic roots of the world's sickness to produce their evil effects again, and the last state of mankind would be seven times worse than the first.

It is now plain to see that the lack of creative idealism in the between-wars period was one of the major causes of the present catastrophe. 'Why was the new order not set up while Germany was weak, and was ready to play her part within any reasonable higher order?' Dr. Rauschning's question is pertinent, and pierces to the heart of the matter. His words should be pondered by all who are oppressed by the calamity that has overtaken us, and who seek a way out of the tragic coil.

'The democratic national State of Europe ought to have been able to build up their own common system in peaceful evolution. They ought to have been able without German meddling or the brutal assault of a conquering dictator, to break the shackles that had so hampered and burdened the post-war Europe, the national economic systems and the political artificialities, each defended day by day as the most precious and sacred of institutions, while the things of real importance were ignored or suppressed.'

The thrust is shrewd, and the charge is just. Leadership was lacking to guide the feet of the nations into the only way of peace. No constructive measures were conceived for the building up of a new world, in which the unifying spirit of goodwill and mutual aid should replace the rampant individualism and self-regarding nationalism of separate sovereign States. There was no vision, and for want of it the world is perishing.

Regrets for missed opportunities, and recriminations for past failures, are of no avail now. The harvest of that unhappy sowing is being reaped in blood and tears.

¹ Secker & Warburg. 8s. 6d.

We must suffer and endure until our warfare is accomplished. But when the fighting is done, and the powers of darkness are overthrown, as we pray and believe they will be, then what? It is a question of vital and supreme importance. To win the war is not a sufficient war aim. A military victory will be Dead Sea fruit if the evil things that brought forth all our woes are left to flourish as before. A new world there must be in very truth, a reconstructed world of loftier mould than men have ever known. Revolution, evolution, call it what we will, the old sorry scheme of things must be changed. There needs a rebirth of civilization and society, the generating of a spirit of unity and community, in which the former separatisms of wealth and class privilege, of nationalistic independence and self-interest, shall be dissolved. The wisdom of the world, the unregenerate heart of man, are not sufficient for these things. They demand a higher ethic, a more spiritual vision, than the noblest humanism can supply. The re-creation of civilization, a revolution of reconstruction, can only be effected along with what Dr. Oldham has called 'the resurrection of Christendom'. Without the ethical basis and the spiritual dynamic of a living Christianity, the world-order of justice and brotherhood and peace is utterly impossible. An un-Christian world will be ever an anarchic world. In the confusions and conflicts of pagan power-politics, mankind is like to find its doom.

Vast and infinitely complicated will be the task of the world rebuilders after the wreckage of the war, but it is clear that the basic and central and dominant purpose must be to bring union out of disunion, co-operation out of division and chaos. The nihilism of Nazism seeks to destroy the unity of the life of mankind. It is the nature of the beast so to do, for unity and fellowship are essentially Christian ideals. The brave and brotherly new world can be created only by men of Christian faith and culture. If unity is to be the basis of any reconstruction with the promise of permanence, a deep change of heart and mind is essential. It will be in very deed a spiritual revolution or resurrection. 'In international relations the system of national States with uncontrolled sovereignty can no longer be maintained; in home affairs uncontrolled individualism is no longer tolerable.' In these postulates Dr. Rauschnig sums up the problems awaiting solution in the post-war years. To attempt to restore the old order of independent national sovereignties, with its manifest weaknesses and dangers, would be to fight against the stars in their courses, to defy the inevitable trend of development in international relations. Divided by 'political artificialities', States have fallen one after the other. Union would have given them strength and security. Time and space are no longer the separative factors which once they were. Science has made nigh that which was far off. Political and economic association is bound to follow. It is the price of the survival of democracy and liberty. Over against the Nazi new order of a Master-Race served by docile slave peoples must be set a genuinely Christian order which will preserve national social life and freedom of individual development, while securing a combination of resources for the common defence, and a surrender of self-interest for the common weal.

In the heart of the storm, while the battle for freedom is at its fiercest and deadliest, it may seem utopian to plan for the post-war world. But the things of the spirit are in the long run mightier than the power of the sword. A resolution taken now, and clearly proclaimed, to abandon selfish sovereignties and the fallacies of autarchy, and to seek the more excellent way of federative union and fraternal co-operation, would bring spiritual reinforcement to the armies of democracy. What is hindering this first step on the road to constructive revolution? The mental limitations and dullness of vision of elderly statesmen, the lethargy and indifference of the Church, the want of knowledge and understanding among the peoples, may all share a part of the responsibility. We tolerate these things at our peril. Disunion and lack of fellowship have brought mankind to the brink of the abyss. We can only be led to

victory by men who look out into the future with a vision of the world as God sees it, when the nations shall form one family, and 'all men's good be each man's rule'. Only in that vision, and in the power of the divine Creator Spirit, can the revolution of reconstruction, the Christian new order, be born.

F. HAROLD BUSS

REVENGE AND RETRIBUTION

CAPTAIN Balfour's demand for ruthlessness, hatred and justice 'tempered with the devil of a lot of memory', and the apparent condonation of 'the wild justice which is commonly called revenge', in a leading article of *The Times* have called forth protests which are as timely as they are certainly endorsed by the Christian conscience.

The desire to exact vengeance for the hideous brutalities of Nazi tyranny is widespread and very natural. It is none the less wrong; it is 'naked evil', as Dr. Temple said in his address to the Convocation of York on January 22nd, an evil in itself as an offence against love, and evil in its political and moral effects. But Dr. Temple went on to distinguish retribution from revenge. 'Retribution', he said, 'is an element in justice, and justice is the primary expression of love; but vengeance, however great the provocation, is essentially a satisfaction of self-centred passion, and expresses, as it also causes, enduring enmity.' This is important and illuminating. The old doctrine of the retributive character of punishment is much out of fashion, largely, I believe, because retribution is commonly confused with revenge, and, consequently, is regarded as opposed to the remedial or reformatory aim of punishment. The result is perplexity; people know not what to think about the rights and wrongs of punishment. The aim of this brief article, then, is to emphasize the distinction between retribution and revenge by attempting to show that the former is of the very being of justice, and therefore of all true punishment.

In his Gifford Lectures (*The Faith of a Moralist*) Professor A. E. Taylor makes much the same distinction as that drawn by Dr. Temple. 'Revenge', he says, 'is essentially a personal gratification to be enjoyed by a party who conceives himself to have been in some way aggrieved or damaged . . . retribution becomes more prominent and more certain in proportion as the feature of satisfaction for the desire of personal vengeance sinks into the background.' Thus retribution, unlike revenge, is impersonal and impartial. It is not prompted by malice. The end it seeks is not personal gratification but the vindication of justice, the moral principle. And does not justice, so outraged and despised in the world of to-day, cry aloud for vindication? 'If justice perishes', said Kant, 'then it is no more worth while that man should live upon the earth.'

Professor Taylor maintains (rightly as I think) that retribution is indispensable to sound ethics. There would seem to be no activity of conscience without it. Perhaps this is most clearly seen when we reflect upon the sense of *guilt*. For this implies a demand for punishment which the offender finds in his own heart. The just sentence of a court of law 'is only the repetition of one which the offender, if his moral being remains sound at the centre, must already have passed against himself.' In being 'brought to book', the offender recognizes that he is receiving what is due to him, his deserts as we say, and in that recognition mainly lies the hope of amendment. 'We indeed suffer condemnation justly; for we receive the due reward of our deeds.' In this confession of the dying thief is there not already the beginning of repentance? So far, then, from opposing the retributive and the remedial aspects of punishment, I think we should see in retribution the foundation, at least in part, of punishment's remedial effects.

Again, if it be true that, as Socrates said, the criminal who is simply 'let off' (forgiveness, of course, is not simply 'letting-off', but is another transaction on a far

higher level) remains worse in himself and more miserable than the offender who is punished; if, to cite one of the paradoxes of the *Gorgias*, the deadliest injury you could inflict upon a mortal foe would be to use your eloquence to 'get him off' the penalty of his misdeeds; if there be truth in this — and I believe it to be profoundly true — then retribution, even the infliction of extreme penal suffering, is not inconsistent with love. There is a stern element in Christian love.

Punishment is thus retributive and remedial; and it is the latter largely because it is the former. In addition to these two aspects, there is a third, the deterrent aspect of punishment. The penal law often in fact has the effect of deterring the would-be criminal, through fear of its sanctions, from the committal of the crime contemplated. The penalty inflicted on a wrong-doer serves 'as a warning to others', and in so doing safeguards society. It has been argued that the true justification of punishment is to be found here, in its intimidating effects, and in the benefits to society accruing therefrom. But this cannot be. For if a man is 'punished' not because he deserves punishment, but in order to deter others, he is being used as an instrument, as a mere means to an end beyond himself. And this is a violation of the moral law, which insists that every one must be treated as an end, and no one may be made merely 'a means of or an instrument for the advantage of others'. Disregard of this principle, the very charter of human dignity and rights, may lead to the most cruel betrayals of justice. Thus, for example, in order to protect themselves by intimidating the public, the Germans recently shot one hundred and fifty French hostages, most of whom were entirely innocent of any act of violence. That deed was doubtless more or less effective as a deterrent. But it was not a just act, nor was it one of punishment. The innocent may suffer for the guilty but cannot be punished in their stead. Punishment is not transferable. The sufferings of Christ on the Cross were not a punishment, for, to quote again the dying thief, 'this man hath done nothing amiss'. The cruder expressions of the substitutionary idea of the Atonement were offensive to the conscience just because they implied the transferability of punishment. We can no longer sing such lines as —

'So out of pity Jesus said,
He'd take the punishment instead.'

Punishment can be inflicted only because it is *deserved*, and the notion of desert involves the idea of retribution — the rendering of what is due. It would appear, then, that retribution is fundamental to punishment in its whole length and breadth, and that deterrence cannot be made its determining factor. Nevertheless, if those who are guilty of acts of wanton brutality in the occupied countries are brought to book for them, before an impartial authority, and receive each 'the due reward of his deeds', one effect will doubtless be to intimidate and restrain others who are capable of such misdeeds. Another effect will certainly be to limit and to discourage 'the wild justice which is commonly called revenge'.

No one has ever spoken more uncompromisingly about the necessity for retributive justice than Kant, the German thinker who was of Scottish ancestry. 'Even if a civil society,' he wrote, 'were to dissolve itself by the vote of all its members (for example, if a people inhabiting an island were to resolve to separate from one another, and scatter themselves over the surface of the globe), nevertheless, before they go, the last murderer in prison must be executed. And this, that every man may receive what is the due of his deeds, and the guilt of blood may not rest upon a people which has failed to exact the penalty; for in that case the people may be considered as participators in this public violation of justice' (quoted by F. H. Bradley in *Ethical Studies*). To find in such words a wholesome corrective of the sentimentalism which is content for the offender simply 'to be let off' does not mean that we can

wholly endorse Kant's moral rigorism. In God justice and mercy are one. In us justice must be tempered with mercy, for, as Portia said:

'earthly power doth then show likest God's
When mercy seasons justice'.

But to discuss the wonderful mercy of forgiveness is beyond the scope of this article, which may conclude with some words of Vladimir Solovyof, the great Russian moralist: 'The true conception of punishment is many-sided, but each aspect is equally conditioned by the universal moral principle of pity, which includes both the injured and the injurer. The victim of a crime *has a right* to protection, and, as far as possible, to compensation; society *has a right* to safety; the criminal *has a right* to correction and reformation.'

J. DUNCAN PERCY

PS.—Confusion of mind regarding punishment is probably increased by the fact that we sometimes use the word loosely, in an unethical sense, as did the Prime Minister in his vote of confidence speech to the House of Commons when he twice spoke of the 'heavy punishment' we must be prepared to take in the Far East. Evidently he was using the word in the sense of punches or blows. But punishment is strictly an ethical term. So much so that to speak of 'just punishment' seems to me tautological, like saying 'just justice'.

BISHOP SHUTE BARRINGTON'S EDUCATIONAL EXPERIMENT

BISHOP Shute Barrington, 1734-1826, was one of four distinguished sons of Viscount Barrington, the author of *Rights of Protestant Dissenters*. He died the same year that the future Bishop was born. It is possible that this son inherited a good deal of his father's magnanimity of spirit.

His early ecclesiastical preferment is evidence of the spiritual and intellectual gifts he possessed. He was appointed successively to the Sees of Llandaff, Salisbury and Durham. He continued at Durham for thirty-five years, 1791-1826, where he died at the great age of ninety-two.

His name is best remembered for his leadership in many social reforms, but even more so, by his introduction of the new system of education, known as the 'Madras System', which was invented by Dr. Andrew Bell. In those days, it was regarded as an experiment, but the Bishop had the satisfaction in his last years of seeing much fruit for his labours. It could not well have been otherwise, for behind it all there was a spiritual motive and idealism which gave strength to his heart. His unstinted generosity, as he poured out large sums of money for the work, disarmed those who might have been his critics.

During his residence at Bishop Auckland he frequently saw large numbers of vagrant children playing in the streets of the town. His heart went out to them in deep compassion. Why were they not cared for and educated and instructed in religious truth? The more his Lordship thought about them, the more was his mind determined to save them. That became the absorbing thought of his mind. If no one cared for them, they would become the slaves of vice, beggary and ignorance. Those children now should have the central place in his soul, and there they should remain to his last hour.

Coincident with these private reflections, an extensive social reform had been working in the Northern counties. During the year 1798 conferences were held at the Bishop's palace to consider plans for bettering the condition of the poor. Among those who were consulted were William Wilberforce, Ebenezer Elliott and Dr. Bell. Sir Thomas Bernard, who became Chancellor of Durham diocese, drew up a plan by which the new social work might be carried out. So was established the 'Society

for the Bettering of the Condition of the Poor'. The Bishop was made its President. The service rendered continued successfully for several years. It was the intimate contacts with the poor which led inevitably to the still more important plans for the education of the children whose parents were unable to pay the fees in the schools then existing. If that were to be done, they were faced with a serious financial problem. But the Bishop did not allow that to bar the way.

The Bishop's first care was to proceed with his plans without interfering or injuring the educational work of the existing schools in Bishop Auckland. He could not allow his scheme to be competitive. There were at that time in the town the following schools: the old Grammar School; a Blue-coat school, founded by the will of Lord Crewe, which had thirty boys receiving small allowances for clothes and books; a Girls' school, superintended by the widow of one of the Curates in the town; a school that was supported by the Society of Friends; and five other schools of limited accommodation, but which were sympathetically considered by the Bishop. In fact, the Bishop encouraged them all and assisted in their progress in many practical ways.

Dr. Bell's new mode of instruction, which the Bishop was so anxious to introduce in his diocese, created another difficulty. Its principles will be referred to in a later paragraph. But the predominant principle was that tuition should be given by the pupils themselves. That was first applied at Madras, scientifically and practically, to the instruction of the poor. But if that was to be applied in the diocese, the Bishop saw that the scholars who were to be teachers must themselves have some training.

To remove this difficulty, his Lordship determined to found a College at Bishop Auckland, for the education of masters, ushers and teachers. It consisted of nine foundation boys, who were to be monitors of the new Barrington School already in course of erection. They were to be clothed, maintained and educated at the Bishop's expense. They were admitted at the age of fourteen and selected from the most promising boys. Sir Thomas Bernard tells us that in order to provide for the permanent support of the establishment, the Bishop appropriated the residue of the dividends of £30,000 three per cent reduced annuities, which he settled by deed upon four trustees for this and other similar trusts. This residue amounted to £436 a year, and was found to be more than adequate to the expense of the establishment.¹

There were important advantages in that arrangement, the most valuable being in the religious atmosphere the students would breathe in the Palace Chapel and the constant influence of the Bishop's own consecrated life. It could not fail to inspire them with the same spiritual ideals his Lordship entertained, especially as his great purpose was the religious instruction of poor children so long neglected.

The next thing was the building of a new free school. The Bishop bought an old house on the south side of Bishop Auckland market-place. It was taken down and the site cleared for a substantial building of three stories with a frontage of forty-five feet and with room at the rear for a play-ground. It was completed and opened on the 26th of May, 1810, which was the Bishop's birthday, he having reached his seventy-sixth year, a fact that reveals his wonderful vitality and youthful spirit. Dr. Bell preached a sermon, and also gave a school feast to the scholars and visitors. Seventy pupils were enrolled, which number was doubled within two years.

The Madras new system of education introduced into the school depended, to a great extent, upon the enthusiasm of its inventor — Dr. Bell. As time has shown, some of its advantages were exaggerated and were soon superseded. But the main object — the religious and moral instruction of the children — is still the ideal in most present-day institutions.

Dr. Andrew Bell, 1753-1832, was the son of a barber in St. Andrews. His element-

¹ Sir T. Bernard, *The Barrington School* (second ed., 1812).

ary schooling appears to have been an unhappy time, for he suffered much by the cruel discipline of his master. He made a vow, that he would some day invent a system of education that would be a delight to the scholars. This he lived to see demonstrated.

He entered the Church, and in his thirty-fourth year went to India and was appointed Army Chaplain, indeed he held eight Army Chaplainships simultaneously. He became superintendent of the Madras Orphanage at his own charges, but found it in a hopeless state of confusion. The sight of a Malabar school, where the natives wrote upon the sand to learn their alphabet, set him thinking and suggested to his mind the idea of the value of the co-operative principle, which became the chief thing in the system. He applied it in the Orphanage with more success than he anticipated and restored the institution successfully.

His financial affairs also prospered, for when he returned to England he had investments worth £25,000. He became Rector of Swanage, in Dorset, but devoted most of his time organizing his new system far and wide. Toward the close of his life, he gave large sums of money to the Scottish Universities and from these sources the *Bell Lecture on Education* was established in 1821, and the Chairs of Education in Edinburgh and St. Andrews Universities were made possible. A portrait of Dr. Bell may be seen in Barrington School.

The outstanding principles of the system have been given fully in Sir Thomas Bernard's monograph. Only a brief summary of them can be given here, for lack of space.

1. The key principle was tuition by the pupils themselves. Upon that the harmony of the system depended. It was not merely to save the toil of the master or that teachers acquired knowledge by instructing others, but rather that more mental energy might be liberated in the scholars and give them unexpected power over their own destiny and prepare them for their entrance into the realms of Scriptural knowledge. As soon as the difficulties of reading were entirely conquered, the Bible was placed in the hands of the pupils. The Bible was made the basis of all moral and religious improvement, and Sir Thomas Bernard gives special emphasis to that. He says: 'The great object of all education is this — that every individual may have free and unrestrained access to the sacred book; as his instructor in youth, his guide and director in active life, and his resource and consolation in declining age'.

In view of the evident anxiety of our own age, as seen in the letters appearing in the Press, this ideal has lost none of its urgency, and is the wish of all who love their children.

2. Division of labour. 'Divide and Govern' is as correct a motto for a school as for a cabinet. It facilitates the execution of everything arduous and desirable. If the subject is to be mastered it must be apportioned into several parts and set out into very short and easy lessons. The alphabet must be taught letter by letter; the words, syllable by syllable; then, word by word; then, sentence by sentence. Nothing complicated must be attempted until the primary knowledge is distinctly and permanently fixed in the mind. It may seem a slow and tedious method, but later, the rapidity of the learner will come naturally from such meticulous care at the beginning.

3. Never pass by any object of attainment until it is thoroughly understood. The scholar must quit nothing, until he has mastered it; not a letter, a word, a line, a stop, a verse, or a sentence. If any lesson be imperfectly learnt, the class must be sent back to learn it again and again, until it is perfectly mastered.

The great art of instruction is to fix and preserve attention without weariness. When knowledge is confused and imperfect, it no longer supplies a light to direct the scholar, or enable him to assist others. In that way, it is possible to give delight and the pleasure which becomes the handmaid of knowledge. The discipline leaves no

sting or resentment, when the scholar realizes he is the master of his work and knows that he knows his lesson.

As an example of these principles we may give only one. It will show what was common in all the educational work of the new school. The first thing the scholars learnt when they were able to read was the Lord's Prayer. The first lesson contained only six words, which were divided by the teachers among his pupils and dictated by him — 'Our . . . Father . . . which . . . art . . . in . . . heaven'. Each boy had his word and pronounced it clearly and correctly when he came to his turn. In syllabic reading the pause in the voice that must take place between each syllable proved to be an effectual cure of what is called a singing tone in reading, and if a boy had a stammer it was found that it also cured the defect in most instances. The second lesson was — 'Hallowed be Thy Name' — and again the same method was followed, and onward to the conclusion without haste and with a happy sense of the complete mastery of the prayer, impossible to forget. As the scholars advanced they learnt in the same manner — Graces for and after meals; short Morning and Evening Prayers; and a few short Psalms. The history and biographies of the Old Testament followed in course among the older pupils. We do not know how far any comments were made on the Scripture learnt, but it is probable that was not regarded as essential for the young minds so long as the words were fixed upon their memory. Modern scholarship, as we know it, had not then entered the field of Bible study.

There were also other novel features in Dr. Bell's system which for a time assisted the discipline of the school. Punishments of offenders were decided by a jury composed of boys from the accused's own class, with final discretion of the master. The cases were, however, so few that the regulation was soon dropped. The awards for good conduct also ceased after a time, virtue becoming its own reward. Payment of small sums to ushers, teachers and monitors were discontinued as soon as their training became more perfect. Harmony and unity of spirit rendered them unnecessary.

If we ask what now remains of the system we should say — Nothing! That, however, would be only of the things seen in those days. In a deeper sense, a great deal remains of the work of the Bishop and Dr. Bell. Their discovery of excellent gifts in the minds of the poor boys, and the surprising birth of moral well-being and youthful enterprise, reveal how much was done and continues to be done by the same spiritual idealism.

The later system of pupil teachers, in 1846, was largely due to what was done at Barrington School. The Bishop's constant care to emphasize the principle of co-operative effort among teachers and scholars alike, still holds the field in all educational work. It is interesting to note that in a recent book — *Handbook of Christian Teaching* — the authors stress the need of the same principle in teaching children what is meant by the Creation Story. So it may be said that if the things once seen at Barrington have faded out, there yet are the unseen things which mould character and give true guidance to youth with the same spirit as in former years.

It was my good fortune to become a scholar at Barrington in 1883, when I soon felt the influence of the high moral standard that prevailed like an atmosphere around us. The severity of the punishments in an earlier school was soon forgotten, and joy and pleasure in the tasks took the place of fear. It was there, I may add, that I earned the first shilling I ever possessed. A clergyman came in one day and asked the master, Mr. Hammond, if he could choose a boy to write a bundle of postcards for him, and I was chosen, though I was not a Church boy, but a Methodist Sunday School scholar. I expected no reward, but it made the gift all the sweeter to my memory.

In a kind letter from the present Head-master — Mr. C. S. Bolam — he tells me that Barrington has been considerably altered since 1929. A shop next door to the

school was bought and the school re-modelled, and arranged on modern lines. It is now a Senior Mixed School with a roll of two hundred scholars. The same care is taken concerning religious teaching. Each day Hymns and Prayers and a short address from Mr. Bolam give the scholars the right key for their studies. The children are very happy, and during the eighteen years Mr. Bolam has been the superintendent of the school there has been no difficulty or controversy to disturb his work.

The question of religious instruction in the schools is a real anxiety for the nation at this time. Whatever things may be proposed for re-building the waste places in our land, there can be nothing so important as caring for the moral and religious training of the rising generation. Inspired by the truths of the Scriptures, they will build the nation on the unseen foundations of righteousness, peace and love.

F. R. BRUNSKILL

THAT STRANGE THING WHICH WE CALL BEAUTY

If, as Keats says, 'A thing of beauty is a joy for ever', it is no wonder that beauty is its own argument and it is always final. When this blank tyranny of violence and ugliness is overpast, there will be a new hunger for old good, beauty for ashes,

The richer life where beauty
Walks hand in hand with duty.

And if some grim earnest souls still urge us to turn away from that pleasing snare, we need not listen to them, any more than to Herbert Spencer who explained beauty as mere sexual attraction and religion as fear of the unknown! Rather, let us heed St. James who declared that: 'Every good gift and every perfect boon is from above.'

In spite of all our present distresses there is to-day a real renaissance of beauty, a great and growing revolt against what William Morris used to call the 'uglification and vulgarization' of life. We have witnessed the working out of a terrible technique for creating mass-mentality on the basis that the State is the perfect embodiment of science, of art, and of religion. There is a natural war between such a system, dealing with men in masses, and art which must spring from free and self-expressing individuals. Practical evidence of this reawakening meets us everywhere to-day: for instance, our new churches reflecting the obvious need for beauty as an aid to worship; in our schools astonishing things being done by children expressing themselves freely in drawing and design; our advertisement hoardings; the little statuettes in the front-windows of working-class houses; and of course the craze for 'beauty-culture', so pathetic and futile in some ways and yet so significant.

Greatly daring, I venture to suggest that evangelical religion in general and Methodism in particular have been in grave danger of adopting what is essentially a *frivolous* attitude towards this side of life. To look upon art as a mere luxury, a kind of trivial embroidery on real life, what is that but a frivolous, flimsy view, unworthy of serious thought and harmful in its practical results? Exactly how this has come about would be a long story. Some of our leading thinkers maintain that such an artificial simplification of the whole problem arises from Cartesian dualism, i.e. our 'common-sense philosophy' of mind and matter. This means that there is really no place left for beauty—it is merely the titillation of some mysterious 'aesthetic faculty'—so that the logical parallel to Cartesian dualism in philosophy is Puritanism (the Puritanical sort) in religion. But is God exclusively interested in piety or moral goodness and indifferent to devotion to beauty and truth? Are we to insist that the artist paint his picture with one hand and worship God with the other? The poets have warned us against setting Apollo to grind moral corn at the Philistine mill. True, there is a sense in which we may refer to art as 'the handmaiden of piety;' but we must hold to it that art does exist in its own right; it stands for that primary

spiritual activity by which we apprehend beauty. As in ethics the concept 'good' is something that is really indefinable, so with beauty; it is one of the 'final values' somehow connected with personality, unique, absolute, and objectively valid.

Now at the risk of resembling a fly in a barrel of tar (to use a very inartistic figure!) I want to explore a small part of this magic realm represented by my own individual personal experience, the experience of an ordinary member of the Christian community with a natural human interest and love for 'whatsoever things are lovely'.

Beginning then with an unforgettable incident of boyhood, I am standing again in imagination spellbound before a plaster-cast of the head of Hermes in our art gallery. It was to me just then the most beautiful thing in the world, with a certain independence and completeness in itself. Consider then what that memorable experience really meant; for, to compare small things with great, just as Bishop Berkeley spent a lifetime in thinking out the full implications of a vision that came to him in youth, so it may be helpful to think carefully about this. Let us call it the *αἰσθησις*, for after all, one has to get back to the real starting-point, the simple act of sense-perception, on which the 'aesthetic judgement' is based. These things at least were implicit, I believe, in that particular experience, although they were not realized: a sense of 'sudden glory', imaginative splendour, a strange quickening of my whole being, an emotion of intense pleasure. There was also a feeling of awe, and a suggestion of fear. (This last, by the way, may help us to understand a certain attitude of fear and dislike often shown by many people towards art and beauty.) Also there was a serenity and a sense of utter reality and finality. The dominant feeling, I think, might best be expressed in William Blake's great phrase: 'Eternity peeping through time.'

This attempt at analysis, however fumbling and imperfect, may help us in wrestling with the question, 'What is art?' — a question so difficult because it has the mystery of simplicity about it. Not 'What is beauty?' for that 'strange thing' is strictly ineffable; you cannot hope to pluck out the heart of that mystery. In answer to the question 'What is art?' you might of course retort immediately: 'What *isn't*?' For those who know best tell us that the activity we call art has assumed protean forms: e.g. a kind of magic, an aid to religion, a servant of history, pander to vice, advertisement of prosperity, guide to conduct — in short almost anything you like to use it for. And all the time it is really that free, unique, disinterested, spiritual activity that has to do with the apprehension of beauty. After all, one might just as well ask, 'What is life?' The philosophers have done their best to provide us with a final 'aesthetic'. From Plato and Longinus down to Hegel, Croce, Samuel Alexander, and Peter Green, they are all helpful in their different ways, but the ordinary man feels he had better leave the philosophers (and the aesthetes!) to fight out their fierce obscure battles while he escapes into a serener air and a more enjoyable world. For some, he fears, would even 'clip an angel's wings, unweave a rainbow'. Where the creative imagination is concerned, poets, lovers, and lunatics have always had certain advantages over the systematic thinkers! As Coleridge remarks: 'What rule is there which does not leave the reader still at the poet's mercy and the poet at his own?' Robert Bridges has warned us that

ev'n the Greeks themselves, supreme
in making as in thinking, never of their own art
found the true hermeneutic.

And again he speaks of

that ladder of joy whereon
slowly climbing at heaven he shall find peace with God,
and beauty be wholly spiritualized in him,
as in its primal essence it must be conceived.

Beauty, he tells us, is something unique, 'an absolute piece of Being'. This is perhaps to anticipate; but it may help us to distinguish between pictorial descriptions and a strict definition. Literary exponents of art are apt to indulge in verbal rhetoric when they try to say what a great picture or symphony *means*. That, of course, can only be said in its own material. For instance, to 'comment' on the 'Eroica', that is, to explain what Beethoven *meant*, you would need to expound it in a second piece of music of your own; and the man who did not take in the 'text' would be no less baffled by the 'comment'. (Which reminds one of the old saint's remark to her minister who had lent her a Bible Commentary and asked later how she liked it: 'Well, sir,' she replied: 'the Bible do shed a lot of light on that book!')

Now all this may be rather depressing, but it does warn us as to what not to expect in trying to solve the problem. It is so easy to do what many writers do, falsify the whole problem by starting with some very doubtful assumption, e.g. Croce takes the *lyrical poem*, and Alexander *sculpture* as the one true type of all art. One would assume rather that it would be *music*, for that is least dependent on its medium and therefore, as Walter Pater remarks, might be regarded as the type of what every art *would be if it could*. ('It gives a very echo to the seat where love is throned.')

At any rate, with this clue in hand, we may boldly stake out this claim and maintain with Croce that all art is *one*; it is always and everywhere an individual, unique, spiritual activity; a kind of 'revelation', something that takes place without any effort of the will. Taking various forms, it finds expression through different media, according to the variety of artistic gifts and training. The poet expresses his creative imagination in words, the painter in form and colour, the sculptor in marble, the musician in sounds. Yet in the last resort all are essentially the same; each is in all and all in each. Thus, to use a familiar expression, we may speak of a cathedral as 'a poem in stone' or as 'frozen music'. What we call 'natural beauty' may also be included in this general conception, for as we often say, 'Nature is the art of God'; and in any case 'natural beauty' in the moment of recognition is intimately connected with personal spirit and its activity.

What of the old difficulty expressed by the phrase 'Good art and bad morals'? We know that a great deal of nonsense has been written about 'Art for art's sake'. Also we know that, as A. N. Whitehead puts it: 'The defence of morals is the battle-cry which best rallies stupidity against change. . . . One incidental service of art to society lies in its adventurousness. . . . Stagnation is the deadly foe of morality.' But, as he says: 'The charge of immorality is not refuted by pointing to the perfection of art.' Lovers of art must remember that, to say the least, art must sometimes suffer for the sake of other interests. After all, life is greater than art; an artist is a *man* — having special artistic sensibilities, no doubt, for good and ill — but a definite personality, placed in the moral and spiritual order of the world. We may say to him: 'Be a good man, and then express yourself as freely as you like.' For some of us the only way may be to pluck out the eye and cut off the foot, but surely Our Lord did not mean all to go through life with a maimed personality. Again, a morally bad man may paint an excellent picture; it will not be as good as it might have been, but on the other hand it could not be wholly bad; for 'There is a soul of goodness in things evil.' Nevertheless, art is dangerous; hence in its highest forms there is always a certain austerity and severe restriction. That may partly explain why the poets were politely bowed out of Plato's ideal state. Being in a sense 'possessed', they are awkward people to have about — even in a family or a church!

As to the practical question of the bearing of all this upon our Christian thought and life, the essence of all art is vision and we know that 'Where there is no vision, the people perish.' That means a certain flash of insight, and so with aesthetic perception. The perfect type and origin of it all is just this: 'God said: Let there be light

and there was light.' That applies to the great Leonardo da Vinci and to the most prosaic of us; he spent three days gazing at the blank wall of the convent before painting the 'Last Supper'; and we, not being artists at all, cannot express our vision in colour, stone or music, so we have to get it expressed *directly*, without any intervening medium, in character, conduct, life. But the quality of vision is vital; most precious are those moments of mystical awareness when we 'see into the life of things'. The true artist helps greatly for his is a true revelation; he brings 'authentic tidings of invisible things'; he is eyes to us who are purblind, feet to us who are lame; he brings us the more of truth that we could never win for ourselves.

Another memorable personal experience may illustrate this. It so happens that these lines are being written on August 6, the Feast of the Transfiguration. To me Raphael's wonderful picture will always be associated with a certain experience many years ago in a Chinese village. Two or three of us had been hard at work helping refugees and others. Pitiful scenes there were: one little group especially, bringing a poor sufferer to us, might have walked straight out of the Gospel pages. Afterwards, between sleep and waking, I saw as in a vision Raphael's masterpiece as never before or since; the glory of the Mount with the three Shining Ones, and there down in a corner the poor distracted father appealing in vain to the disciples. No longer was there any puzzling incongruity; the genius of the painter had reconciled the two things, *redeemed* it all into a glorious unity. Thus by his immediate intuition, by the delicate inner truth of art, the artist may give a hint, an 'intimation' of how Reality itself is dealing with things. No wonder art has been described as 'Man's Amen! to the glory of God!'

If, as some believe, we are soon to witness the next flowering-time of the arts, it is well that that essentially superficial attitude already referred to is rapidly changing. Unlike Walter Pater, of whom it was said that he in a certain sense invented beauty and didn't know what to do with it, we to-day should know what to do with it, and what it may do with and for us. (One thinks of James Smetham, Methodist artist and class-leader, and wonders whether we know what to do with him!) For modern thought, art appears to be also a natural link between science and religion. Perhaps we need more 'liaison-minds', somehow combining the self-authenticating vision of the seer with the commanding power of the systematic thinker; and, above all, the beauty of holiness. . . . The 'Beatific Vision' being still man's final lore, it is his first and last duty to make his own life into a true work of art.

CHARLES GIMBLETT

Editorial Comments

CONTINENTALISM?

Whatever may be the strategic situation in the various fields of war, it is already obvious that Hitler is defeated. The Allied Nations have not yet achieved victory, but the Fuehrer is beaten and the strange thing is that he has defeated himself! His primary aim was the establishment of a New Order in Europe. It seemed so simple. To occupy a country, to assume control of its economic and political life, and to canalize all its enterprise so that a steady stream of profits flowed to Germany — that was the programme to be carried out in every European land. Through it the *Herrenvolk* would be well-fed and supremely happy.

It has not worked out like that. Poland, Czechoslovakia, Norway, Greece, Russia and even France have discounted his plans. Wherever German armies have come there is anger, opposition and the smouldering fires that will surely blaze up presently. These signs are part of the bitterness of defeat. However long or short the struggle may be, it is now clear that Hitler will never establish his New Order in Europe — not even temporarily in the more completely possessed territories. Poland, with not a single Quisling, is proof of the futility of his plan. Norway, in spite of its Quisling, has listened gladly and proudly to its Bishops condemning the persecution of the Jews and so defying Hitler with his legions and his intuitions.

One of the reasons for this stubborn and invincible opposition in all the occupied countries is undoubtedly the spirit of independence which cannot be destroyed in democratic peoples. The complete failure of the New Order is due partly to the attempt to dominate each separate nation, but it is due also to another fundamental cause. Europe has ceased to exist as an isolated political unit. No plan for the future can succeed if it be confined to such artificial limits as those implied in the term Europe. 'Continentalism' is as fatal to New Orders as is exaggerated and selfish nationalism.

As Professor Wilhelm Keilhav, of Oslo University, recently pointed out: 'Europe is not a continent of its own, and its delimitation against Asia is not based upon any natural or even existing realities, but is wholly conventional and extremely arbitrary'. It is not a geographical unit nor is it a racial unit. Under modern conditions it cannot be a satisfactory economic unit. 'The New Order firmly established in an isolated Europe would mean the ruthless rule of an impoverished German master-people over an ever decreasing number of over-worked, unhealthy slaves.' The Atlantic Ocean is no longer to be considered an 'estranging sea'; it has become a highway for the commerce of the world. World politics are a reality. The plans for to-morrow must concern Washington, Moscow, London and Chungking. However wistfully Adolf Hitler may have dreamed of world domination, he has been increasingly conscious that the first, inevitable stage must be the complete conquest of the 'European' nations. A recent article in *Das Reich* defined his policy: 'Once and for all the German Government wish it to be understood that the new Europe will give no concessions to America. This includes not territorial concessions only, but economic as well. Never again will America be allowed any part in European economy or industry — neither through shares nor investment. Europe under Germany's domination will be isolated against any kind of American interference.' The presence of the armies of the United States, as significant as the constantly arriving convoys laden with munitions and food, is the immediate answer to such outpourings. The New Order in Europe — the dream of a defeated man — will never be realized. Any

satisfactory plan of reconstruction must leap over all artificial boundaries and envisage the whole world. The closing passage of the noteworthy speech delivered¹ by Professor Keilhav contains this exhortation: 'Only if we fully understand the greatness of the situation will we be able to succeed. Therefore we have to give up the traditional superiority complexes attached to the notion of "Europe" and approach the peace problems as true citizens of the world'.

LIBERTY—IN BRITAIN AND AMERICA

Wars may be fought and won in the cause of freedom, yet be followed by an aftermath in which liberty is curbed and the victors, themselves, be less free than before. 'The condition upon which God hath given liberty is eternal vigilance', and John Philpot Curran might have added 'and increasing knowledge'. Freedom involves responsibility. Its protagonists must face enemies without and enemies within. One of the best safeguards against losing the liberty for which we are fighting is an appreciation of its nature and a knowledge of how it came, in any measure, to be ours. Many of us have been long indebted to Dr. G. P. Gooch for his interpretation of history and our debt is increased by the monograph on *Our Heritage of Freedom*² which he has recently written. In it he maintains that this precious possession 'rests on three stout pillars — the independence of the nation, the sovereignty of the people, the rights of the individual'. He believes that we shall preserve our freedom because 'the willing co-operation of free men produces strength, not weakness'. In describing the evolution of constitutional self-government he says, 'England is not merely the mother of Parliaments but the chief architect of ordered liberty. It is indeed her chief contribution to the welfare of mankind.' Here is a text which should be expounded by leaders of youth movements everywhere in our land. Here is the reason for the development of a more intelligent sense of responsibility.

When Dr. Gooch traces the course of the struggle for the rights of the individual he finds three main lines of advance — towards the supremacy of the law, freedom of expression and religious equality.

The political thinkers whose work he characterizes are Hobbes, Locke, Halifax, Burke, Bentham and Mill. Of these, he reminds us, Hobbes was authoritarian, the rest were libertarian. 'Hobbes was chiefly interested in the authority of the sovereign, Locke in the sovereignty of the people, Burke in the solidarity of society, Bentham in the needs of the individual citizen.'

Whilst one is examining the roots of the freedom which is our British heritage, one thinks instinctively of the people of the United States, linked with us in this tremendous hour. They, too, stand for similar political liberty. In 1863 Abraham Lincoln began his speech at Gettysburg with these words: 'Fourscore and seven years ago our fathers brought forth upon this continent a new nation, conceived in liberty. . . .' The phrase sends us out to trace eagerly the pedigree. Who begot their thought of freedom? Is there here the spiritual kinship which, even now, is holding us together in perilous places? Is it because of this common heritage that the future of mankind is guaranteed? The political theory on which the Constitution of the United States is founded was the theory interpreted by Locke. The Declaration of Independence maintains that 'all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness'. It asserts, too, that 'whenever any form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it'. These and the related sentences are described by Dr. Gooch as 'pure Locke, of whom Jefferson, like the other founders of the United States, was a diligent student. It is a

¹ At the International Congress of the P.E.N.

² G. P. Gooch, C.H., D.LITT., F.B.A. *Our Heritage of Freedom*. (The Individualist Bookshop. 6d.)

source of legitimate pride to Englishmen that the American torch of liberty has been kindled at the parent flame.'

With such a heritage, in such an hour as this, we stand firm, rejoicing in possessing freedom of expression and freedom of worship, and determined not to rest until we have won for mankind complete deliverance — freedom from want and freedom from fear. The gifts our fathers won for us can only be retained as we strive to win those further gifts for our sons.

BERNARD LORD MANNING

The personality of Bernard Manning was the result of a strange blending of strength and gentleness, of modesty and courage. He believed in being, as he once wrote, 'ultra-conservative in the details of life, so as to be able to strike out on liberal lines in the big things'. His death has removed a much-loved personality from Cambridge and has brought a sense of personal bereavement to many who knew him only through his writings. He had a style so intimate and sincere that there were times when one read the printed page and seemed to hear its author speaking. He was always a welcome contributor to the *London Quarterly Review*, and from an editor's standpoint a kindly and considerate correspondent. Not the least of one's privileges was the preparation of his book on *The Hymns of Wesley and Watts*.¹ One of the tasks he had before him on the eve of his passing was a review for our pages. Remembering these personal links it was with gratitude that I began to read his biography² written, with sympathy and understanding, by F. Brittain, his friend and colleague. It is a delightful and vivid sketch of one whose modesty might easily have perplexed a less discerning and less intimate friend. Born at Caistor, on Dec. 31, 1892, Bernard Manning was baptized in the Methodist Chapel. That was fitting, for his father had been trained at Westminster College. Though he became a staunch Congregationalist, he never lost his love for Methodism, and few men have had a better or more critical knowledge of the hymns of Charles Wesley.

From his boyhood he was compelled to fight a constant battle against ill-health, but he fought so silently that one forgot his affliction. That was what he desired. 'No bump-supper was considered complete until he had satisfied the clamorous undergraduates by making a speech. He went to Henley every summer to watch the Jesus crews competing in the regatta.' In 1925 he was elected Treasurer of the Amalgamated Clubs of the College. 'This new office brought him into close contact with the members of the component clubs — rowing, "rugger", "soccer", hockey, cricket and tennis. He took the greatest interest in their affairs.' The picture calls up another — that of Robert Louis Stevenson, blinded by Egyptian ophthalmia, crippled yet writing with his left hand, in a darkened room, *A Child's Garden of Verse*. On one point, at least, Bernard Manning and R. L. S. would have understood each other.

His education began at the little seventeenth-century grammar school at Caistor. It never ended, for though he won his way to Cambridge, and became eventually Fellow of Jesus College, he was ever learning. A list of academic successes would tell us only the least important things about the man. His friendships were revealing. Undergraduates called him Bernard, though he was Senior Tutor. Men like Foakes-Jackson, Nairne and A. C. Benson called him friend, though he was so much their junior. Of the association with Nairne, Mr. Brittain says, 'He was attracted to Bernard Manning from the first. . . . They had many ecclesiastical interests in common, but what united them most was their other-worldliness. Neither of them could see that he possessed this quality himself, but each of them saw and admired it in the other.'

He was tolerant but definite in his religious convictions. Calling himself a Dissen-

¹ Bernard L. Manning, M.A., *The Hymns of Wesley and Watts*. (Epworth Press. 6s.)

² F. Brittain, M.A., *Bernard Lord Manning*. (Heffers, Cambridge. 7s. 6d.)

ter, he was influenced by Congregationalism, Methodism and Anglicanism. Only ill-health prevented his becoming a Congregational minister. His sermons were usually expository, always original and always charged with spiritual power. (A volume,¹ recently published, will be reviewed in a later issue.) On Sunday mornings he went regularly to worship at the Congregational Chapel in Trumpington Street, where the Rev. H. C. Carter, his close, personal friend, was the minister. At night he went to Jesus Chapel where the services were conducted by Foakes-Jackson or Edward Wynn. 'Jesus Chapel,' he wrote, 'is a wonderful place. . . . One can just hear the birds outside, and an occasional step in the cloisters. Besides that, all is quiet. The windows are a holy study. The conventional types in the chancel, though crude and far from life-like, have still a symbolism, a meaning beyond form, and at least press home the facts of our great faith. The Burne-Jones windows in the nave are of another kind — natural, free, living. . . .'

In his short memoir, Mr. Brittain has given us many pictures of his friend. They are all well-composed and well-limned but none is more perfect than the following:

'A countryman and a lover of the countryside; a Whig, that is to say a patriot not merely as a Tory or a foreigner may be a patriot, but a patriot peculiarly appreciative of our English parliamentary traditions, loyal to mild monarchy, rejoicing with a slightly superior air in that unique turn in our constitutional development which has saved us alone of all the world from the tyranny alike of monarchs and revolutionaries; pious but utterly unclerical in point of view; critical of prelates and quietly scornful of those shallow persons who see at a glance through the whole sham of the Christian religion; never taking himself too seriously and always ready to smile at his own extravagances; tender, sympathetic, appreciative of every place and person and point of view that he knows; insular and rustic, but scholarly and gentle, a sort of etherealized and evangelized John Bull.'

One could look in vain for a better description of Bernard Manning than that. Any one who knew him can see how every phrase fits him exactly. Yet, remarkable to say, the man who wrote it did not know that he was describing Bernard Manning. He intended it for a description of Cowper. It was, in fact, written by Bernard Manning himself in the course of an article on Cowper's poetry.

His contributions to religious history included a dissertation on *Some Aspects of Popular Religion in the later Part of the Fourteenth Century*, chapters on Edward III, Richard II and Wyclif in the *Cambridge Mediaeval History*, and expanded version of his Thirwall Essay, *The People's Faith in the Time of Wyclif*, and four lectures on *The Making of Modern English Religion*.

In his varied and full life he found time to edit the *Cambridge Review*, to become an important member of 'The Roosters', an amusing club at Jesus College, to deliver addresses at meetings of the Congregational Union and Swanwick Fellowships and to preach at the High Chapel, Ravenstonedale, Westmorland, where his father was the minister.

In all his activities he remained a humble pilgrim, a bonny fighter, a loyal friend and a devoted servant of God. It is not without significance that a few months before he died he spoke to the Assembly of the Northamptonshire Association of Congregational Churches on the subject of the Christian attitude towards death:

'The war has made it impossible for any of us to avoid facing the fact of death. We cannot pretend that death does not matter at this moment. The present experience of Western civilization has shattered all glass houses of that pattern. It has shattered the bungalows built by people who hoped to ignore death till they were too moribund to notice it. Those bungalows and glass houses the war has destroyed, but it has never shaken the house which Divine Wisdom has builded for herself.'

¹ Bernard L. Manning, M.A., *A Layman in the Ministry*. (Independent Press. 5s.)

This, then, was his attitude as he came near the gate of Death. On his last journey to the Nursing Home, he took with him a Bible, a Prayer Book and a copy of *Hymns for the Use of the People called Methodists*. Presently he sent for a book on the Latin of the Vulgate, and a copy of *Redgauntlet*. Such was his last library. In some ways it was a commentary on his whole life. He was a defender of the faith who moved with sympathy and understanding amongst the crowd, teaching them many things but always eager himself to learn. Now he has passed from us we remember the lessons he taught not only with his lips but even more completely by the manner of his life.

LESLIE F. CHURCH

Ministers in Council

MANCHESTER DISTRICTS' MINISTERIAL ASSOCIATION. The programme for the next session of this Association is in active preparation and arrangements are in the hands of the Rev. T. Hacking, its secretary, who has successfully carried through so many of the previous gatherings.

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NORTH WESTERN AREA MINISTERIAL ASSOCIATION. The Rev. H. Wakefield of Liverpool, the new secretary of this Association, writes me that at the forthcoming eleventh annual session at Bebington, Birkenhead, the Rev. W. B. Bilborough will preside. In the morning the Rev. J. T. Wilkinson, Ph.D., will read a paper on 'The Doctrine of Grace in the New Testament', after which a critique will be given by the Rev. A. L. Wigley, B.A., B.D. In the afternoon the Rev. Ambrose Allcock will present an essay on 'Religious Education in Day Schools'. On this subject the discussion will be opened by Mr. W. Newman, M.A.

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BISHOP HENSON ON EDUCATION. The reference in the last paragraph to Religious Education calls attention to a topic now being canvassed on all hands. Bishop H. H. Henson in his *Retrospect of An Unimportant Life*, vol. i (Oxford University Press, 1942), dwells in this connection upon the work of Dr. Davidson when Archbishop of Canterbury. In his biography there was a failure, says Dr. Henson, to point out the essential weakness of the case which the Archbishop was in some sense officially bound to advocate. That weakness lay in the fictional character of its main assumptions. Much emphasis was placed on the injury inflicted on parents by the type of religious teaching provided in the State schools but it was not true that the parents themselves were conscious of any hardship. It was assumed that the parents of the children attending Church schools attached great value to the specifically denominational teaching which was given in them, whereas not only was there small evidence that such was the case but it was notorious that the majority of parents regarded the type of Anglicanism represented by the foremost clerical champions of 'distinctive Church teaching' with misgiving and dislike.

That is a strong but deserved criticism of one factor in the situation. But Dr. Henson has a second point to make. He remarks that it was urged that the Anglican laity were making great financial sacrifices in order to maintain Church schools. As against such a plea he contends that it was well known that Anglican laymen were mainly influenced by considerations of self-regarding economy. That statement has, indeed, received corroboration from several other sources.

* * * *

PREPARING IN WAR FOR PEACE-TIME EDUCATION. From yet another angle we see in *Haldane: 1915-28* by Sir Frederick Maurice (Faber, 1939) how a layman looked upon Education, and that too whilst we were in the midst of war.

On July 12, 1916, Haldane rose in the House of Lords to move a resolution calling attention to the necessity of preparing for the future, when the conflict would be over. Plans for educational advance must be laid beforehand. Speaking from twenty years' previous experience he held that the theme of education must be made interesting to the nation. It must be shown to mean not mere examinations. It meant, he argued, the training of the mind in the widest and most comprehensive sense so that the youth of the country might be able when the time came, to turn, it might be to science, it might be to other humanities. He was especially concerned, he told the House, with the education of the children of the working classes. He had often wondered how

many Watts, Kelvins and Darwins had perished in the vast mass of untrained talent which the children of the working classes afford. He held that our greatest mistake in this country had been in concentrating almost exclusively upon the education and training of the well-to-do. At the age when compulsory elementary education ceased, what provision was there for the child of the working man unless he had a very exceptional and keen father? In consequence of this, he believed that at that time ninety per cent of our population had not that education which was required if the nation was to make the best use of our available talent.

At a later date he quoted Matthew Arnold's warning that the time would come when for the ordinary man material prosperity would not be enough and he affirmed that what Arnold foresaw had come to pass. The workers, said Lord Haldane, were in revolt against a scheme of things which, as they saw it, reserved all the best things in life for a small and not too obviously useful class. He demanded that there should be conferred on the worker two freedoms — freedom from the domination of capital and freedom from his own ignorance.

And now in 1943, whilst we are in the midst of another war, amid a fresh debate on Religious Education, do we not need as Churches to take heed lest many of our fellow citizens come to think that sectarianism is more concerned with its own dogmatic interests than in making possible the best educational facilities for every child — and not least for the child of the village?

* * * * *

AN OUTSIDER AND RELIGIOUS EDUCATION. Those outside the Christian Churches — and they form, alas, the majority of the inhabitants of our island — have a right to be heard on the questions clustering around religious education in our day schools. The Rationalist Press Association is therefore making its voice heard in the matter. It claims that its members include such men as Lord Horder, Sir Arthur Keith, Professor Albert Einstein, Dr. Julian S. Huxley and Sir Henry Wood, and that it can speak for many thoughtful dwellers in the land. Following its policy of cheap publications, it has just issued a fifty page pamphlet on *The Riddle of Religious Education and a New Solution* by A. G. Whyte, B.Sc. (Watts, 6d.). The writer shows himself well acquainted with the history of his subject and gives citations from various recent books and articles.

He thinks that it was ironical that Headmasters in a conference on January 3, 1942, should pass a resolution which on the one hand pledged themselves to make the Christian Faith the basis and inspiration of their work, and on the other hand made at the same time an appeal to the leaders of the Christian Churches in this country to find means of preparing a joint statement of our common Christian Faith which could be employed as a basis for the teaching in the schools. Mr. Whyte sees in this an ingenuous confession of blind faith. As for a practical response to that appeal, he asserts that it is one thing to combine for action against the common foe of unbelief and indifference but quite another to achieve unity of belief within their own ranks. . . . Well . . . it is perhaps sometimes good to see ourselves as others see us!

But what is his solution? Quite frankly he avows his own personal preference for the secular solution. Why should teachers be called upon to become lay missionaries, to do in the day schools what clergy and ministers have failed to do in their churches, chapels and Sunday schools? He would himself plump for secular education, as did New Zealand fifty years ago. He believes that this is the way marked out by strict logic.

At the same time he recognizes that in practical politics we are not swayed by logic. We are creatures of compromise. And so he names an alternative. It is that scholars should be taught in our day schools comparative religion.

He insists that there is urgent need of a world-view in every branch of knowledge.

Extend, therefore, the scope of religious instruction to include Hinduism, Buddhism, Mohammedanism, Confucianism. In his opinion this would have real value for developing appreciation of the life of millions in other lands. Both teachers and taught would, he is sure, find this subject one of keen interest. The historic sense would also be intensified and religion would be shown to be dynamic, not static.

Turning from this R.P.A. pamphlet, it is interesting to see what the revised edition of the *Cambridgeshire Syllabus of Religious Teaching for Schools* has to say. The compilers of that Syllabus set themselves to map out a programme of religious instruction for scholars up to sixteen years of age. Dealing with this very matter, the authors of the Syllabus state, 'Reference to the great religions of the world other than Christianity . . . will be almost inevitable in dealing with the central affirmations of the Christian Faith'. But it has to be noted that treatment of this comparison is deferred. The writers promise to include it in a later course to be prepared for pupils between sixteen and eighteen years of age.

May it not, however, be possible to heed the suggestion for a much earlier treatment, a suggestion coming from a very unexpected source, and — whatever the motive behind the proposition — to give effect to the proposal so that scholars in elementary day schools may learn of the children and faith of other lands to whom we owe in sympathy and love the sharing of our fuller knowledge of God, no less than the imparting to them of a growing partnership in our commerce and civilization?

W. E. FARNDALE

Recent Literature

The People and the Presence: A Study of the At-one-ment. By W. J. Phythian-Adams. (Milton, Oxford. 12s. 6d.)

Canon W. J. Phythian-Adams's recently published book is a comprehensive and stimulating piece of work. The sub-title may prove misleading if the reader expects a full-scale treatment of the Atonement, for many of the Biblical aspects of this doctrine are left untouched. What the writer has attempted to do is to set Christian doctrine in general against the background of a detailed study of the idea of the 'tabernacled Presence' of God, as it appears in the Old and New Testaments and in the subsequent course of 'Sacred History', in the life of the Church. Step by step Canon Phythian-Adams traces the manifestation of the Divine Presence in the religious life of Early Israel, with special reference to the dualism of the Covenant-theology, in the teaching of Jeremiah and Ezekiel, and in the faith and worship of the Jews after the Exile. Next follow a treatment of the New Covenant and studies of the teaching of St. Mark, St. Stephen, St. Paul and St. John. Sometimes the writer presses his views beyond the limits of sound exegesis, notably, I think, in his submission that John i. 14 means that the Word tabernacled *in us*, and also in his treatment of Mark i. 2 and xiv. 58. Occasionally, he coins new words, such as 'Sonhood' and 'Naomorphism' (sanctuary-symbolism), but these may be defended as necessary aids to the exposition of novel and illuminating ideas. In a valuable Epilogue he expounds these ideas, using as a philosophical basis the principle of 'Holism' made familiar by Field Marshal J. G. Smuts, the view, namely, that throughout created nature there is a principle of co-ordination and integration which operates through a series of stages, and issues in an ordered structure of 'wholes'. Thus, he maintains that the New Creation is the crown and fulfilment of the whole creative process, and that the Life of the New Creation is Eternal Sonhood within an Organism which is the Body of Christ, and in a fellowship which is the Communion of the Holy Spirit.

The first of these points is made by a survey which begins with the amoeba, traces the emergence of Man and his efforts to achieve a communal life, and rises to its climax in the fact of the Incarnation. Like those which have preceded it, the Incarnation is a creative act, 'an act of at-one-ment wrought out of the Life of God who is Love'. Of this section one may say that for a reader whose interests are mainly scientific no more persuasive argument for the acceptance of Christian truth could be devised. The second point leads naturally to a moving presentation of the doctrine of the Church. Here, as throughout, Canon Phythian-Adams maintains his communal emphasis. While, on the inward side, Sonhood is 'participation in the inward Life of the Son', on the outward side the New Creation 'is an historical entity which the World can recognize', the Ecclesia, 'the body of Christ'. We could wish that the writer had not thought it necessary to disparage the more personal aspects of the Christian experience in developing his theme. Thus, for example, he insists that regeneration is not 'the mere establishment of more "spiritual" relations between the individual and God'; it is 'Incorporation'. Surely the former is not a small thing; indeed, without it the latter is mechanical. But most readers, I hope, will be disposed to express gratitude rather than to make complaint. I cannot think of a recent work which sketches a grander conception of the Christian Church or provides a better answer to those who are tempted to wonder if she has failed. We are reminded that she is an 'Organism' 'still in the making' against a background of age-long creative process, and that 'the long-suffering of God still waits upon its maturity'. It is an uplifting thought to be assured that 'gradually there is taking shape the vision of an Occumenical Church, a Church in which old "unhappy divisions" shall become

blessed diversities of grace abounding'; and, with the writer, we also hope and pray and work for 'the day when the Church will be manifested among men no longer as the Tabernacle of the Presence which moves in the midst of them, but as the City of God, the Zion which will be their home', as it was seen of old in vision by the Seer John.

VINCENT TAYLOR

The Rape of the Locks—The *Perikeiromene* of Menander, translated by Gilbert Murray (Allen & Unwin. 5s.)

We know tantalizingly little of Menander, though he wrote more than a hundred plays, and was the most famous representative of the New Comedy, and though quotations from his works are abundant. Dr. Gilbert Murray, whose translations have helped so much to make known to English readers the genius and spirit of Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides and Aristophanes, has translated the *Perikeiromene* of Menander under the title, suggested by Bernard Shaw, *The Rape of the Locks*. In the translation the play is complete, but only about half exists in the four extant Greek fragments. Therefore Dr. Murray has supplied what is lacking by conjectural emendation saying that the result is not a work of exact scholarship.

Since there was no chorus in his plays, and the characters were neither divine nor heroic nor even kings and queens but were ordinary men and women: and since there was a definite plot, and the ending was generally a marriage, following the removal of the obstacles to the course of true love, there is in Menander, despite much that is artificial and conventional, something more akin to our modern comedies than is felt in the comedies of the earlier Greek periods. In this volume the readers have a chance to appreciate a whole play, and at the same time they can exercise their wit to discern where Menander ends and Murray begins. Modern authors must get accustomed to having their plays hacked and hewn into almost unrecognizable shapes to fit them for the films, but here is a scholarly, understanding and sympathetic pen filling in the gaps in a play only half of which has been preserved. The reader is left wondering what Menander would have thought of his play in this form, and whether the Murray version may not be an improvement on the original.

F. B. CLOGG

Physics and Philosophy. By Sir James Jeans. (Cambridge University Press.)

Another book by Sir James Jeans is quite sure of its public. He has no rival as an exponent of his own subject. Readers of his previous books of this kind will find the same excellent characteristics, especially the writer's gift of illustration and explanation. If the discovery of brilliant analogies is the hall-mark of genius, that mark is surely here. A conspicuous instance of this is the imaginary peasant in the middle of Europe, who has never seen the sea, picking up wireless signals from every ship in the world and plotting their successive positions on squared paper. We must leave the ingenious peasant to the reader however. He illustrates the way by which we discover the pattern of events controlling phenomena, but we cannot know what the pattern means or how it originates. Even if 'some superior intelligence were to tell us we should find the pattern unintelligible'.

Sir James discusses philosophy in a vein of rather disarming modesty, but we cannot help feeling that he represents the borderline between physics and philosophy rather as a great gulf. 'While the workshop of the scientist is his laboratory, or perhaps the open field or the star-lit sky, that of the philosopher is his own brain'. Moreover, 'the philosopher not only speaks but thinks in subjective, the scientist in objective terms'. But we have been previously reminded of words engraved upon Kant's tomb—that

philosopher's deep reverence for the starry heavens above and the moral law within. Sir James finds the order of these items very significant.

'Modern physics is not altogether antagonistic to an objective idealism like that of Hegel', we are told. Incidentally, Hegel tried to rehabilitate the ontological proof for the existence of God, which is here described, as to its older form at all events, as 'a transparent piece of logical legerdmain'. As to logic, Sir James is very scathing about the Aristotelian logic, especially the law of the excluded middle. The dialectic of Hegel, however, we have known described as a 'mentality' rather than a philosophy — a night when all the cows are black. We are not at ease here. The best modern repudiation of Aristotelian logic that we know is to the credit of Dr. Goebbels, who seems to describe a certain retreat as only an advance to the rear.

There are strong warnings to those who travel by the high *a priori* road, and Eddington's epistemological argument is discussed. The sword of the mind is no two-edged weapon, and even if it were such it could not force this oyster of a world. All is empiricism. What is said here about materialism and free-will, and all the answers, is that they need restatement. Mechanism, however, will probably not be reinstated, and pictorial representation is not possible. None the less, in some ways 'modern physics has moved in the direction of mentalism', and 'the argument for determinism is in some respects less compelling than it seemed to be fifty years ago'.

R. SCOTT FRAYN

John Henry Muirhead: Reflections by a Journeyman in Philosophy on the movements of thought and practice in his time. (Allen & Unwin. 15s. net.)

It was characteristic of J. H. Muirhead that he should describe himself as a journeyman in philosophy and as having no original ideas of his own. But to many who knew him and his writings he seemed rather to be an accomplished master of his subject. It is true that he was more an interpreter than an originator, but he was a great interpreter. His book on *Ethics* has been a chief guide to the subject for half a century, and is still not superseded. And his study of *Coleridge as Philosopher* is a fine piece of fresh research, whilst his account of *The Platonic Tradition in Anglo-Saxon Philosophy* is a most illuminating history of part of Western idealism. Many other works owe much to his inspiration, though perhaps his greatest feat was the editing of the splendid series of books in the famous 'Library of Philosophy'. He was one of the pioneers of Hegelianism in this country, and to the end he retained his belief that it was the greatest thing that modern thought had to offer. But he kept contact with newer developments, generally in an appreciative though not uncritical spirit. His tolerant and comprehensive nature sought out points of agreement with his own views, and he was a colleague beloved of those from whom, like Alexander, he greatly differed.

The present volume is in part a delightful autobiography, in part a racy commentary on men and events. For Muirhead had plenty of Scottish shrewdness and humour and had met many distinguished people. His descriptions of Edward Caird, Green and Nettleship, Jowett and Bradley are vivid, whilst the account of John Ruskin and his teaching is most just. 'We are beginning to wonder whether his denunciation of our generation as the most cruel and unwise that ever troubled the earth — the most cruel in proportion to our sensibility and the most unwise in proportion to our science — was not literally true.' Most of Muirhead's story in concerned with life in university towns — Glasgow, Oxford and Birmingham — and with social work in which he played a notable part. But the revelation of his own spiritual struggles away from Scottish Presbyterianism through Unitarianism to 'Free Christianity', which seems to be much the same as liberal Hegelianism, is quite fascinating. To the

end he maintained that it was not Hegel's thought which fostered the great wars of modern times, but the imperialistic reaction against it in the works of Nietzsche, Haeckel, Treitschke and the like.

Muirhead had a large number of pupils who are now carrying on his tradition and who revere his name. The present reviewer can remember with gratitude his encouragement of a young philosopher engaged in argument with an expert like Mackenzie.

Muirhead's own 'reflections' are completed by his editor, Professor Harvey, who has enriched the book with appreciations by himself and Dr. Helen Wodehouse of a personality well described as 'among the most lovable of men, and the most worthy of love'.

ATKINSON LEE

Marcion and the New Testament: An Essay in the Early History of the Canon. By John Knox. (University of Chicago Press.)

Marcion is one of the most interesting figures in the Church History of the first half of the second century. But the period is obscure: the extant documents are few: and almost all we know about Marcion comes from those who wrote to refute his heresies. This means that, as Mr. John Knox of the University of Chicago says, conjecture about him and his importance is unavoidable; and Mr. Knox has exercised his right in making conjectures, which if they can be considered probable would have a considerable effect upon the study of the Canon of the New Testament. He agrees with Harnack that Marcion was not primarily a Gnostic. His antithesis between the God of justice of the Old Testament and the God of love was his interpretation of the Pauline antithesis between the law and the gospel. Marcion set up Christian writings as true Scripture over against the Old Testament. In this he was primarily responsible for the idea of the New Testament. His Scriptures consisted of 'Apostle' and 'Gospel', ten Epistles of Paul, and, as is generally supposed, a mutilated Gospel of Luke. The Church answered him not by rejecting his Scriptures but by absorbing them into a larger whole. This accounts for the contents of the New Testament. Marcion had ten Epistles of Paul, the Church had thirteen. The Pastorals were written partly as an attempt to answer Marcion's teaching. But the Church added letters from other apostles and made another book, Acts, the beginning of the 'Apostle'. The meaning of all this was to put Paul as it were in his right place, qualifying the picture of his relation to the Christian community which is given by Marcion. The differences between Marcion's text of the ten Epistles and that of the Church is due partly to omissions by Marcion. He left out passages which he thought were out of harmony with the true Pauline position. But some of his readings were genuine, and his text was nearer to the original in some respects than that afterwards sanctioned by the Church. This leads Mr. Knox to suppose that Marcion's Gospel was not an abridgement of our Luke, but a more primitive form of the Gospel. The Church answered Marcion's 'Gospel' by adopting four Gospels, and by the adoption of a two-part work which was both Gospel and Apostle—Luke-Acts. This two-part book was an early apologetic response to Marcionism. The 'Gospel' as Marcion knew it did not bear the name of Luke; it was simply 'the Gospel'. Luke-Acts was put into its final form about the middle of the second century; the first part is based on a Proto-Luke which Marcion also used. Mr. Knox has made a careful study of the material at hand and of the literature about Marcion. In a short review there is no space to do justice to the way he builds up his case. He admits that some of his conclusions are more obviously true than others, and are held with greater conviction; but he claims the whole has a rational consistency. The evidence, he admits, is too meagre to disprove or to prove his theories. Many serious difficulties are presented by his conclusions, and are not satisfactorily cleared by his examination.

of the linguistic question involved, nor by his attempt to meet the objection that the compiler of this second century Luke-Acts made no use of the Pauline Epistles which must have been familiar to him at the time when he wrote.

F. B. C.

Jesus in the Light of History. By A. T. Olmstead. (Charles Scribner's Sons. 10s. 6d.)

This book lays down a large plan. It seeks to give the exact chronology and itinerary of the ministry of Jesus, to set it in its social and religious environment, and to appraise His words and deeds in the clear light of history. The tone, too, is confident. Traces of later editing of the Gospels in the interests of faith may apparently be detected with some ease, and sayings in answer to questions not raised until the days of the early Church carefully separated from those which are authentic. In accordance with Dr. Olmstead's axiom that 'our extant Gospels preserve all the phenomena of "translation Greek"', the Greek of the Gospels must be translated back into the Aramaic which Jesus spoke. In a word, 'at long last, Jesus makes His own appearance in the full light of history'. These are ambitious claims, and it would be idle to suppose that they are wholly fulfilled. The strength of the book lies, as we should expect from so accomplished an archaeologist and historian as the Professor of Oriental History in the University of Chicago, in the detailed topography, especially of Jerusalem (with its clear map-plan printed in duplicate), and in the competent survey of the historical and religious background of our Lord's ministry. But the book does not present a satisfying picture of Jesus. Its very wealth of detail is apt to obscure one's vision. Much of it consists of copious extracts from the Gospels, which the author's comments seek to connect and expound. These extracts, too, are marred by the excessive literalism of the author's renderings, which meets and oppresses the reader continually. One need not be a purist to shrink from such sentences as: 'Like this did we never at all see anything,' 'you shall not wash *my* feet to the end of time!'. One can only wonder also at the assurance which readily deletes certain passages as interpolations, which, as the author thinks, sometimes yield the result of 'sheer nonsense', and naively says of another section: 'There must be an element of truth in the narrative. It cannot have been all invented, it is in such complete contrast to what followed.' At not a few points the careful reader will demur; for example, to the statement that Jesus was at a minimum about fifty years of age. But this will not lessen his appreciation of the skill and thoroughness with which the life of Jesus is set in its historic *milieu*. Bibliographical notes and full indices add to the usefulness of the book. The names Annas and Thackeray are misprinted on pp. 207 and 293 respectively.

H. G. MEECHAM

The Cuban Church in a Sugar Economy. By J. Merle Davis.

This is a book which may not make a popular appeal, but no student and enthusiast of the oecumenical movement should miss reading and studying it. It is excellently done and we congratulate the author in his presentation, both of the problem and the constructive suggestions for its solution. The sub-title of the book, 'A Study of the Economic and Social Basis of the Evangelical Church in Cuba', focusses and concentrates the reader's thought upon the main theme. The Sugar Economy is seen in the intensified growth of the sugar-cane and the manufacture of sugar. This actually is limited to three to four months of the year and during the 'dead' season — the remaining eight months of the year — the people live on their earnings made during the busy season, which are not large, and exist during the larger part of the year in conditions bordering on starvation. This is astounding especially as the soil is marvellously fertile and offers ample scope for farming and gardening. But the people seem to be

content to live in poverty rather than give themselves to manual labour. The result is that the people are very poor, which is reflected in their enfeebled health, the high mortality from various maladies, the bareness of their homes and the lack of many of the mere necessities of life. This is particularly so in the rural areas, and while there are some large cities and towns in the island, Cuba is essentially a rural community.

Such is the problem that the Christian Church is facing. The Roman Catholic Church is strong in numbers and influence in the larger cities. The Evangelical Churches are also comparatively strong in the urban areas and often regard their work in the rural districts as adjuncts to their urban work. The crying need is for a bold policy in education and the rehabilitation of the people, in agriculture, in handicrafts and in pursuits which will enable the rural population to rise above their poverty, to stop the migration of the more ambitious young people to the towns and cities, and to train leaders for all these activities. As he sees the need, the reader longs for the inspiration and leadership of a man like J. F. Oberlin. What he did for Waldbach, such a man could do for Cuba. Here is a great opportunity for the Evangelical Church. With strong statesmanship the people, we believe, will respond because of their temperament, their environment and their racial heritage, a great work can be done for the people and a new chapter written in the great story of modern missions.

S. T. HOPPS

The Totalitarian War and After. By Count Carlo Sforza. (George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 3s. 6d.)

In this little volume (78 pages) of 'personal recollections and political considerations', Count Carlo Sforza, former Italian Foreign Minister, seeks to serve the cause of freedom by revealing the truth. Escaping from France in July, 1940, he sets down his own reflections on the European situation, more especially from 1938 to that date. From his intimate knowledge of affairs and personal acquaintance with many of the actors, he reveals the incompetence, greed, bad faith, cruelty, and lust for power prevalent in high political circles. Claiming as an Italian to be internationally minded, he declares Fascism to be 'the most anti-Italian episode of the millennial history' of his country. Count Sforza surveys the countries of Europe, and from personal contacts behind the scenes, tells the sordid story of political intrigue that marks the Nazi-Fascist attack on democracy. Yet he has faith in the future. On the basis of 'national but sobered patriotisms', he believes it is possible to build a true internationalism; and concludes, 'this authoritarianism and its beastly wars are really the birth-pangs of a safer and wider and better organized world-democracy'; 'Liberty is a right which must be won anew each day'; 'organized peace is a blessing which must be safeguarded each day'. If these lessons are learned, and we pass into a more disciplined age, the sacrifices of these days will not have been wholly in vain.

A. J. D. LLEWELLYN

Science and Ethics. By C. H. Waddington and Others. (Allen & Unwin. 7s. 6d.)

This book is in the form of a discussion. It opens with an essay by Dr. C. H. Waddington on the contributions which the scientific outlook may make to our ethical ideas. He argues that the modern developments of psychology, anthropology, Marxism and Logical Positivism, which have often seemed to leave no basis from which our ethical beliefs may be derived, should really be interpreted in quite a different sense. In his opinion they make it possible to envisage man's morality as one of the ways in which he becomes adapted to his environment, and thus able to take part in evolutionary progress. This thesis was originally advanced in *Nature*, and the second portion of the book contains the comments on it which were made in

that journal by many eminent scientists, philosophers and Churchmen. The final sections of the book contain more extended discussions between Dr. Waddington and various experts on the particular fields to which he had referred. Among the contributors to these later sections are the Bishop of Birmingham, the Dean of St. Paul's, Professors de Burgh, Fleure, Ritchie, Huxley, Haldane, Joad, Dingle and Bernal, with Drs. Needham, Darlington, Stephen, Miss Melanie Klein and several others.

A Companion to the Communion Service. By W. Robinson. (Oxford University Press. 2s. 6d.)

That is, as the title suggests, a small book of prayers and practical devotional hints for those about to partake or to lead in the Service of Holy Communion. The author lays emphasis on the (frustrated) desire of the Reformers to make this sacrament the main service of every Sunday and offers a suggested order in which 'the structure only of the service is fixed and not the precise words'. In the introduction Dr. Nathaniel Micklem pleads for a renewed valuation of the Sacrament of Holy Communion in the Free Churches, and an appendix contains extracts to show the importance of this sacrament in the Reformed tradition. The book is valuable not in what it achieves, but in what it suggests might be achieved.

Studies in History and Religion. (Lutterworth Press. 21s.)

This is an unusual book with an interesting story behind it. All save one of the fourteen essays comprising the volume were written by former pupils of the Rev. H. Wheeler Robinson, M.A., D.D., and were presented to him on the occasion of his seventieth birthday. The one exception is the Rev. A. J. D. Farrer, B.A., who was Dr. Wheeler Robinson's colleague for twenty years. Each contributor is a well-known theologian.

No attempt was made to secure a unifying theme. Each writer offered a treatment of some subject congenial to him. The range of subjects covered may be taken as some indication of the variety of Dr. Wheeler Robinson's interests and the inspiration he has given in many different fields.

A photograph of the fine portrait of Dr. Robinson painted in 1941 by Mr. James Gunn makes an excellent frontispiece and will be valued by all friends of the Doctor.

We understand that Lutterworth Press will be pleased to send a prospectus of the book to any reader who cares to write to them at Doran Court, Reigate Road, Redhill, Surrey.

FORTHCOMING BOOKS

A new book, *The Turning Tide*, by Major-General Tollemache, designed to give the public an idea of the new type of soldier and war machine which has emerged from the British Army's initial disasters, will be published by John Murray and the Pilot Press Ltd., at the end of February. It is generously illustrated with thirty-two pages of photographs.

Mrs. Norris is far too wise an observer of life to bestow on her sweet but inexperienced heroine the legendary first-love which lasts, flawless, until death. Her new novel, *Dina Cashman*, which will be published by John Murray at the beginning of March, is not less romantic because it is human.

Karma and Rebirth, an addition to the Wisdom of the East Series, by T. Christmas Humphreys, will be published by John Murray on February 11th. Karma, the law of cause-effect, of nature's retribution for lost harmony, and rebirth from which it is inseparable, is too old a doctrine and too widely held to be the property of any one religion. It is fundamental in all Oriental philosophy and was preached by St. Paul.

Henceforth. By H. A. Evan Hopkins, M.A. (The Inter-Varsity Fellowship. 1s. 6d.)

Evan Hopkins wrote this book in response to a request for a guide for new converts. He has admirably answered the need. *Henceforth* can be recommended to the young Christian with absolute confidence, and especially if he or she is receiving 'higher education'. To such persons the Inter-Varsity publications are particularly addressed.

Science and the Spiritual. By T. E. Jessop. (Sheldon Press. 1s. 6d.)

The latest of the Christian News-Letter Books is by Professor T. E. Jessop, and confirms the purpose of the series, 'An attempt to understand the principles at stake and the policies which must be pursued in a changing society'. This book consists of four lectures given at the University College of Wales at the invitation of the Faculty of Theology. They are concerned with the study, the peculiarity, the validity and the metaphysic of ideals. The author traces the collapse of our old stabilities to the outstripping of human insight by natural knowledge, and urges a balance between grasp of fact and grasp of values. This is possible by the study of ideals which draw from above rather than a concern for instincts which push from below. The validity of ideals rests on the fact that they change animal mind into human spirit and they are the condition of the continuance on the distinctively human plane. The acceptance of ideals commits us to definite tasks and the philosophy of the ideal provides a rational structure to which the insight of religious experience can be fitted. The author states his case clearly and challenges his readers to interpret the ideal in life.

Wedding. By Sir Francis Younghusband. (John Murray. 2s.)

The publication of the startling figures of the birthrate recently given by Dr. Enid Smith give point to the study which Sir Francis Younghusband has made in his book *Wedding*. The subject of marriage has too long been a matter of whispering and vulgarity and this timely volume discusses the subject both from the spiritual and physiological sides. It is a book that should be read by every educated young person who contemplates marriage. There is a frankness in its pages which is sorely needed and there is a mystic element which lifts life into high fellowship. It is interesting to note that the author's long stay in India has so influenced his mind that the presentation of his claims is set in Indian thought terms. The ideal wedded state is shown winsomely and the history and pangs of marriage are clearly outlined. The home here pictured would be the cell of a new world order that would make the world anew and establish love as the highest goal of life.

Periodical Literature

BRITISH

The International Review of Missions (January, 1943). — The Survey of the year 1942 presented in the January number of the *International Review of Missions* contains the record of the Church at work on the background of a war which is now world-wide. Though it forms a record of suffering, of further loss of contact between home base and field and of the jeopardizing of much achievement, it tells a heartening tale of initiative in crisis, of courage and devotion on the part of indigenous leaders, and of mutual care and co-operation. The enforced departure of foreign missionaries from Japan and from much of the Japanese-occupied territory has afforded an

opportunity for a suggestive study of the strength and potentialities of the native churches. In India, amid conditions of political dissension (which are keenly analysed), the Church is seen to be progressively and constructively at work. Africa, under the ever-growing impact of war conditions and commitments, shows unmistakable growth in initiative and responsibility on the part of the churches. A survey of other parts of the world — Latin America, the Pacific Area, the Near East, the lands of the 'older churches' — reveals the Christian mission boldly responding to the challenge of circumstances which are as difficult as they are diverse. A poignant and disturbing section on the Jews describes the peak of adversity to which their suffering has attained in the course of the year and the growing concern of Christian agencies.

Other notable contributions are an article by an outstanding Christian leader of the Netherlands, Dr. Hendrik Kraemer, who, in 'The Riddle of History: Thoughts on Romans IX-XI', writes from the heart of the battle against anti-Semitism in his country and brings home once more the Christian responsibility for the Jew; and a study by the Rev. Robert M. Clark, of the United Church of Canada, on 'Theological Categories in the Indian Church', an important contribution to the discussion on the adaptation of thought forms in the translation of the terms of Christian doctrine into the various languages.

Reviewers include Dr. H. H. Farmer (on *Revelation and Reunion*, by G. W. Broomfield, and *The Nature of Catholicity*, by Daniel Jenkins); the Rev. J. W. C. Dougall (on recent books dealing with Africa and the Issues of the War); the Rev. J. W. Burton (on *The South Seas in the Modern World*, by Felix M. Keesing); and Sir Hubert Young (on some 'Rhodes-Livingstone Papers', a series dealing with problems of Northern Rhodesia).

The Hibbert Journal (October, 1942). — This is an impressive issue in relation to the present war-time thought. It opens with a brilliant article by the Editor, in which he presses home his own anxiety about the necessity of a new mind now, if there is to be a new and better world after the war. The four following articles all deal with some aspect of this vital matter. Then, Edward W. Hirst writes interestingly on 'The Golden Rule versus the Rights of Man'. Norman Bentwich writes on 'American Peace Programmes'. There is an important article by E. L. Allen on 'Religion in a Controlled Society', in which he says: 'Perhaps it will be wisest to assume that even the greatest war in history will not have shaken our people out of their habit of evading ultimate issues. As far as the Churches are concerned a more radical Christianity is in the air, the most eager and determined groups in the Churches are those which want to give free witness to a doctrine and an ethical standard beyond anything which the State can possibly be expected to bless. What attitude is one to take up to a State which is ready to patronize what will seem to many an emasculated version of Christianity? The Church must send out men and women of knowledge, faith and love, into the planned society of the future: that is the greatest thing she can do.' There is a scathing discussion of the proposals for the Church of England, contained in a book called *Putting Our House in Order*. This is one of the hottest pieces of writing seen in print for some time. W. F. Lofthouse continues a subject very much alive to-day: 'Retribution and Reformation'. The past is brought to life in a sympathetic article by Anne Holt, on William Ellery Channing, which recalls his death a century ago. There is a pointed though brief consideration, by W. J. Sparrow Simpson, of that delightful writer with a strange mysticism, Sir Francis Younghusband, to whom it seemed to make little difference whether God exists or not. Other articles and reviews complete a feast capable of satisfying any mental strength.

AMERICAN

The Yale Review (Autumn, 1942) has three articles of international interest and several others of significance to the New World among which are those on 'Unity and American Leadership', 'Labour in War-Time' and 'In Mexico'. The three of widest concern are those on 'Germany's Role in Post-War Reconstruction' by V. M. Dean, 'Are the People Right?' by A. G. Keller, and 'Education and World Conflict' by C. A. Dykstra. Of these the first is supreme. In it the Director of Research for the Foreign Policy Association, Vera M. Dean, has outlined the right policy for the relations between the United Nations and Germany in the Post-War World. This essay will not be palatable at the moment, but time and reflection will prove its wisdom. In a time when we hear so much of what we shall *do* to the Germans if we win the war, and what we shall *do for* them if they lose it, we ought to consider what the Germans should contribute to the common endeavour of making Europe a liveable continent not only for them but also for other people. Literary articles include a charming study of 'An American Child in France' by Anne Green, and 'A Word for the Essayist' by James N. Hall. Stories and verse, with an expert survey of new American books, add much to this valuable quarterly.

Studies in Philology (October, 1942). — The first article in this issue is a very learned and very technical study by Anna G. Hatcher of the tense-usage in the *Chanson de Roland*. It should be invaluable to students of the original text. E. H. Duncan contributes a thorough investigation of the alchemy in Ben Jonson's masque *Mercury Vindicated*, full of curious research. The next article deals with the criticisms of Dr. Johnson and Dr. Hugh Blair on Addison's prose style, but one fails to see why any one should pay a moment's regard at this time of day to any judgement of a pretentious pedant like Blair. There are two articles dealing with Walter Savage Landor — one by Karl G. Pfeiffer on Landor's critique of *The Cenci*, and the other by Doris E. Peterson on Cervantes' *Numantia* as a probable source of *Metellus* and *Marius* in the *Imaginary Conversations*. Frederick L. Jones writes on Shelley's indebtedness to Spenser, and Robert Warnock contributes a remarkably interesting article on 'Boswell on the Grand Tour', based on papers that have recently come to light at Malahide Castle. The last article (in French) is a careful and suggestive discussion by H. A. Hatzfeld of naturalism in modern French literature.

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